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Abstract
The collection of three essays study how political factors can shape economic outcomes, with
a particular regard to developing countries. My exploration in this direction begins with the
government-firm connections and extends to the cause and prevention of internal armed con-
flicts.
The first chapter examines the reciprocal relationship between governments and firms. The
rent-seeking behavior of politically connected firms and its associated costs have long been
recognized by economists. The existing literature has mainly focused on the favors that firms
receive, but much less attentions has been paid to what politicians gain in return. In my
first chapter, titled ”Can Governments Harvest Connections with Firms? Evidence
from China,” I provide evidence on the reverse - firms providing favors to governments in a
reciprocal relationship - exploiting a natural experiment in China. In October 2001, the tax
revenue sharing rule between central and local governments was unexpectedly reformed: the
higher the local tax revenue in 2001, the higher the share that local governments would get
post-2001. From a newly collected dataset, I find that before the reform the governments that
granted more favors to firms - access to credit and tax deductions - were able to mobilize more
assistance from firms in order to raise the tax revenue in 2001. Furthermore, this reciprocation
is not an institutional relationship, but hinges on a repeated interaction between firms and local
leaders. Exploring the variation in leadership turnover, I find that firms who had previously
received government favors provided no assistance to leaders who would soon leave office. These
results are consistent with a theory of reciprocal relationships between governments and firms.
My findings not only suggest that governments and firms can form dynamic relationships to
exchange favors intertemporally, but also shed light on the government-business relationship in
China.
The last two chapters focus on political violence, which has commonly been regarded as among
the first-order issues in developing countries. The second chapter examines whether the en-
dowment of natural resources might lead to internal armed conflict. To examine this question,
we ideally require exogenous variation in resource windfalls. This is a challenging task as the
quantity of natural resources extracted is a choice and oil prices may be affected by violent
conflict. To address this issue, in a published paper co-authored with Guy Michaels at the
London School of Economics, titled ”Do giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal armed
conflicts?,” we use new data to examine the effects of giant oilfield discoveries around the
world since 1946. We show that the timing of giant oilfield discoveries is plausibly exogenous.
We find that on average these discoveries increase per capita oil production and oil exports
by up to 50 percent. But these giant oilfield discoveries also have a dark side: they increase
the incidence of internal armed conflict by about 5-8 percentage points. This increased inci-
dence of conflict due to giant oilfield discoveries is especially high for countries that had already
experienced armed conflicts or coups in the decade prior to discovery.
In the last chapter, I focus on the prevention of internal armed conflict. In order to lessen the
likelihood of conflict, one important precaution is to ensure that military resources do not fall
into the hands of non-state groups. Observing the recent conflicts in the Middle East, and, in
particular, the issue of wide spread of military resources well beyond governments control, one
main contributing feature is that governments sponsor weapons to non-state agents (militias)
to fight the states enemies, but after the war ends these weapons cannot be called back. In
my third chapter, titled ”Proxy Warriors: A Theory of Military Assistance”, I develop
a theory to study government’s optimal strategy in sponsoring weapons to militias. Although
giving militias more weapons may win the war more quickly, it puts more weapons into the
hands of militias afterwards. Militias learn that they can benefit from holding more weapons
when hostilities end. This incentivizes the militias to fight strategically in order to maximize
their subsequent stock of weapons. Given this governmental dilemma, in a dynamic setting I
rationalize a supply strategy featured with a stopgap proposed by the US security forces.
Acknowledgements
The completion of this thesis won’t happen without the guidance of Professor Gerard Padro-
i-Miquel. I am more than grateful for his feedback and encouragement throughout the Ph.D.
period, which has contributed to my work enormously. I would also like to thank Professor
Guy Michaels for his continuous support and attention to my academic as well as personal life.
Their guidance has taught me valuable lessons over the course of these years. I would also like
to give special thanks to Professor Robin Burgess, Ronny Razin, Alwyn Young who have given
their helps at the very last stage of my Ph.D. studies.
I would like to thank to my parents, my sister and brother-in-law, for their self-less support
to my academic pursue throughout these years. I am also more than grateful to Pei Gao for
her love and belief in me. She needlessly learned and contributed to my thesis. This work is
a product of hers as well as it is to mine. Her family’s encouragement has also contributed to
the completion of this thesis.
Having a group of very good friends is essential to go through all these years. I thank Michael
Amior, Diego Battiston, Shiyu Bo, Shawn Chen, Rui Costa, Vicky Fan, Andy Feng, Georg
Graetz, Hanwei Huang, Kilian Huber, Felix Koenig, Monica Langella, Yatang Lin, Stephan
Maurer, John Morrow, Maria Molina-Domene, Frank Pisch, Ferdinand Rauch, Katalin Sze-
meredi, Eddy Tam, Giulia Zane, and many others.
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the London School of Economics.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my grandparents. They have taught me to form
a strong sense of purpose which leads me to the path of becoming an economist.
Table of Contents
Declaration………………………………………..………………………………….……..………2 
Abstract……………………………………………..……………………………………………….3 
Acknowledgements…………………………………..…………………………………………….5 
Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………………….6 
1 Can Governments Harvest Connections with Firms? Evidence from China………………8
1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..9
1.2 Institutional Background…………………………………………………..…………16
1.2.1 The Chinese Tax-sharing Reform in 2001…………………..…………..17
1.2.2 Political Institution………………………………………………………….19
1.2.3 Proxies for Government-Firm Relationship..…………………………….21
1.3 Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………22
1.3.1 A Reciprocal Relationship as an Equilibrium……………………………25
1.4 Data on Fiscal, Economic, and Political Variables………………………………27
1.4.1 Corporate Income Tax and Other Fiscal Data………………….……….28
1.4.2 Data on Ownership, Size, Debt Leverage and EffectiveTax Rate……30
1.4.3 Data on Local Political Leaders…………………………………………34
1.5 Empirical Analysis…………………………………………………………………..35
1.5.1 Empirical Specification………………………………….……..…………..36 
1.5.2 Assistance from Favored Firms: Credit Access……….………………..36
1.5.3 Assistance from Favored Firms: Tax Deduction………………………..38
1.5.4 Robustness Checks………………………………………………………..39
1.6 Dynamics of Reciprocity………………………………………..……………………43 
1.6.1 Robustness Checks……………………………………….……………….45
1.6.2 Previous Favored Firms under New Leaderships……….……………47
1.7 Discussion: the government-rm relationship in China……………………………49 
1.8 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..….……..50
1.9 References .…………………………….…………………………………………….52 
1.A Reciprocal Relationship Without Past……………………………………………57
1.B Which Leader Matters………………………………………………………….……58 
1.C Figures……………………………………………………………………..………….61
1.D Tables…………………………………………………………….……………………72
1.E Data Sources…………………………………………………………………………78 
2 Do giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal armed conflicts?..............................................94
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………95
2.2 Related Literature….…………………………………………………………………99 
2.3 A model of conflict for resources…………………………………………………102
2.4 Data on oil, conflicts, and economic outcomes………………………………….106
2.4.1 Data on oil discovery and production…………………………………..106
2.4.2 Data on economic outcomes…………………………………………….109
2.4.3 Data on political violence……………………………………………….110
2.5 Results………………………………………………………………………………..112
2.5.1 Baseline specifications and results……………………………………..112
2.5.2 Robustness of our main results…………………………………………116
2.5.3 Additional results………………………………………………………….124
2.6 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………….126
2.7 References…………………………………………………………………………..127 
2.8 Figures…..….………………………………………………………………………..133 
2.9 Tables……….………………………………………………………………………..136 
3 Proxy Warriors: A Theory of Military Assistance………………..………………….………151
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..152
3.2 Model…………………………………………………………………………………156
3.3.1 Setup…………………………………………………………..…………..156 
3.3.2 Equilibrium Definition…………………………………………………….157
3.3.3 Supply with Temporary Stopgaps…………………..…………………..158
3.3 Government without Commitment……………………………..….………………159
3.4 Government with Commitment………………………………………………….…160
3.5 Characterizing The Equilibria……………………………………………..….……162
3.5.1 The Militia's Effort Choices………………………………………..…….162
3.5.2 The Losses when Weapons are Left beyond Government Control…169
3.6 Rationalizing The Stopgap Strategy……………………………………………..169
3.7 Comparative Statics………………………………………………………..………171
3.7.1 The Militia's Characteristics……………………………………………..171
3.7.2 The Weapon's Depreciation……………………………………………..172
3.9 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………….172
3.10 References…………………………………………………………………………173
3.A Proofs…………………………………………………………………………..…… 176
Chapter 1:
Can Governments Harvest Connections with
Firms? Evidence from China
Yu-Hsiang Lei
It is well-known that governments sometimes favor connected firms. This pa-
per provides evidence on the reverse - firms providing favors to governments
in a reciprocal relationship - exploiting a natural experiment from China. In
October 2001, the tax revenue sharing rule between central and local govern-
ments was unexpectedly reformed: the higher the local tax revenue in 2001,
the higher the share that local governments would get post-2001. From a
newly collected dataset, I find that before the reform the governments that
granted more favors to firms - access to credit and tax deductions - were able
to mobilize more assistance from firms in order to raise the tax revenue in
2001. Furthermore, this reciprocation is not an institutional relationship, but
hinges on a repeated interaction between firms and local leaders. Exploring
the variation in leadership turnover, I find that firms who had previously re-
ceived government favors provided no assistance to leaders who would soon
leave office. These results are consistent with a theory of reciprocal rela-
tionships between governments and firms. My findings not only suggest that
governments and firms can form dynamic relationships to exchange favors
intertemporally, but also shed light on the government-business relationship
in China.
1 Introduction
The rent-seeking behavior of politically connected firms and its associated
costs have long been recognized by economists. Firms’ rents are often gener-
ated through preferential treatment by governments, such as, better access to
credit or lighter taxation (Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Dinc¸
(2005), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Chen (2015)).1
The existing literature has mainly focused on the favors that firms receive,
but much less attentions has been given to what politicians gain in return.
Beyond personal rents, such as corruption, there are also other forms of re-
turns. For example, when governments are in need, firms that have received
preferential treatments can take actions to help achieve certain policy ob-
jectives. The literature on developmental states shows that the assistance
from firms to governments is widely observed in developing countries, includ-
ing industrial development, increasing business investment, the absorption of
unemployment and so on. (Evans (1995) and Woo-Cumings (1999)).
This study focuses on what governments get from firms. In the process,
it shows that the government-firm relationship is dynamic and reciprocal.
In other words, their reciprocal relationship is sustained by the future value
of the relationship. Using a unique reform in China which enables me to
quantify the value of firms’ assistance to governments, I examine the question:
do governments gain from firms’ assistance through a reciprocal relationship?
To examine how governments can mobilize the informal assistance of firms
is a challenging task. Not only are these returns being hard to observe and
quantify, but also it is equally challenging to assess whether governments
have any incentive to seek this assistance. Therefore, to test this question,
ideally, I would focus on governments that share similar political institutions
1Furthermore, these rents are highly likely to cause efficiency loss and other social cost; for example, the
efficiency losses of channeling business to less productive firms (Cingano and Pinotti (2013) and Amore and
Bennedsen (2013)) and other social costs, such as workplace safety (Fisman and Wang (2015),Jia and Nie
(2015)
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and face a common shock that requires governments to seek assistance from
firms. A tax-sharing reform in 2001 between central and local governments
in China provides a unique set-up to examine this subject. First, the reform
incentivized local governments to raise tax revenue, a quantifiable response
that allows me to compare one with another, and its design leaves room
for assistance from firms. Second, the reform was announced unexpectedly,
which allows me to explore the pre-existing connections between governments
and firms. Finally, exploring the variation within a country helps me to hold
the underlying political institutions constant.
The central-local tax-sharing reform in question was announced in Octo-
ber 2001 by the central government, which specified that from 2002 local
governments were required to share their corporate income tax with the cen-
tral government.2 In order to avoid a negative shock to local fiscal budgets,
the 2001 local corporate income tax was designed as a benchmark — no
local governments will ever receive less corporate income tax revenue than
the revenue collected in 2001. That is, the higher the 2001 tax revenue, the
more tax could be retained at the local level in future years. This design
incentivized local governments to raise the benchmark (the 2001 corporate
income tax revenue) during the 2-month window period after the announce-
ment.3 In both November and December 2001, abnormal tax growth was
widely observed among local governments.4
How was this jump in revenue attained? One important issue to note is
2Here, the term ‘local governments’ means all non-central governments, including provincial, prefectural
and county governments. My focus in this paper is county governments where most of the variation is coming
from.
3Two incentives for local governments to raise benchmarks are discussed in the section of institutional
background and here is the summary: first, the fiscal revenue is a main resource for local economic devel-
opment, a dimension in which local governments are made to compete against each other for their leaders’
career advancement; second, county leaders need to show that they are aligned with those in the prefectural
or provincial governments who all intend to keep tax at the local level and also evaluate the county leaders’
performance.
4A government paper published on January 1st, 2002 stated that corporate income tax increased na-
tionwide by 139.4% for November and 187.1% for December, compared with the tax revenue for the same
months in 2000.
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that tax revenue needs to be remitted to the Treasury before being redis-
tributed back to local governments. Therefore, the increase in tax revenue
could not simply be a fake number. After careful auditing work done by cen-
tral government, a government paper explicitly stated that local governments
raised the 2001 tax revenue through two channels: (1) relabeling other tax
revenues and (2) financing with the assistance of firms. In this paper, I first
measure firms’ assistance and then explore the determinants that explain the
variation in firms’ assistance.
In order to assist local governments, firms bear the cost of generating a
large cash flow in a short time, as well as the risk of being punished by
the central government. Given the risks and urgency, we hypothesize that
governments are most likely to reach for assistance from firms which they
have favored in the past. To test this, I trace the governmental favors to
local firms before the reform and then to explore whether governments that
granted favors to firms can mobilize firms’ assistance in raising the 2001 tax
revenue.
The first empirical challenge is to quantify the level of firms’ assistance in
raising the 2001 tax revenue. In order to do so, I assemble a panel dataset of
the corporate income tax revenues between 1998 and 2003 from nearly 500
county governments from various provincial, prefectural and county fiscal or
tax yearbooks. On average, the 2001 corporate income tax nearly doubled
what it would have been if it had maintained its time trend. However, a great
variation was found between county governments, reaching in some instances
about 30 times the counterfactual.5
The next empirical challenge is to measure the governments’ favors towards
local firms. Guided by the literature, I focus on two of the most common
favors that governments grant to firms in the Chinese context: access to
credit and tax deductions. First, preferential access to credit is an impor-
5Aba county in Sichuan had the highest response in my sample, reaching almost 30 times what it should
have been if it had stayed on its own trend.
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tant favor from local governments. This is because all banks in China are
state-owned and capital mobility across regions is low, therefore it gives local
governments great influence over all decisions to grant loans. Furthermore,
many evidences have pointed out that how loans commonly discriminate in
favor of state-related firms (Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005), Li, Meng, Wang
and Zhou (2008), Firth, Lin, Liu and Wong (2009)). In addition, others dis-
cuss how private firms rely significantly less on loans and more on retained
earnings and private lending (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), Dollar and Wei
(2007), Riedel and Gao (2007)). Given the data limitation I use total liability
normalized by assets, called debt leverage, to proxy for access to credit. Since
the composition of the liability for state-related firms is more likely to be fa-
vored loans from the governments, I use debt leverage to proxy a government
favor to state-related firms.6
The second favor that I consider is preferential corporate income tax de-
duction. Chinese corporate income tax codes for domestic firms are identical
nationwide. But, given its complex nature, the tax code is often manipulated
by local governments, which offer tax deductions. Bai, Hsieh and (2014)
offers a lively example and discussion. Accordingly, the effective tax rate, de-
fined as the corporate income tax paid divided by the firms’ reported tax base,
is adopted as a proxy for tax deductions. The tax deduction is a sensitive
favor for private firms, but it is not so much sensitive for state-related firms
because both of their tax and revenue are part of local governments’ fiscal
budgets. To summarize, I have two measures for favors: (1) debt-leverage of
state-related firms and (2) effective tax rate of private firms. Both measures
for favors are constructed using data from China’s Annual Surveys of Indus-
trial Production and taking the average for 1999 to 2000, the years before
the reform, to represent previous government favors to firms.
6State-related firms are defined to include both state-owned enterprises and collectively-owned enterprises
which are owned by the rural community but under tight political controls. The firms’ classification is
discussed in detail in section 4.2.
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I take the measure of firms’ assistance to examine whether the governments
that granted more favors to firms before the reform - access to credit and
tax deductions - were able to mobilize more assistance from firms in order
to raise the tax revenue in 2001. In a cross-sectional setup, I found that
in counties where state-related firms had greater access to credit, county
governments can mobilize more assistance from them in raising the 2001
benchmark. The estimated effect is large and statistically significant. A one
standard deviation increase in the credit access measure of state-related firms
leads to a 0.2 standard deviation increase in the measure for firms’ assistance.
I find no similar effect for private firms.7 The results remain robust after
controlling for the sales share of the state-related firms in local economy
and other firm characteristics, including turnover ratio (firms’ capacity to
translate assets into sales income), profitability (a proxy for productivity)
and local industrial composition. Turning to the second favor, tax deduction,
similar results emerge. I find that in counties where private firms enjoyed
greater tax deductions, county governments can mobilize more assistance
from them in raising the 2001 benchmark. Moreover, no similar effect for
state-related firms is found and the results remain robust after controlling for
the share of private firms as well as other firm characteristics.
After showing that the governments can acquire more assistance from firms
that received more favors in the past, I move on to examine whether this
informal relationship is a personal or institutional one. To do so, I assem-
ble another dataset comprising all county-level leadership turnover from all
provincial and prefectural yearbooks between 1994 and 2008. This allows
me to trace the year in which leaders take office and also the year in which
they leave. Different from previous studies, such as Chen and Kung (2016),
in which only the county party secretary is recorded, I also trace the county
mayor who is directly responsible for local governance affairs, including man-
7As an important counterfactual, I show that the same measure of central-state-owned firms, which do
not rely on local government favors, has no effect.
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aging local fiscal planning. I find that when government leaders were soon
to leave office in a few months, the firms that had previously received favors
did not assist the government in raising the 2001 benchmark. This result
confirms that this informal reciprocity between governments and firms is in-
deed a personal relationship. This finding is not because leaders lacked the
incentive to respond, since county leaders need to show that they are aligned
with those in the prefectural or provincial governments who all intend to
keep tax at the local level and also evaluate the county leaders’ performance.
This is confirmed since leaving leaders are still found to relabel other taxes to
finance their responses in the benchmark. In addition, I use leaders’ tenure
at the end of a term to proxy the likelihood of their leaving to show that
the results for leaving leaders are not driven by reverse causality, i.e. leaders’
leaving as a consequence of their responses to the reform. Finally, I find that
firms that previously enjoyed greater favors from previous government are
also more likely to take the initiative to assist new leaders in order to build
up a new reciprocal relationship to gain future government favors.
To interpret the full set of results, I present a simple model of the recip-
rocal relationships between governments and firms in an infinite horizon. In
my model, both governments and firms are forward-looking and they choose
whether to exchange favors with each other. To align with the empirics,
governments now request for favors from firms. Firms then need to decide
whether to offer favors in exchange for future gain from reciprocity or not to
offer favors and be punished by losing the reciprocal relationship with gov-
ernments. The model suggests that if firms have previously received favors
from governments, then a reciprocal relationship between governments and
firms exists. In this case, firms would choose to return favors to governments.
Furthermore, in a stationary environment the firms that have received more
favors from governments previously would be the ones that also expect a
higher value from future reciprocity. As a result, these firms are likely to
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offer more favors to governments. Two predictions arise from the model:
(1) that governments can mobilize more firms’ assistance if firms have in the
past received more favors from them. (2) when the probability of government
turnover is high, previously favored firms do not return favors to governments
since the current official will not be there in the future to return them.8
Literature review
The findings of this paper contribute to the literature on political connec-
tion by extending the discussion to include the perspective of governments or
politicians. Due to its secrecy in nature we know very little about how much
and what are the prices paid by the firms in exchange for benefits. These
payments can be in simple forms of cash transfer that accrue to personal
gain, such as corruption, but it can also be in forms to support connected
politicians, such as through campaign contributions to provide electoral ad-
vantage (Sukhtankar (2012)) or through expanding employment to garner
votes (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar (2006), Cole (2009), Dinc¸
(2005)). The findings of this paper add to this small literature suggesting
that the forms of payment do not have to be monetary but rather it can be
all sorts of costly actions to meet governments’ demand. Furthermore, this is
the first study to provide the evidence in showing that the two-way reciprocal
relationship can also exist in an authoritarian regime.
The findings of the informal and dynamic interaction between governments
and firms also contribute to the empirical literature of informal relational
contracts (see Gil and Zanarone (2016)). In particular, the breakdown of
reciprocity due to leaders’ leaving suggests that this informal contract is a
long-term relationship that is enforced by anticipating future gain from stay-
ing in the reciprocity. There are a few empirical literatures that study the
informal contracts between firms in the developing country context (Mac-
8I extend the theoretical framework in appendix A to understand firms’ choice to assist local governments
when leaders just arrived in office without pre-existing relationships with firms. It predicts that firms
that relies more favors from governments would still assist new leaders in order to enter a new reciprocal
relationship.
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chiavello and Morjaria (2015), Banerjee and Duflo (2000), McMillan and
Woodruff (1999)). This paper contributes to this growing literature in devel-
opment and shows that the same informal relationship can also run between
governments and firms.
Finally, this paper is related to the vast literature on fiscal federalism.
While most studies (see Oates (1999)) focus on the benefits and the costs
associated with decentralizing fiscal authorities. This paper depicts the po-
litical struggle between central and local governments when a recentralization
needs to be reformed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the institutional background to the central-local government tax-sharing re-
form, local government institutions and government favors to local firms.
Section 3 provides a simple theoretical framework to organize the empirical
results. In Section 4 I provide details of the data set and variable construc-
tion. In Section 5 I present the baseline empirical results and robustness
checks. In Section 6 the heterogeneous effects of local leadership turnover is
presented. In Section 7 I discuss how the findings can help us understand the
government-business relationship in China and in section 7 I draw conclusions
and policy implications.
2 Institutional Background
In this section, I begin by discussing the 2001 Chinese central-local tax-
sharing reform (subsection 2.1). This is followed by introducing the under-
lying political institution (subsection 2.2), and lastly I discuss local govern-
ments’ favors that go to firms (subsection 2.3).
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2.1 The 2001 Central-local Govn’t Tax-sharing Reform
Corporate income tax was an important local government fiscal resource
before 2002. The tax rate is 33% on profit income and local governments
do not have the authority to alternate the tax rate. All corporate income
tax had been retained to local governments as a major fiscal resource, which
accounted for about 11% of the local tax revenue in 2000, with a 25% annual
growth rate.
In October 2001, central government unexpectedly announced a nation-
wide reform to partially centralise income tax in order to develop the Western
part of China. It states that from 2002 corporate income tax would be shared
between central and local governments.9 The central-local sharing ratio be-
gan at 50:50 in 2002 and changed to 60:40 from 2003 onwards.10 To avoid
a negative shock to local fiscal budgets, the 2001 tax revenue was designed
to be a benchmark. Such that whenever the share that stayed at the local
fell below the benchmark, the central government would refund to local gov-
ernments the difference between the benchmark and the local shares. That
is, the higher is the 2001 tax revenue, the more tax would remain at the
local level post-2001. This specific design incentivized local governments to
increase the 2001 tax revenue in November and December of 2001 right af-
ter the announcement of the policy. The local governments’ responses to the
reform was illustrated in a government paper published on January 1, 2002.11
“After the announcement of the 2002 corporate income tax sharing reform
in October this year, local corporate income tax had an abnormal growth
. . . tax revenue of November 2001 increased by 139.4% compared with the
same time last year . . . and 187.1% for the first half of December. . . Areas
9The term ”local governments” here refers to all non-central government bodies, including provincial,
prefectural and county governments (see Figure 11)
10The way in which the fiscal revenue-sharing system works can be found in the Han and Kung (2015).
11The same reform also applies to personal income tax with a similar reaction from local governments but
smaller in extent. In this study I focus on the corporate income tax.
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with more than 100% growth during mid-December are as follows: Jiangxi
increased by 816%, Ningbo city increased by 708.7%, Henan increased by
609%... Do not raise the benchmark purposely. . . ”
Due to the extreme responses from local governments, the central govern-
ment abandoned the 2001 benchmark. This was replaced by a function of
the corporate income tax revenue in year 2000. Using annual corporate in-
come tax from about 500 county governments and including GDP per capita
as controls, in Figure 1 I plot the estimates of year dummies from 1998 to
2003. It clearly shows that the 2001 estimate deviates from the time trend.
However, there is no associated increase in local economic activities. This is
shown in Figure 2.A in which the total value-added tax (VAT) in 2001 has
no associated deviation, nor the local firms’ aggregate sales income, shown
in Figure 2.B. This confirms that the abnormal deviation in 2001 corporate
income taxes is indeed a response to the tax-sharing reform.
An important issue to note is that all the tax revenue needs to be remitted
to Treasury before being redistributed back to local governments. Therefore,
local governments cannot simply fake the number. In fact, the central govern-
ment sent auditors to check these local governments’ abnormal responses.12
They find out how local governments raised the tax revenue mainly through
two channels which are stated in the same government paper: (1) relabeling
tax revenue and (2) financing from firms’ assistance. The first channel does
not need the assistance of firms but simply relabeling other tax revenue as
corporate income tax.13 However, operations through the second channels
require assistance from firms. The logic behind the scene can be best de-
scribed as follows: in any other normal times, shown in Figure 3.A, firms
12Some local governments were fined for having raised tax revenues on purpose. Their fine was recorded
in the provincial aggregates published in the 2002 National Tax Yearbook.
13Despite that it is a simple accounting exercise for governments, it can be very costly since this doing can
easily be detected by the central government. Therefore, as I will show later in the empirical section it only
explains about 18% of the rise in the benchmark and possibly leaders utilize this channel more only when
firms are less willing to assist.
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pay tax to local governments and the revenue is then remitted to Treasury
before being redistributed back to the governments. However, in November
and December 2001 as shown in Figure 3.B, firms paid tax and also other
transfers. The money was again remitted to Treasury and then came back to
the governments. Governments kept the tax and returned the extra money
back to the firms. As shown in Figure 4, using firm survey data I find a
consistent evidence that firms were not paying abnormally high corporate
income tax in 2001. In sum, these patterns suggest that no real tax is being
paid but simply move money around and relabel them as corporate income
tax.
2.2 Political Institution
2.2.1 Using County as the Unit of Analysis
In this study, I use county governments as my unit of analysis for the
following reasons: First, there is a great variation in how much the 2001
benchmarks are raised among county governments. Second, this is the lowest
level of administration, therefore firms located in the county have to deal
directly with this level of government.14 Finally, I use firm location to match
which governments firms deal with the most. However, this does not apply to
firms registered under district governments because they are likely to operate
in another district within the same prefecture. Furthermore, firms located
in the district should value their relationship more with the prefectural gov-
ernments, rather than with the district governments. This makes the county
and district governments incompatible in many ways. Therefore, I only focus
on county governments in this study. In the next, I discuss the governments’
leadership and the sources of leaders’ incentives to remain the tax at local.
14The governmental hierarchy is shown in Figure 11.
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2.2.2 Government Leadership
Governments throughout the political hierarchy in China are running a
dual-leadership system. In counties, the county mayor is the de jure leader
and responsible for all governance affairs while the county party secretary
leads the county to obey the Communist Party rule. There are no explicit
rules on how their responsibilities should be distributed. In practice, the
party secretary should be the de facto leader since the position enjoys a higher
rank within the Party. Given the ambiguity in their roles in the government,
when I examine the heterogeneous effects of leadership turnover, I take into
account both county mayor and county party secretary. Another reason for
this innovation is because when the party secretary leave the office, it is likely
to promote county mayor to take over the party secretary position. In this
case, there will be a continuity in the government leadership.
Regarding local leaders’ turnover, both mayor and party secretary have a
de jure term which is fixed for 5 years but their de facto terms are determined
by bureaucratic assignments. Based on my constructed turnover data, their
terms on average is about 4 years and more than 80% of them leave the office
within 5 years with a peak around 4 to 5 years.
2.2.3 Promotion As An Incentive Driver
Both leaders of county governments who manage to show competence in
developing local economies are rewarded by promotion within the hierarchical
political system. This is done by making local government leaders compete
against each other for career advancement; for example, county leaders com-
pete against each other for promotion in entering prefectural government.
This jurisdictional yardstick competition has long been recognized, as in
Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000) and Xu (2011), and is supported by empiri-
cal evidence, such as Chen (2015), Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim (2015), and Li
and Zhou (2005). It is this urge to develop economically which incentivizes
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county leaders to raise the 2001 benchmarks to keep fiscal resources local. In
addition, their personnel evaluations are usually compiled by governments in
the ranks immediately above. For example, county leaders in my study are
evaluated by prefectural governments, which also try to keep tax local. This
puts in place another incentive for county leaders to respond to, as to cater
for those who evaluate them.
2.3 Proxies for Government-Firm Relationship
To empirically identify firms that are connected to governments is partic-
ularly difficult. Most literature on political connections uses family ties or
personal contacts to identify firm-specific connections. However, these meth-
ods do not apply here for two reasons: one, to conduct a business at the
grassroots level, such as counties, some relationship (called Guanxi in Chi-
nese) with government officials is necessary. Therefore, Guanxi is not binary
but rather a relationship that varies in intensity. Second, I need an county-
level measure for Guanxi in order to analyze county governments’ aggregate
responses. To address these two concerns, instead, I measure previous favors
from governments to firms as a proxy for the value of the connection between
them. This method gives a varying measure and enables me to aggregate at
the county level. To do so, I focus on two of the most common and mea-
surable favors that governments grant to firms in Chinese context - access to
credit, and tax deductions.
I begin by discussing preferential access to credit. In China all banks are
state-owned and capital mobility across regions is low. This gives local gov-
ernments a great deal of power over decisions to grant loans. Therefore, as
is widely recognized, capital in China is misallocated between firms. This
has received significant attention in the literature, such as Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) and Dollar and Wei (2007). In particular, literature, such as Firth
et al. (2009), Li et al. (2008), Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005), have pointed
21
out that state-related firms are much easier to access credit through external
finance comparing with private firms which mostly rely on retained earn-
ings and private lending (Dollar and Wei (2007), Riedel and Gao (2007) and
Allen et al. (2005)). In addition, Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) also
points out that private firms are financially repressed and as a result their
capital-output and capital-labor ratios are substantially lower. These studies
suggests that more government preferential loans would go to state-related
firms. Therefore, I use the favor of granting access to credit as government
favors for state-related firms.
The second favor to be discussed is preferential corporate income tax de-
duction. Chinese corporate income tax codes for domestic firms are identical
nationwide. It had a flat rate at 33% before 2008 but a large grey area for
deduction. Therefore, given the scope in which tax code can be manipulated,
local governments often offer tax deductions. A lively discussion can be found
in Bai et al. (2014). However, for state-related firms both their profit or tax
need to be remitted to local governments, which makes state-related firms
less sensitive to tax deduction as a favor. Therefore, I use corporate income
tax deduction as government favors for private domestic firms.
3 Theoretical Framework
Political connections can take various forms; here, I define connected firms
as those receiving preferential treatments from governments. Therefore, I
model the governments’ mobilization of firms’ assistance in a reciprocal rela-
tionship, following Kranton (1996). Government (G) and Firm (F) are two
risk-neutral agents exchanging favors in an infinite time horizon. For sim-
plicity, I assume their favors to be identical and non-storable. Furthermore,
favors are informal and no contractual agreements are possible. In each pe-
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riod, agents take turns to offer and then to request for favors.15 In this study,
I examine the link between previous favors to firms and firms’ help to govern-
ments in responding the reform. To align with the empirics, I assume that
Firm is the first to request for favors, followed by Government. Firm needs a
favor, x, from Government, where x is randomly drawn from a distribution
F (·) with support [0, x¯].16 Government who gives favors x incurs a private
cost c(x) > 0, where c′(x) > 0, c(0) = 0, and c(x¯) < x¯.17 The announce-
ment of the reform serves as a realisation of favors needed by Government
from Firm. Government therefore turns to Firm to request for favors as Firm
previously did. Once a period is over and before a new period starts, nature
determines that one of the two agents request for a favor before the other and
then the game proceeds as in the previous period. I assume for probability
θ > 12 Firm would be the first to request for favors and (1− θ) > 0 for Gov-
ernment. Their per half period discount factor is δ > 0. Furthermore, since
this relationship between governments and firms is informal, it is more likely
to be a personal rather than institutional one. Therefore, it is most likely
that this relationship is a repeated interaction between government leaders
and firms. That is, the leaders’ leaving would affect how Firm expect its
value from future of reciprocity. I assume the probability of leaders’ staying
is pi ∈ [0, 1] and it is only realized the half period before.18 This suggests
that whether leaders are leaving or not will only be known in the previous
half period.
Let V FR = θV1+(1−θ)V2 and V GR = (1−θ)V1+θV2 be the expected lifetime
15There are various kinds of favors demanded by the local governments. The detailed discussion can
be found in Section 7. Here in the framework I omit the discussion on the initial cause of the reciprocal
relationship. Instead, I focus on this reform which would allow us to study this dynamic relationship.
16For simplicity, we assume that Government and Firm share the same distribution, F (·) with the same
support [0, x¯]. This can be easily to extend to have Government and Firm drawing their favor request from
different distributions.
17 I assume that the cost function is bounded above by the favor to ensure that it is beneficial in the
expectation of staying in a reciprocal relationship. It is a reasonable assumption since many favors are costly
because of the checks and balances by the institution rather than because of their inherent cost.
18This assumption is justified since county-level leaders’ turnover are based on bureaucratic assignment
without a fixed term. Furthermore, they often learn the decision at the very last minute.
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discounted utility (continuation value) from their reciprocal relationship for
Firm (F) and Government (G) respectively, where V1 and V2 are the expected
value of those who request for favors first and second. V1 is the expected
utility when agent k requests for the favors first:
V1 =
∫ x¯
0
zdF (z) + piδ
∫ x¯
0
−c(ω)dF (ω) + (piδ)2V kR , k ∈ {G, F} (1)
The first term is the expected favors received and the second term is the
expected favors provided in the next half period before entering the next
period to receive continuation value. V2 is the expected utility when agent l
requests for the favors second:
V2 =
∫ x¯
0
−c(ω)dF (ω) + piδ
∫ x¯
0
zdF (z) + (piδ)2V lR, l ∈ {G, F} (2)
As a symmetry to the first agent to request for favors, the first term is the
expected favors provided and the second term is the expected favors received
in the next half period before entering the next period to receive continuation
value. As I discuss earlier, here I assume that Firm is the first to request for
a favor, I solve for V kR , k ∈ {G, F}, using (1) and (2). This gives
V FR (x¯) =
1
2(1− piδ)M(x¯) +
(1− piδ)(2θ − 1)
2(1− piδ2(2θ − 1))L(x¯) (3)
V GR (x¯) =
1
2(1− piδ)M(x¯)−
(1− piδ)(2θ − 1)
2(1− piδ2(2θ − 1))L(x¯) (4)
where M(x¯) =
∫ x¯
0 (z − c(z))dF (z) and L(x¯) =
∫ x¯
0 (ω + c(ω))dF (ω). Since I
assume θ > 12 , then I have V
F
R (x¯) > V
G
R (x¯). This is mainly a result of time
discounting, since Firm is always likely to be the earlier one to request for
favors. The parameter θ thus captures the degree to which Firm is needy, in
relation to Government. The continuation value for Firm, V FR (x¯), is increas-
ing in θ, while the continuation value for Government, V GR (x¯), is decreasing
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in θ.
3.1 A Reciprocal Relationship as An Equilibrium
Since a reciprocal exchange happens intertemporally, agents can choose
whether to renege on offering favors. Therefore, I study conditions in which
a reciprocal relationship is enforceable, a subgame perfect equilibrium, so
that no one will have an incentive to renege on offering favors and to apply
a punishment whenever someone does. First, a grim-trigger strategy can be
a credible punishment: whenever an agent reneges on providing favors, the
other agent will no longer provide favors. This is credible since when one
agent stops offering favors, the best response for the other is to do the same.
In this equilibrium, value for both agents will become 0. After establishing
the outside option from the punishment, I turn to working out the conditions
in which Government and Firm are willing to participate in a reciprocal
relationship. Since I assume that Firm is the first to request for a favor, for
Government to stay in a reciprocal relationship the following condition needs
to be satisfied.
− c(x¯) + piδ · 0 + (piδ)2V GR ≥ 0 (5)
This condition states that if the worst possible payoff of Government, Firm
request for x¯ and then Government request for 0 favor and followed by the
continuation value, is still greater than the payoff of never entering, a re-
ciprocal relationship, 0, Government will choose to participate a reciprocal
relationship and exchange favors with Firm. For Firm to stay in a reciprocal
relationship, the following condition needs to be satisfied.
0 + piδ · −c(x¯) + (piδ)2V FR ≥ 0 (6)
If condition (5) for Government is satisfied, given that V FR (x¯) > V
G
R (x¯),
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the condition (6) will also be satisfied since Firm is closer to requesting for
a favor. This condition states that if the worst possible payoff of Firm, Firm
requests for 0 favor and then Government requests for x¯ and followed by the
continuation value, is greater than the payoff of never entering a reciprocal
relationship, 0, Firm will choose to participate a reciprocal relationship with
Government. Therefore, I have the following prediction:
Prediction 1. (Reciprocal Relationship) If governments have previously given
favors to firms, the favored firms will return favors to the governments.
If firms have previously received favors from governments, then a recipro-
cal relationship between governments and firms is an equilibrium. This gives
rise to Prediction 1 which implies that county governments can find assistance
from firms, which have previously received favors, to raise the 2001 bench-
mark. Furthermore, since local governments are raising as much resources
as they can, this suggests that governments request for favors at its upper
bound, i.e. x = x¯. In the setup, I assume the distribution F (·) in which
favors were drawn from is time-invariant. Therefore, the higher is previous
favors from governments to firms, in a stationary environment, the higher is
the expected value of future reciprocity for firms, which leads to a higher x¯
to be requested by governments while the reciprocal relationship can still be
sustained. As a result, the variation of previous favors from governments to
firms can capture the variation in x¯ across counties. This gives the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. County governments which previously granted more favors
to local firms can now harvest more assistance from those previously favored
firms
Therefore, empirically I expect that the measures for favors to firms should
be positively correlated with a firms’ assistance in the 2001 benchmark.
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When Firm decides whether to give favors to Government or to renege, it
takes local leadership turnover into account, in particular when leaders are
soon to leave. A reciprocal relationship is sustained because agents can gain
from future reciprocity, as suggested in (5) and (6). If leaders are about to
leave, the value of future reciprocity will not be received. This suggests that
condition (6) will no longer hold and Firm will renege on its promise to return
favors. This leads me to the following prediction.
Prediction 2. (Reciprocity Without Future) When leaders are about to leave
shortly, leaders will not be able to find assistance from previously favored
firms.
Empirically I expect that when leaders are leaving the office, previous
favors to firms no longer have an effect on firms’ assistance measure in the
benchmark. At the same time, this prediction also suggests that the leaving
leaders have to resort to its outside option - relabeling from other tax revenue.
Corollary 1. (Resorting to Outside Option) When leaders are about to leave
shortly, without the assistance from firms leaders can only relabel from other
taxes.
Empirically I expect that the leaving leaders would still relabel other tax
to increase the benchmark and possibly do more with this channel. In the
appendix A, I turn to look at leaders who have newly arrived in office to
interpret my findings for new leaders. In the next section, I discuss the details
of datasets and how I define and construct variables used in the empirical
analysis.
4 Data on Fiscal, Economic, and Political Variables
In order to study local governments’ mobilizing assistance from firms, I use
data from 476 counties across China. In this section, I discuss my main data
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sources and the details on variable construction. The descriptive statistics of
variables are summarized in Table 1.
4.1 Corporate Income Tax and Other Fiscal Data
To measure local government responses in the 2001 benchmarks, I need
a panel dataset of county-level corporate income tax revenue both pre- and
post-2001. However, all the published sources are either aggregates at provin-
cial level or have been openly available since 2001. Instead, I construct a
dataset that uses first-hand data collected from various local tax and fiscal
yearbook.19 In total, I have a sample of 476 counties across China out of
about 2,000.20 The samples lie within 112 prefectures across 25 provinces.
The map of counties, in which data is available, is shown in Figure 12. The
reason why data for other counties are not available is because governments
before 2001 combined the profits of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and cor-
porate income tax as one bookkeeping item. Before 2001 it was only for
idiosyncratic reasons that the public was able to observe corporate income
tax, for example, if local tax authorities decided to publish their own Year-
books or fiscal authorities published more detailed records for idiosyncratic
reasons. The concern of sample selection will be addressed in the robustness
check of section 5. In addition, all other county fiscal revenue, county-level
nominal GDP and population are constructed from the Provincial, Prefec-
tural and County Fiscal Statistics. To control for a possible difference in the
incentive to respond caused by local fiscal burden, I construct fiscal pressure
for each county which is defined as fiscal expenses divided by fiscal revenue.
In the following section, I measure my main outcome variable, the firms’
assistance in the 2001 benchmark.
19The data sources are listed in the Appendix.
20 I exclude Tibet, Xinjiang and Qinghai from the analysis.
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4.1.1 Measuring Assisted Corporate Income Tax Deviation (ATD)
In order to measure the assistance from firms to raise the 2001 corporate
income tax, I take three steps: 1) I construct the counterfactual 2001 cor-
porate income tax to measure the total deviation; 2) I then calculate the
amount from relabeling other taxes and net out from the total deviation; 3)
I finally normalized the measure with counterfactual corporate income tax.
The details of each steps are explained in the following. While all other
economic variables grew in a quadratic time trend, the deviation of 2001 cor-
porate income tax from its own trend can be taken as a measure of the local
governments’ responses. In order to do so, using a panel data on corporate
income tax from 476 counties from 1998 to 2003, I regress corporate income
tax on individual quadratic time trends and include Ln GDP per capita as a
control but exclude year 2001. For county i at time t,
yit = b0 + ω1t+ ω2t
2+
∑
i
(γ1it+ γ2it
2) · βi + βi + δln GDPPCit + uit,
t = 1998....2003 but t 6= 2001
My specification is particularly flexible and allows each county to follow
its own trend.21 Using the above regression, I predict the counterfactual
2001 corporate income tax as if there were no distorted responses from local
governments. The residuals for 2001 are my measure for the overall response.
Using the residuals as an outcome variable, I plot the coefficient estimates
on year dummies in Figure 5. This shows how large the 2001 deviation is in
absolute terms. However, the governments’ responses are from two channels
as shown in Figure 6, relabeling other taxes and firms’ transfer, as pointed
21One obvious alternative is log-linearity. There are two reasons why it is not prefered: first, I intend to
use the deviation from trend as the governments’ responses in absolute level. However, by taking log the
absolute level of deviations will have their magnitude changed. Second, by taking log the variation of my
main outcome variable, relative ATD, will be repressed because more than 50% of the observations have this
measure exceeds 1.10, the threshold in which log transformation becomes to repress the variation greatly.
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out by the central governmental paper. In order to construct a measure
that is purely from firms’ assistance, I proceed as follows: first, I show that
governments indeed relabeled other taxes as part of the responses; second, I
subtract the relabeled taxes from the total responses so that the remnants of
responses are from firms’ assistance.
As shown in Figure 7.A, I find that all other taxes, the sum of business
tax, agricultural tax and other fees, experienced a negative deviation from
trends.22 Figure 7.B plots the relationship between the positive deviation in
the 2001 benchmark and the negative deviation of other taxes. The negative
correlation suggests that the government relabeled other taxes to finance
the jump observed in the corporate income tax in 2001. Their significant
correlation is also formally tested in a regression later in the robust section.
The channel of relabeling other taxes accounts for about 18% of the average
total corporate income tax deviation. I now construct my main outcome
variable, a measure of relative ATD from firms’ assistance, which is calculated
by first subtracting relabeled tax revenue from 2001 corporate income tax and
then divided by the predicted counterfactual. For county i,
Relative ATDi =
2001 Corporate Income Taxi − Relabeled Other Taxesi
Counterfactual 2001 Corporate Income Taxi
If there were no firms’ assistance, the relative ATD measure is expected to
be distributed with a mean close to 1. As shown in Figure 8, the distribution
has a long right tail and is skewed above 1 with a mean of 1.5 and standard
deviation of 0.85. The measure ranges from 0 to almost 30 times the predicted
counterfactual. In my sample, the largest relative ATD is from Aba County in
Sichuan, as shown in Figure 9. It reaches almost 30 times the counterfactual.
After constructing the main outcome of interested, relative ATD, in the next
subsection I turn to explain how to construct measures for previous favors to
22Business tax is approximately 17% of local tax budgets. It is a tax that applies to taxable services,
transferring intangible assets, or selling immovable properties. The sum of all these tax accounts for 64% of
local tax revenue.
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firms as my main regressors.23
4.2 Ownership and Measures for Favors
All firm-related variables are constructed using the Annual Surveys of In-
dustrial Production. The dataset contains universal firms that have annual
sales above 5 million RMB (eq. to 800,000 USD) from 1999 to 2003. Detailed
information for each firm is recorded, including their location, industry code,
paid-in capital composition, liability, assets, sales income, taxable income,
payable income tax, and etc. Next, I begin by classifying each firm according
to ownership, whether state-related or private. This is followed by construct-
ing the measure for favors - debt leverage for credit access and effective tax
rates for tax deduction.
4.2.1 Classifying Ownership
In my samples, the number of surveyed firms in each county ranges from
1 to 765 with a mean of about 73. I classify each firm into state-related and
private domestic firms according to each firm’s paid-in capital composition.24
I define a firm to be local state-related if 50% or more of its paid-in capital
is coming from the local state and collective capital.25 Under this definition,
state-related firms include both local state-owned enterprise and collectively-
owned firms. On average, 50% of the surveyed firms are state-related under
this classification. I apply the same method when I calculate for private firms.
A firm is defined as private if 50% or more of the paid-in capital consists of
23According to the 2002 government paper, the reform was announced unexpectedly. However there is
still concern for the information to be leaked before the announcement and so the local governments would
raise the tax revenue long before October in 2001. But to bias the response estimate, the governments need
to know the reform before 2001 since the fiscal data is annual. Given that there is a similar experience in
local response in 1994 VAT sharing reform, the central government would only try harder to avoid leakage.
24There are 6 types of capital – local state, collective, private, legal person, central state, and foreign. Here
I focus on local domestic firms which have more than 50% of their capital coming from the first 4 categories.
25Collective capital is a type of capital collectively owned by the residents of the town or village and
managed by the local council. Therefore, the use of collective capital is tightly controlled by local politicians.
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private and legal person capital.26 On average, 43% of the surveyed firms are
private according to the samples. The remaining 7% of firms are consist of
central-state-owned firms and other foreign controlled firms.
After classifying firms by these two forms of ownership, I calculate their
respective shares in the county. To assist governments in raising the 2001
benchmarks promptly, the firms’ liquid assets matter more than their illiquid
assets. Therefore, instead of using firms’ total assets, I use their sales income
to calculate the relative size for each ownership. The size of state-related
firms in a county is dividing the total sales income of state-related firm by
the county’s total sales income. That is, for the surveyed firm j in county i,
Size of state-related firmsi =
∑
j∈i I(State-related firmsji) · Sales incomeji∑
j∈i Sales incomeji
Similarly, this method is also used to calculate the relative size of private
firms. The average relative size of state-related firms is about 0.60 while
private firms are smaller on average at about 0.32. Their variation is similar:
private firms’ standard deviation is at 0.23 and at 0.26 for state-related firms.
Their shares sum up to 0.9 on average.27 I next construct the measure for
each favor for various forms of ownerships.
4.2.2 Measures for Favors
To measure the first favor - firms’ access to credit - given the data limi-
tation, I do not observe firms’ total loans but only their balance sheets are
available. Therefore, I take firms’ liability to proxy their access to loan and
normalized by their assets. This measure is to be called debt leverage in this
paper. I calculate aggregate debt leverage for each county. This measure is
constructed by summing up the total liabilities and then normalizing by the
total assets of all the surveyed firms in the county. For all surveyed firms j
26The legal person capital is capital contributed by registered organizations.
27The remaining firms mainly consist of central-state-owned firms and foreign-owned firms.
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in county i,
Debt leveragei =
∑
j∈i Liabilityji∑
j∈i Assetsji
The debt leverage measure has a mean of 0.7 with a standard deviation of
0.16. I repeat the same exercise and calculate the measure for each ownership.
While the average debt leverage for state-related firms is 0.71, the same mea-
sure for private firms is lower at approximately 0.59. The variation is greater
for private firms with standard deviation at 0.26 and at 0.18 for state-related
firms. This measure has a very different meaning for state-related firms as
compared to for private ones. As discussed in the institutional background,
state-related firms are more likely to finance through bank loans while pri-
vate firms have to rely on private lending. Therefore, the debt leverage ratio
should capture the variation of the state-related firms’ access to credit as a
government favor but this is not the case for private firms.
The second favor is corporate income tax deduction and is measured using
an effective corporate income tax rate, defined as the ratio of reported tax
paid to a reported tax base. I calculate the average of the effective tax rate
for each county. For the surveyed firm j in county i,
Effective corporate income tax ratei =
∑
j∈i
reported tax paidji
reported tax baseji
# of surveyed firmsi
The effective tax rate is low: an average of about 5% with standard deviation
at 0.05. I also calculate the average effective tax rate for each ownership.
The mean of effective tax is 0.053 for private firms and 0.047 for state-related
firms. Their standard deviations are 0.054 for private firms and 0.042 for
state-related firms.
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4.2.3 Other Firm Characteristics
In order to control for local firms or industry characteristics, for each
ownership I also construct their respective turnover ratio, defined as total
sales income divided by total assets, to capture firms’ efficiency associated
with assets utilization; and their profitability, defined as profit divided by
total assets, to proxy for productivity; and finally industry composition based
on sales income from resources, manufacturing and utility industry. All the
firm-related variables, including both measures of favors, are averaged from
1999 and 2000, before the reform in 2001. Not only this construction avoids
reverse causality but it also captures the variation before the reform, i.e. the
pre-existing government-firm relationship.28
4.3 Data on Local Political Leaders
In order to construct the tenure in office of local political leaders, I collect
the names of local politicians from the Chinese provincial and prefectural
Yearbook, which records the list of local politicians.29 Tracing their names
over time allows me to record the year in which they took office and the year
in which they leave. Specifically, I collect the names of the top two leaders,
the county party secretary and the county mayor, from 1994 to 2008.30 In
addition to these leaders’ tenure, I can also learn if the county party secretary
was promoted from mayor office in the same county.
To examine how the effect of favors changes with leadership turnover, I
construct indicators for counties with leaders just starting office and those
with leaders who are soon to leave. Given the unique dual-leadership system
28Another construction is to trace the leaders’ tenure and take the average for the tenure period. The
challenge here is that the tenure is often greater than 2 years, i.e. stating before 1999. Alternatively, I
can use only values in 2000 since most leaders are unchanged and given that the relationship is a dynamic
variable the most recent approximation makes even more sense. Despite the results are not reported in the
paper, all the main results are robust to this alteration.
29The list of politicians names is based on those who are in position on the last day of the year.
30A caveat is that some Yearbooks, the earlier ones in particular, do not document the name list and
therefore I do not have data on leaders’ turnover for some counties.
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in China as I discussed in the institutional background, I construct an indi-
cator for counties with new leaders as follows. The indicator takes a value of
1 if both conditions are satisfied and 0 otherwise:
1. County party secretary began office in 2001, not promoted from mayor.
2. County mayor began office in 2001.
Out of 441 observations where the new leader indicator is not missing, about
34 (8%) county leaders had just taken office. Similarly, I construct an indi-
cator for counties with both leaders leaving. This indicator takes a value of
1 if both conditions are satisfied and 0 otherwise:
1. County party secretary leaves office in 2002.
2. County mayor leaves office in 2002, not promoted to party secretary.31
Out of 440 observations where the indicator of leaving leaders is not missing,
about 34 (8%) counties have leaders due to leave in the next few months.
The indicator for leaders at the end of a term takes value of 1 if both leaders
have stayed in the office for 4 years or more.32 Out of 441 observations where
the end-of-term leader indicator is not missing, about 40 (9%) both county
leaders had stayed in the office for 4 years or more.
5 Empirical Analysis
This section begins by discussing my empirical specifications (subsection
5.1). I then discuss the estimates of each of the two favors. The first is state-
related firms’ access to credit, measured by debt leverage (subsection 5.2).
This is followed by the second favor, private firms’ tax deduction, measured by
31Long and Yang (2016) also follow this innovation in this paper and find that leaders’ leaving has an
negative effect on firms’ charitable behaviour.
32Regarding local leaders’ term, both mayor and party secretary have a de jure term which is fixed for
5 years but their de facto terms are determined by bureaucratic assignments. Based on my constructed
turnover data, their terms on average is about 4 years and more than 80% of them leave the office within 5
years with a peak around 4 to 5 years.
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effective tax rate (subsection 5.3). After the baseline estimation, robustness
checks are provided (subsection 5.4).
5.1 Empirical Specification
In order to examine if county governments can mobilize connected firms’
assistance in raising the 2001 tax benchmark, I use data from 476 counties
in 2001 to estimate the following specification:
yik = β0 + γZik + βk + β
′Xik + uik (7)
The outcome variable, yik, is the relative ATD of county i in prefecture k.
Zik is the main regressor, the favors from local governments towards firms
- credit access measured by debt leverage or tax deduction measured by
effective tax rate. βk is the prefectural fixed effects. A set of controls are
included in Xik. The first control is previous fiscal pressure which help to
hold the governments’ incentive to response fixed so that I can focus on
governments’ capacity to mobilize firms’ assistance. Other controls include
previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP) and Ln GDP per capita
in 2001.33 Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefectural level. Given
the concern over extreme outliers, I exclude observations with its measure of
relative ATD at the top 1%. In the robustness checks, I also estimate the
effects using quantile regressions.
5.2 Assistance from Favored Firms: Credit Access
In this subsection, I discuss the main results. I start by looking at whether
counties with a higher local state-related firms’ credit access, as measured in
debt leverage, governments can find more assistance from state-related firms
to raise the 2001 benchmark. That is, whether counties with higher previous
33The results are robust to include Ln GDP as a control instead.
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debt leverage for firms would raise the 2001 benchmark more. As shown
in column 1 of Table 2, the coefficient estimate for all firms’ previous debt
leverage is positive and significant. However, as pointing out earlier that not
all bank loans should be treated as favors. Bank loans tend to favor local
state-related firms. That is, empirically I expect that state-related firms’ debt
leverage should matter but not so for that of private firms. This conjecture
is tested as shown in column 2 of Table 2. The coefficient estimate for state-
related firms’ previous debt leverage is positively significant and its magnitude
is similar to the estimate in column 1 — one standard deviation increase in
the firms’ previous debt leverage increases the measure of relative ATD by
about 0.2 standard deviation. This is a non-trivial effect and suggests that
state-related firms which previously had more access to credit are more likely
to assist governments. The same estimate for private firms’ previous debt
leverage is small and insignificant. This result confirms the first proposition
proposed in the theoretical section: that governments which gave more favors
to local firms in the past can harvest more of their assistance to respond in the
reform. Furthermore, in column 3, I show that debt leverage matters only for
local state-related firms and not for central-state ones, which have a small and
insignificant estimate. This is important in that it suggests that only firms
seeking to establish a relationship with local governments matter. In column
4, I show that this result is robust even after controlling for the relative
sales share of state-related firms. This insignificant estimate for the relative
size of state-related firms seems surprising and counterintuitive. One might
expect that state-related firms would be under local government control and
counties with relatively larger state-related firms would be able to mobilize
more resources in raising the 2001 benchmark. This result suggests that
the informal relationship is even more important than the given institutional
bonding between governments and state-related firms.
Recognizing that there may be unobservables biasing my results which
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cannot be addressed using a cross-sectional framework, I show that in Table
3 the point estimates starting from no controls in column 1 to full controls in
column 4 stay significant and most importantly they all share similar magni-
tude. This suggests that concerns for bias due to unobservables perhaps are
less of an issue. In the next subsection, I discuss my second favor, corporate
income tax deduction.
5.3 Assistance from Favored Firms: Tax Deduction
In the previous subsection, I establish a positive relationship between
state-related firm’s access to credit and firms’ assistance in the 2001 bench-
mark. Here I turn to another government favor: corporate income tax de-
duction. I expect private firms to be more sensitive to this favor and so in
counties with more tax deduction for private firms, measured using an ef-
fective tax rate, governments can mobilize more private firms’ assistance to
raise the 2001 benchmark. Empirically, I expect a negative relationship be-
tween the previous effective tax rate for private firms and the relative ATD.
In column 1 of Table 4, I show that the average effective tax rate has a nega-
tive effect on the relative ATD, but it is imprecisely estimated. Since private
firms should be more responsive to this favor, I separate the tax rate calcu-
lation according to firms’ ownership. The result is shown in column 2. The
estimates of state-related and private firms are very different: while the sig-
nificant estimate for private firms is large and negative, the same estimate for
state-related firms is close to 0 and insignificant. The large estimate for tax
rate of private firms suggests that one standard deviation decrease in effective
tax rate is associated with a 0.14 standard deviation increase in the relative
ATD. These results suggest that a lower corporate income tax rate for private
firms has a positive effect on raising the 2001 benchmark. In column 3 it is
shown that this result is robust after controlling for the relative sales share
of private firms. Furthermore, when adding debt leverage for state-related
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firms in column 4, the estimates of both favors are significant and the esti-
mate for tax rate does not seem to change much. This result establishes that
the two favors work independently. These results suggest that governments
previously providing more corporate income tax deductions to private firms
were able to receive more assistance from them.
As in the previous subsection, to address the concerns that unobservables
may bias the results, in Table 5 I show the effect of effective tax rates from
no control in column 1 to full control in column 4. The point estimates
stay significant for all regressions and again share similar magnitude. These
results again mitigate me the concerns of bias due to unobservables. To fur-
ther validate the baseline results, I discuss robustness checks in the following
subsection.
5.4 Robustness Checks
5.4.1 Characteristics of Local Firms
To capture government favors to firms, I use credit access and tax de-
ductions. However, the variation of these two favors may be due to other
unexplained characteristics of local firms or industries. In order to address
this concern, I include additional controls of firms’ characteristics to test the
robustness of the baseline results.
The first one is the asset turnover ratio, defined as total sales divided by
total assets, which is a measure for firms’ ability to use their assets to generate
sales or revenues. The second one is the profitability, defined as total profit
divided by total assets, which not only measures firms’ capacity to generate
profit but it is also a widely used proxy for productivity. My last control
is the industry composition based on three industries — resource, utility
and manufacturing industry— following classification from the firm survey
data. All three variables capture important characteristics of local firms that
may be associated with credit access and tax deduction. When calculating
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turnover ratio and profitability, I separate these variables according to their
ownerships, state-related and private. The results are presented in Table 6.
I first examine the effect of debt leverage by adding each of these controls.
In column 1 and 2, the estimates of state-related firms’ debt leverage remain
significant and the magnitude are very close to the baseline result in column
2 of Table 2. When controlling for industry shares as shown in column 3,
the estimate remains significant but marginally smaller comparing with the
one in the baseline. When turning to look at the effect of effective tax rate
as shown in column 4 to 6, all three estimates are almost identical to the
baseline estimate in column 2 of Table 4. Despite that the estimate in column
5 is imprecise estimated in column 5, the other estimates when controlling
for turnover ratio in column 4 and industry composition in column 6 both
remain significant. Overall these results suggest that my baseline findings are
not driven by unexplained characteristics of local firms.34
5.4.2 Quantile Regressions
In the previous section, I excluded the observations with top 1% relative
ATD to address the concern of outliers. Alternatively, I can estimate the
effect using quantile regressions. In Table 7, I show the effects at the 25, 50
and 75 percentiles. In column 1 - 3, the estimates of the debt leverage of
state-related firms are smaller than the baseline estimate which evaluates at
mean but remain significant for 25 and 75 percentiles. Furthermore, the effect
is much greater at the higher percentile – the estimate at the 75 percentile is
more than double comparing with its counterpart at the 25 percentile. This
result indeed suggests that the magnitude of the estimate at mean is some-
what driven by larger values but the coefficients remain significant even at a
lower percentile. The results for effective tax rate give a very similar pattern
as shown in column 4-6. The estimate is significant at the 75 percentile and
34The significantly negative estimates of utility industry will be explained in section 5.4.4.
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more than double comparing with the estimate at the 25 percentile. This
result suggests that even though the effect is much larger in counties with
greater ATD but my baseline findings are not driven by the outliers.
5.4.3 2002 Tax Revenue and Selection Bias
One worry concerning about the relative ATD measure is whether the
following year tax revenue were also affected by this reform and led to my
findings. To address this issue, I repeat the same exercise as how I measure
the outcome variable as regression (7) but this time I not only drop obser-
vations of 2001 but also those of 2002.35 I then repeat the calculation in
(8) to construct this alternative outcome variable. The results are shown in
column 1 and 2 of Table 8. Despite that the effect is marginally smaller for
debt leverage of state-relater firms and larger for effective tax rate of private
firms, the results are consistent with my baseline findings.
My sample covers a third of all counties in China, 476 out of 1,600. De-
spite that the sample size is limited, it has a wide geographical distribution,
including 112 prefectures across 25 provinces. I previously discussed that the
limited data availability is due to idiosyncratic reasons, for example more
detailed bookkeepings. But in order to fully address this concern for sam-
ple selection, I examine whether my baseline results can hold robust when
conditioning only on 4 provinces that covers most or all counties, including
Anhui, Hubei, Sichuan and Zhejiang. The results are shown in column 3 and
4 of Table 8. Using a subsample of only 209 counties, the effects are slightly
larger for both debt leverage of state-relater firms and effective tax rate of
private firms comparing with those in the baseline but without significant
difference. These results relieve my concerns for selection bias.
35If I drop observations of both 2002 and 2003 when measuring relative ATD, the measure becomes
incredibly noisy and therefore I compromise by dropping only those of 2002.
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5.4.4 Firms That Need No Reciprocity Provide No Assistance
In the previous section, I discuss that firms provided assistance to gov-
ernments when they rely on government favors. Another option to test this
proposition is to check whether firms which do not rely on reciprocity to gain
local government favors provide no assistance to raise the 2001 benchmark.
In my firm survey data, firms are classified into resource, manufacturing and
utility industries. The first two industries rely heavily on local governments’
facilitations, such as targeted infrastructure, land and so on. Even though
firms in the utility industries share same needs but they do not rely on recip-
rocal relationship with local governments to gain those favors.36 For example,
local electricity supply firms are managed by both a giant electricity agglom-
eration and a local government. However, the political power of the electricity
agglomeration outweighs that of local governments since it enjoys a higher
Party rank. Therefore, local governments need to cater for those firms in the
utility industries rather than forming a reciprocal relationship with them. I
expect that the larger is the utility industries, local governments would get
less assistance of firms.
In column 5 of Table 8, I show that counties with greater sales share of
utility industries have lower relative ATD. The estimate for the share of a
utility industry, -1.024, is negative and significant. This magnitude suggests
that when there is one standard deviation increase in the share of utility
industries, it has a nontrivial effect, of 0.2 standard deviation decreases in
the relative ATD. This allows me to conclude that when firms do not rely on
reciprocal relationship to gain local government favors, they do not provide
assistance to governments.
36This is because firms in the utility industries have a unique administrative structure, called “Tiao-Kuai”
(in Chinese). Put simply, this means that firms under this administrative structure have two principles.
Giant state-owned firms or bureaucracies of the central government which have vertical lines of authority to
coordinate functions, while local governments share horizontal lines of authority to coordinate according to
the needs of the locality being governed.
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5.4.5 Firms’ Assistance Or Strengthening Tax Enforcement?
In the previous section, I claimed that firms receiving tax deductions as a
favor from governments will assist in raising the 2001 benchmark. Nonethe-
less, a similar result can also emerge if local governments renege on previously
promised low tax rates and raise the tax to statutory level based on the le-
gal tax code. If this alternative mechanism existed, the rise in the 2001
benchmark would be due to tax enforcement rather than a result of firms’
assistance. However, given that governments collected more tax, one should
observe an abnormal growth in the tax revenue reported by private firms. In
Figure 10 I plot private firm tax revenue over time. It does not show that
in 2001 private firms paid abnormally high tax and this result allows me to
exclude this alternative explanation. After establishing the baseline results,
in the next section, I discuss the heterogeneous effects of local leadership
turnover.
6 Dynamics of Reciprocity
6.1 Previous Favored Firms under Leaving Leaderships
Following my baseline results and the associated robustness checks, I con-
firm the existence of reciprocal relationships between governments and firms.
In this section I move on to test whether this informal reciprocal relationship
is personal or institutional. In order to do so, I focus on the scenario in which
leaders are soon to leave office as predicted by my theoretical framework —
when leaders are leaving, in the absence of future benefit, previously favored
firms will be reluctant to assist in raising the 2001 benchmark.37
37One alternative hypothesis is that because a leaving leader would more likely to appropriate due to the
lack of accountability, similar to the term limit effect on the policy choices (Besley and Case (1995)). This
is likely to be another channel - a channel of coercion. This is in fact an empirical question. Despite my
results do not rule out this possible story but they seem to suggest that the reciprocity channel dominates
the coercion one.
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To start with, as discussed in the data section I define the counties with
leaving leaders as counties with both county party secretaries and county
mayors leaving office in 2002 and where the mayor is not promoted to party
secretary in the same county. In testing this prediction, I assume that whether
both county party secretary and mayor leave immediately in 2002 is prede-
termined and also public knowledge, in particular for local firms. This as-
sumption is very likely to hold, since the reform was announced at the end
of 2001 and an assigning order should already have been placed for those
due to leave in a few months’ time.38 In Table 9, I show that counties with
both leaders leaving and other counties are similar, except that the share of
private firms is slightly larger for counties with leaving leaders.
In Table 10, I look at whether the effect of favors is diminished when lead-
ers are soon to leave. In column 1, the estimate of the leaving-leader indicator
is negative but imprecisely estimated. However, its non-trivial magnitude of
the estimate suggests that a lower response may be due to limited firms’
assistance. As results in column 2 and 3 shows, counties with their leaders
soon to leave do not have assistance from state-related firms which previously
received credit access as government favors. In fact, in these counties the ef-
fect of debt leverage is significantly lower than its effect in other counties
and the sum of estimates for interaction and main effect for debt leverage is
not significantly away from 0 with p-value around 11. The null effect of debt
leverage for counties with leaving leaders suggests that governments cannot
find assistance from previously favored state-related firms.
When I turn to the favor of tax deduction, the results are similar to those
for the favor of access to credit. In column 4 and 5, the result also shows
that counties with leaving leaders do not have private firms’ assistance even
if those firms have previously received favor of tax deduction. The estimate
38Leaders’ term is 5 years but leaders can still be reassigned before the term finishes. More than 80%
of local leaders leave within the 5-year term with a peak at 4 years. Unfortunately, I cannot explore the
variation of leaders’ assignment because the logic behind the personnel management inside the Party remains
a black box.
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of effective tax rate in these counties is significantly higher from the one for
other counties. Furthermore, the insignificant sum of estimates for interaction
and main effect for effective tax rate suggests that the favor of tax deduction
has no effect in counties when leaders are soon to leave; that is, governments
cannot reach for assistance from previously favored private firms. These
results, along with those on the favor of credit access, suggest that leaving
leaders are less likely to find assistance from previously favored firms, which
is consistent with my second prediction.39 Therefore, I can conclude that this
informal reciprocal relationship is personal rather than institutional.
6.2 Robustness Checks
6.2.1 Lack of Incentive or No Assistance from Firms
In the previous section, I showed that firms previously receiving favors
do not assist governments in return when leaders are soon to leave office.
However, in addition to the explanation which states that firms choose not
to provide assistance when they do not expect future returns, it could also
be the case that leaving leaders lack the incentive to respond to the reform.
To address this concern, I argue that there is an institutional reason on why
leaders are still incentivized to respond even when they are leaving. This is
because raising the 2001 benchmark shows their alignment with the leaders
in the prefectural governments who evaluate the county leaders’ performance
for promotion and also intend to keep tax local.40
Furthermore, I use two observations to demonstrate that leaving leaders
still have the incentive to respond. First, as shown in column 1 of Table 11,
overall relative deviation from counties with leaders soon to leave office are
no different from other counties.41 Second, as suggested by the Corollary, I
39Furthermore, in the appendix B I find no evidence that my heterogeneous effects are driven by either of
the leaders’ leaving and suggest that both leaders matter.
40 This is supported by the fact that prefectural governments also have abnormal responses in raising the
2001 benchmark.
41Overall relative deviation includes transfer from both channels - relabeling other tax resouces and finance
45
show that when leaders are soon to leave, other taxes were still relabeled as
corporate income tax to be used to raise the 2001 benchmark .
In previous discussion on constructing the main outcome of interest, firms’
assistance, in Figure 6 I show the strong negative correlation between relabel-
ing other taxes and the overall deviations in the 2001 corporate income tax
revenue. I now turn to formally testing this relationship using regression and
the results are shown in Table 11. In column 2, this negative relationship is
shown to be robust and significant after adding the full set of controls and pre-
fectural fixed effects. On average, relabeling other taxes accounts for about
18% of the total deviations. Furthermore, in columns 3 to 4, I show that
when leaders are leaving, this channel is still utilized because the interaction
is negative and insignificant. More importantly, despite that the interaction
is imprecisely estimated, the effect of deviation of other taxes when leaders
are soon leaving is close to 1 ( ≈ 0.144 + 0.850) with a 0.49 p-value when
testing the sum equals to 1. This result suggests that this channel becomes
the dominate source to raise the benchmark when leaders are leaving. This
result not only demonstrates leaders’ incentive to respond even when they are
leaving, but it also implies that, as suggested by the Corollary, the leaving
leaders resort to relabel more from other taxes when the firms do not provide
assistance.
6.2.2 Leaders’ Leaving Could be Endogenous
In the above analysis, I use ex post information on whether leavers actu-
ally leave or not to construct indicators for leaders soon to leave. However,
whether leaders leaving or not could be a result of raising the benchmark and
so the use of ex post information may create a problem of endogeneity. To
address this concern, I use the fact that the reform was unanticipated so that
I can treat leaders’ time in office in 2001 as an exogenous variation. I use
from firms.
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the leaders who are close to the end of their de jure term, fixed at 5 years,
to proxy the likelihood of their leaving.42 I construct an indicator that takes
a value of 1 if both county party secretary and mayor are at the end of their
term by 2001, having served 4 years or more, and 0 otherwise.43 Using this
newly constructed indicator, I repeat the same exercise as those in Table 10.
The results are shown in Table 12.
In column 1, counties with end-of-term leaders’ relative ATD on average
are similar to other counties. In column 2 and 3, I look at the heterogeneous
effects of leaders’ leaving on credit access for state-related firms, measured in
debt leverage, on relative ATD. The results are similar to those in Table 10 in
which the favor has no effect when leaders are expected to leave. Despite that
the negative estimate of interaction is imprecisely estimated, its magnitude
is close to the main effect for debt leverage and thus makes the sum almost
0. In column 4 and 5, a similar pattern is observed when looking at the
effect of tax deductions for private firms, measured in the effective tax rate.
While there is no effect from tax deduction when leaders are expected to
leave judging by the sum of interaction and main effect for effective tax rate,
other counties have a large and significant effect similar to those in column
5 of Table 10. My results show that the findings in the previous subsection
are robust to this alternative definition of leaders due to leave. After testing
my second prediction, I now turn to discuss my additional findings.
6.3 Previous Favored Firms under New Leaderships
In this section, I look whether firms that receive favors from previous
governments will also assist local governments under new leadership. New
42The 5-year term is not fixed, for leaders can still be reassigned before the term finishes. More than
80% of local leaders leave within the 5-year term with a peak at 4 years. Unfortunately, I cannot explore
the variation of leaders’ assignment because the logic behind the personnel management inside the Party
remains a black box.
43Since the mayor is likely to be promoted to party secretary, to proxy the likelihood of both leaders’
leaving I also ensure the current party secretary was not previously promoted from local mayor.
47
leaders should have built limited reciprocal relationships with local firms.
Therefore, this reform provides a unique opportunity to test if firms that
were relied on favors from governments whether these firms are more likely
to assist new leaders and thus to build up a relationship with leaders for future
reciprocity. In the appendix A, based on my theory of reciprocal relationship,
I modify the model and let firms to take the initiative and decide whether to
assist local governments. The theory predicts that firms which rely more on
government favors would be more willing to assist governments.
I first discuss the variation from an indicator for new leaders. It is likely
that some unobservable factors which determine the turnover of local leader-
ship also affect how much they the local leaders respond. However, as in my
construction of an indicator for end-of-term leaders, I use the fact that the
reform was unanticipated to treat those counties with new leaders as if they
were determined exogenously. Here, counties with new leaders are defined as
counties with both county party secretaries and mayors taking office in 2001
where the party secretary was not promoted from the mayor in the same
county. In Table 13, I show that counties with both new leaders and other
counties are very much balanced in all aspects. Now I turn to examine my
empirical findings, shown in Table 14.
As shown in column 1, there is no significant difference in relative ATD
between counties with new leaders and other counties. In column 2 and 3, I
interact the state-related firms’ debt leverage, as favors of credit access, with
the indicator for new leaders. The result suggests that state-related firms
which enjoyed credit access as favor under previous leadership will also assist
new leaders. In column 4 and 5, I find that despite that the effect may be
discounted but private firms that previously enjoyed greater tax deduction
also assist new leaders. Overall my results suggest that firms that previously
relied on government favors will also take the initiative to assist new leaders
in order to build up a new reciprocal relationship to exchange for favors in
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the future.44
7 Discussion: the government-firm relationship in China
The findings of this paper that local governments are in need of assistance
from firms are especially important when it comes to explain the government-
business relationship in China. I focus on three Chinese institutional features
to discuss this implication. First, as previous papers (Maskin et al. (2000),
Li and Zhou (2005), Xu (2011)) have pointed out, this is a country that uses
many policy goals and quotas from the top to manage lower-tier governments
and sets local governments to compete with each other to advance the careers
of the leaders. Second, in order to achieve the sometimes unreasonable pol-
icy objectives or to compete against others, local governments often need to
rely on informal assistance from firms, for example achieving economic indi-
cators, absorbing unemployment and cutting down polluting emissions, and
so on. In this paper, the need from firms’ assistance to boost up corporate
income tax revenue is another example of this kind. Third, not only local
governments need assistance from firms, but they also have many resources
to offer as an exchange. The decentralizing institution endows local govern-
ments with control over business resources, including capital, land and other
public goods (Li et al. (2008), Firth et al. (2009), Bai et al. (2014)). Taking
these features together, local governments are highly incentivized to build up
crony economies due to the institutional design. While the previous litera-
ture mainly focused on the first and the third aspects, this paper is one of the
first studies to offer systematic evidence on the second and thus to complete
this picture in explaining the rise of institutionally-caused crony capitalism
in China.
44Furthermore, in the appendix B I find no evidence that my heterogeneous effects are driven by either of
the leaders’ leaving and suggest that both leaders matter.
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8 Conclusion
To better understand how connections work and thus their benefits and
costs, in this study I use another perspective to look at government-firm
connections through their two-way interactions. Using an event study in
China, instead of focusing on firms’ gain, I examine whether governments
can mobilize more assistance from those firms to which they have already
given favors. But it is not easy to do so, since favors are usually traded
in secrecy or simply cannot be quantified. Yet this event study not only
enabled me to measure the value that governments (or politicians) attribute
to connections but also broadened my understanding of other possible forms
of return. I summarize my findings as follows.
In order to respond to a central-local tax-sharing reform, I found a robust
positive correlation between government favors to firms before the reform,
credit access and tax deductions, and firms’ assistance to governments in
responding the reform. Furthermore, I found that this reciprocal relationship
between governments and firms is personal rather than institutional. When
leaders are about to leave office, I find that previously favored firms do not
provide assistance, because no future gain can be expected from leaders once
they have left. The results are consistent with the predictions derived from
a theory of reciprocal relationships between governments and firms. As an
additional result, I found evidence suggesting that private firms took the
initiative to offer more assistance to new leaders in exchange for gains from
future reciprocity.
The findings of this study have implications beyond the Chinese context.
First, this unique setting allows me to be one of the very few studies to
quantify that governments can gain from their connection with firms and to
examine the two-way interaction between them. There are also other ex-
amples, such as campaign contribution (Claessens, Feijen and Laeven (2008)
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and Sukhtankar (2012)) and lobby activities (Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-
Rosen (2012)). But here I stress that, as the second contribution, firms’ fa-
vors to governments are not necessarily personal transfers, e.g. corruption;
in some circumstances firms can contribute to achieving governmental objec-
tives. This implication corresponds to the literature on developing states in
Asia, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, where governments form
close relationships with firms in order to seek formal or informal assistance
to attain their overall developmental objectives (Woo-Cumings (1999) and
Evans (1995)). Third, by revealing how connections work behind the scenes,
I show that, unlike a spot transaction, connections between governments and
firms can be dynamic relationships to exchange favors between each other
intertemporally. This logic also brings in important policy implications. Pol-
icymakers should bear in mind that a policy that leaves room for governments
to seek assistance from firms to fulfil their objectives would be highly likely to
promote cronyism. Furthermore, even though a frequent turnover of leaders
may hold back cronyism, it also has a downside – it costs firms more resources
to build up new connections, which can be socially wasteful.
Finally, the findings in this study advance our understanding of the government-
business relationship in China: first, even when state-related firms share insti-
tutional bonding with local governments, local governments cannot mobilize
assistance from state-related firms without informal relationships. Second, as
stated in the introduction, in authoritarian regimes, such as China’s, higher
tiers of government often dictate local government policy objectives which
involve unreasonable missions or quotas. To carry out these tasks, the local
governments often seek assistance of local firms. This gives local govern-
ments the incentive to invest in their relationships with local firms and to
create local crony economy. Third, unlike other studies that focus on the
party secretary, the findings about leadership turnover suggest when looking
at connections with firms one should take the county mayor into account
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together with the party secretary. Finally, the two measures for favors seem
to capture the variation of government-firm connections and can be used for
future study on cronyism in China.
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A Reciprocal Relationship Without Past
Now I look at leaders who have newly taken office. If leaders are new to
office, it is likely that no previous reciprocal relationships exist with firms.
This suggests that I should amend my framework to look at whether firms
take the initiative in offering favors by raising the 2001 benchmark. Assuming
that Government is the first to receive favors, I solve for V¯ kR(x¯), k ∈ {G, L}.
Similarly, I use (1) and (2), which gives
V¯ FR (x¯) =
1
2(1− piδ)M(x¯) +
(1− piδ)(2θ − 1)
2(1 + (piδ)2(2θ − 1))L(x¯) (8)
V¯ GR (x¯) =
1
2(1− piδ)M(x¯)−
(1− piδ)(2θ − 1)
2(1 + (piδ)2(2θ − 1))L(x¯) (9)
where M(x¯) =
∫ x¯
0 (z − c(z))dF (z) and L(x¯) =
∫ x¯
0 (ω + c(ω))dF (ω). In this
setting, since θ > 12 , then I still have V¯
F
R (x¯) > V¯
G
R (x¯). But, compared with
the previous case, in which Firm first requested for favors, the difference
between V¯ FR (x¯) and V¯
G
R (x¯) is smaller. To sustain a reciprocal relationship,
the following condition for Firm needs to hold.
− c(x¯) + δ · 0 + δ2V¯ FR ≥ 0 (10)
For Government to stay in a reciprocal relationship,
0 + δ · −c(x¯) + δ2V¯ GR ≥ 0 (11)
All else being equal, V¯ FR (x¯) increases in θ. This suggests that when Firm is
needier, the value of its continuation is higher. Thus, under general conditions
when piδV¯ GR > (piδ)
2V¯ FR , a higher θ allows a greater x¯ to satisfy both (10)
and (11) conditions in order to sustain a reciprocal relationship; I have the
following hypothesis.
Prediction 3. (Reciprocity Without Past) When leaders are new, firms which
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rely more on governments’ favors will take the initiative by offering more
favors.
In counties with new leaders, previous favors no longer matter. Those new
leaders cannot find assistance from firms which received favors from previous
governments. However, firms that are sensitive to government favors might
provide assistance in exchange for future reciprocity. While state-related
firms share institutional bonding with governments, private firms rely more
on this informal relationship. Empirically, I expect that private firms are
more likely to offer assistance when leaders are new to office. Furthermore,
previous favors should have no effect on relative ATD.
B Which Leader Matters?
B.1 Leaving Mayor or Leaving Party Secretary
In constructing an indicator for counties where leaders are due to leave,
unlike the literature that mainly focuses on party secretary turnover, I take
into account both the mayor and party secretary post. To test whether this
innovation is valid, in theory I should include a quadruple interaction on
the criteria for leaving leaders, a leaving mayor without promoting to party
secretary and a leaving party secretary. In practice, however, the limited
sample size sets a barrier against this practice. Instead, I look individually
at the two leaders’ leaving. I start by looking at mayors soon to leave office.
The results are shown in Table A1.
In column 1 of panel A, counties with leaving mayors respond no differently
from other counties. The estimates in column 2 and 3 do align with my
prediction that the measure for the favor of credit access, debt leverage, of
state-related firms has no effect in counties where mayors are soon to leave
office but the effect exists for all other counties. However, the same pattern
does not apply to the measure for tax deduction, the effective tax rate, of
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private firms. As shown in column 4 and 5 the estimate for interaction is
negative, an opposite sign that is predicted by the theory. When I turn to
examine the effect of party secretaries soon to leave office, I use the variation
of party secretaries leaving and no mayors promoted to fill the office. This
is mainly to avoid the possibility that mayors soon to be promoted to party
secretary may bias the effect of a leaving party secretary. In column 1 of panel
B, similarly, counties with leaving party secretaries respond no differently
from other counties. In column 2 and 3 the results suggest that a leaving
party secretary may moderate the effect of debt leverage of state-related
firms. However, I don’t have a significant estimate for the interaction term.
In column 4 and 5, the signs of the estimates do correspond to those in Table
10. However, the interaction term is imprecisely estimated.
To sum up, I find no evidence that my heterogeneous effects are driven by
either of the leaders’ leaving and this suggests that taking both leaders into
account is a valid innovation when examining their relationships with firms.
B.2 New Mayor or New Secretary
As in the last part of the previous section, I again look at which leader
matters – mayors or party sectaries. I start by looking at the new mayor.
To do this, I use the variation from counties with new mayors and party
secretaries who were not promoted from the mayor office. This is to avoid
the possibility that my estimates may be biased because the party secretaries
promoted from mayor office still own mayor power. In column 1 of panel
A in Table A2, I show that counties with new mayors do not respond dif-
ferently from other counties. The results in column 2 and 3 suggest that
state-related firms that were previously favored with credit access do not as-
sist local governments differently when only the mayors are newly arrived.
The same results can be found in column 4 and 5 when interacting the new
mayor indicator and effective tax rate of private firms- private firms previ-
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ously favored with tax deduction do not assist local governments differently
when only the mayors are newly arrived. In panel B of Table A2, I repeat
the same exercise as in panel A but this time I focus on the effects for new
party secretary. The results are very similar to those in panel A. Firms that
were previously favored through better credit access or greater tax deduction
do not assist local governments differently when only the party secretaries
are newly arrived. Overall these results suggest that no matter which leader,
county party secretary or mayor, is new to office, previously favored firms will
choose to assist no differently from their assistance to county governments
without new leaderships.
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C Figure
Figure 1: Corporate Income Tax (1998 - 2003)
Notes: Using observations from 476 counties, this figure plots the regression coefficients of year dummies
from 1998 to 2003 (1998 as base year) with corporate income tax (in 10,000 RMB) as the outcome variables.
The regression controls for Ln GDP per capita and county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the county level. The corporate income tax data is collected from various local fiscal and tax yearbooks
(see data appendix for the sources). GDP data is from Province, prefecture, and county fiscal statistics.
Details on the data source can be found in the Data section.
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Figure 2: Other Economics Indicators (1998 - 2003)
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Figure 2.A Figure 2.B
Notes: Figure 2.A plots the regression coefficients of year dummies from 1998 to 2003 (1998 as base year)
with local value-added tax (in 10,000 RMB) from 476 counties. Figure 2.B plots the regression coefficients of
year dummies from 1999 to 2003 (1999 as base year) with surveyed firms’ aggregate sales income (in 10,000
RMB) from 476 counties. The regression controls for Ln GDP per capita and county fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the county level. Local GDP and VAT data are from Province, prefecture,
and county fiscal statistics. Data on sales income is from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production. Details
on the data source can be found in the Data section.
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Figure 3: How Firms Assist Local Governments
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Notes: These figures show how firms may assist local governments in raising the 2001 tax revenue. In any
other normal times, shown in Figure 3.A, firms pay tax to local governments and the revenue is then remitted
to Treasury before being redistributed back to the governments. However, in November and December 2001
as shown in Figure 3.B, firms paid tax and also other transfers. The money was labelled as corporate income
tax and remitted to Treasury before they came back to the local governments. Governments kept the tax
and returned all the extra money back to the firms.
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Figure 4: Corporate Income Tax (From A Large-scale Firm Survey)
Notes: Using observations from 476 counties, this figure plots the regression coefficients of year dummies from
1999 to 2003 (1999 as base year) with corporate income tax from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production.
The regression controls for Ln GDP per capita and county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the county level. GDP data is from Province, prefecture, and county fiscal statistics. Details on the data
source can be found in the Data section.
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Figure 5: Corporate Income Tax Deviation from Trend
Notes: Taking corporate income tax to remove individual county quadratic trend (excluding 2001), in this
figure I plot the regression coefficients of the detrend residuals on year dummies from 1998 to 2003 (1998 as
base year). The regression controls for Ln GDP per capita and county fixed effects. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the county level. Corporate income tax data is collected from various local fiscal and tax
yearbooks. GDP data is from Province, prefecture, and county fiscal statistics. Details on the data source
can be found in the Data section.
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Figure 6: Decomposition of 2001 Corporate Income Tax
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Notes : This figure shows that the deviation of 2001 corporate income tax consists of transfers
from two different channels: (1) relabeling other tax revenue and (2) transfer from firms.
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Figure 7: Relabeling Other Taxes — A Channel to Response
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Notes: Figure 7.A plots the regression coefficients of year dummies from 1998 to 2003 (1998 as base year)
with local other tax from 476 counties, including business tax, agriculture tax and other fees. The regression
control for Ln GDP per capita and county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county
level. In Figure 7.B, I scatterplot the absolute deviations in the 2001 corporate income tax and off-trend
deviation of the other taxes. Business tax, agriculture tax, other fees, and GDP data are from Province,
prefecture, and county fiscal statistics. Details on the data source can be found in the Data section.
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Figure 8: Distribution of Relative ATD Measure
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of my main outcome variable, the relative ATD in the 2001
benchmarks. Red line indicates the value of relative ATD being 1. My observations are 473 counties across
112 prefectures and 25 provinces in China. Details of constructing relative ATD can be found in the text of
data section.
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Figure 9: Relative ATD for Aba County in Sichuan
Notes: This figure I plot the corporate income tax revenue of Aba county in Sichuan from 1998 to 2003.
The data is collected from Aba County Tax Authority Year Books.
69
Figure 10: Corporate Income Tax of Private Firms
Notes: Using observations from 476 counties, this figure plots the regression coefficients of year dummies
from 1998 to 2003 (1998 as base year) with corporate income tax of private firms from Annual Surveys of
Industrial Production. The regression controls for Ln GDP per capita and county fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the county level. GDP data is from Province, prefecture, and county fiscal
statistics. Details on the data source can be found in the Data section.
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Figure 11: Government Hierarchy in China
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Notes: Hierarchy of Chinese government: starting from the central government, provincial governments,
prefecture governments, and followed by county and district governments.
Figure 12: Counties in which data are available
Notes: This map show counties (in yellow) in which data on corporate income taxes is available.
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D Tables
Table 1A: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev. Max Min
Relative ATD 471 1.47 0.85 5.99 0
Debt leverage (All firms) 471 0.69 0.16 1.31 0.02
Debt leverage (State-related) 471 0.71 0.18 2.03 0.02
Debt leverage (Private) 471 0.59 0.26 1.62 0
Debt leverage (Central-state) 471 0.14 0.30 1.67 0
Debt leverage (Utility industry) 471 0.50 0.23 1.38 0
Effective tax rate (All firms) 471 0.05 0.05 0.67 0
Effective tax rate (Private) 471 0.05 0.05 0.45 0
Effective tax rate (State-related) 471 0.05 0.04 0.36 0
Sales share (State-related) 471 0.59 0.26 1.00 0.02
Sales share (Private) 471 0.32 0.23 0.92 0
Sales share (Utility industry) 471 0.12 0.17 1.00 0
Ln GDP per capita 471 8.54 0.72 10.99 5.55
Normalized corp. income tax 471 0.00 0.01 0.07 0
Previous fiscal pressure 471 2.45 3.22 44.26 0.84
Absolute deviation 471 1,087 2,575 29,801 -3,200
Deviation of other taxes 471 -574 1,655 9,103 -14,433
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. The unit of observation is
county in year 2001. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate in-
come tax; Debt leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized
by total assets); Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Sales
share measures the size of firms for each type; Normalized corporate income tax is the previous corporate
income tax normalized by GDP; Fiscal pressure captures the extent of tightness in fiscal budget; Absolute
deviation is a measure on the absolute deviations in the 2001 corporate income tax from trend; Deviation of
other tax measures how much fiscal resources were transferred to raise the 2001 corporate income tax. All
firm-related variables are taken average from 1999 to 2000 and constructed from Annual Surveys of Industrial
Production. Corporate Income tax are collected from various local fiscal or tax yearbooks. All other taxes
and GDP data are from Province, prefecture, and county fiscal statistics. Details on the data source can be
found in the Data section.
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Table 1B: Descriptive statistics (continue)
Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev. Max Min
Indicator for leaving leaders 440 0.08 0.27 1 0
Indicator for end-of-term leaders 440 0.09 0.29 1 0
Indicator for leaving mayor 440 0.21 0.41 1 0
Indicator for leaving party secretary 440 0.14 0.35 1 0
Indicator for new leaders 441 0.08 0.27 1 0
Indicator for leaving mayor 441 0.15 0.36 1 0
Indicator for leaving party secretary 441 0.14 0.35 1 0
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. The unit of observation
is county in year 2001. Indicator for new leaders is an indicator that takes value of 1 if both county mayor
and party secretary are new to office and 0 otherwise; Indicator for leaving leaders is an indicator that takes
value of 1 if both county mayor and party secretary are soon to leave office and 0 otherwise; Indicator for
new mayor is an indicator that takes value of 1 if county mayor just arrive in office and without party
secretary promoted from mayor and 0 otherwise. Indicator for new party secretary is an indicator that
takes value of 1 if county party secretary just arrive in office and without being promoted from mayor and
0 otherwise; Indicator for end-of-term leaders is an indicator that takes value of 1 if both county mayor
and party secretary are at the end of term in office and 0 otherwise; Indicator for leaving mayor is an
indicator that takes value of 1 if county mayor is soon to leave and without promoting to party secretary
and 0 otherwise. Indicator for leaving party secretary is an indicator that takes value of 1 if county party
secretary is soon to leave and without mayor promoting to party secretary and 0 otherwise. Data on local
political leaders are collected from Provincial Yearbooks. Details on the data source can be found in the
Data section.
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Table 2: Relative ATD and credit access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Debt leverage (All firms) 0.759**
(0.353)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.816** 0.819** 0.817**
(0.333) (0.337) (0.330)
Debt leverage (Private) -0.211 -0.211 -0.204
(0.183) (0.184) (0.187)
Debt leverage (Central-state) 0.0316
(0.144)
Sales share (State-related) 0.0750
(0.215)
Prefecture FE X X X X
All Controls X X X X
Obs. 471 471 471 471
R2 0.415 0.422 0.422 0.422
Notes: This table presents estimates of debt leverage (a measure for credit access) on relative ATD in the 2001
benchmark. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Debt
leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets);
Sales share measures the size of firms for each type. All regressions control for previous fiscal pressure, previous
corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), Ln GDP per capita and prefecture fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Robustness check: credit access as a favor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.976*** 0.941*** 0.874** 0.816**
(0.354) (0.334) (0.348) (0.333)
Debt leverage (Private) -0.175 -0.157 -0.171 -0.211
(0.215) (0.197) (0.195) (0.183)
Ln GDP per capita -0.286** -0.299*** -0.338***
(0.112) (0.107) (0.110)
Normalized corp. income tax -12.15* -13.70**
(6.627) (6.272)
Previous fiscal pressure -0.0280
(0.0209)
Prefecture FE X X X X
All Controls X X X X
Obs. 471 471 471 471
r2 0.395 0.412 0.418 0.422
Notes: This table presents robustness check on estimates of debt leverage of state-related firms on relative ATD in
the 2001 benchmark. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income
tax; Debt leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total
assets); Normalized corporate income tax is the previous corporate income tax normalized by GDP; Fiscal pressure
captures the extent of tightness in fiscal budget. All regressions control for prefecture fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Relative ATD and tax deduction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Effective tax rate (All firms) -0.509
(1.512)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.246* -2.217* -2.003*
(1.198) (1.241) (1.128)
Effective tax rate (State-related) 0.144 0.157 0.188
(1.139) (1.148) (1.104)
Sales share (Private) -0.0565
(0.248)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.754**
(0.322)
Prefecture FE X X X X
All Controls X X X X
Obs. 471 471 471 471
R2 0.405 0.416 0.416 0.429
Notes: The table presents estimates of effective corporate income tax rate (a measure for tax deduction) on relative
ATD in the 2001 benchmark. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate
income tax; Debt leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by
total assets); Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Sales share
measures the size of firms for each type. All regressions control for previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate
income tax (normalized by GDP), and Ln GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Robustness check: tax deduction as a favor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.944*** -2.504** -2.289* -2.246*
(1.100) (1.150) (1.197) (1.198)
Effective tax rate (State-related) -0.157 0.0839 0.473 0.144
(1.314) (1.302) (1.401) (1.139)
Ln GDP per capita -0.243** -0.265** -0.307**
(0.122) (0.118) (0.121)
Normalized corp. income tax -12.53** -13.67**
(5.835) (5.899)
Previous fiscal pressure -0.0329
(0.0245)
Prefecture FE X X X X
All Controls X X X X
Obs. 471 471 471 471
R2 0.393 0.405 0.411 0.416
Notes: This table presents robustness check on estimates of effective tax rate of private firms on relative ATD in the
2001 benchmark. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax;
Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Normalized corporate income
tax is the previous corporate income tax normalized by GDP; Fiscal pressure captures the extent of tightness in
fiscal budget. All regressions control for provincial fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Robustness check: other firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Debt Leverage (State-related) 0.817** 0.830** 0.692*
(0.335) (0.333) (0.349)
Debt Leverage (Private) -0.220 -0.218 -0.233
(0.188) (0.179) (0.200)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.238* -2.123 -2.334*
(1.201) (1.292) (1.263)
Effective tax rate (State-related) 0.161 0.157 -0.361
(1.120) (1.081) (0.869)
Turnover ratio (State-related) X X
Turnover ratio (Private) X X
Profitability (State-related) X X
Profitability (Private) X X
Sales share (Utility industry) X X
Sales share (Resource industry) X X
Prefecture FE X X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X X
Obs. 471 471 471 471 471 471
R2 0.422 0.424 0.436 0.416 0.417 0.436
Notes: The table presents robustness checks on estimates of favors on the relative ATD. Columns (1) - (3) present
estimates on debt leverage when controlling for turnover ratio, profitability or industry shares. Columns (4) - (6)
present estimates on effective tax rate when controlling for turnover ratio, profitability or industry shares. Relative
ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Debt leverage variables
measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets); Effective tax rate
captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Sales share measures the size of firms for each
type; Turnover ratio measures the efficiency on how assets are used to generate sales income; Profitability tries to
capture the variation of productivity of local firms, defined by profit normalizing by assets. All regressions control
for previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), Ln GDP per capita and prefecture
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Robustness check: effects of favors in quantile regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Percentile 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
Panel A: Quantile regression with prefecture fixed-effects
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.304** 0.425 0.788**
(0.132) (0.407) (0.314)
Debt leverage (Private) -0.0659 -8.19e-06 -0.264
(0.111) (0.372) (0.277)
Effective tax rate (Private) -0.970 -1.592 -2.120***
(0.998) (1.185) (0.760)
Effective tax rate (State-related) 0.469 -0.283 -1.130*
(1.076) (1.195) (0.640)
Prefecture FE X X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X X
Obs. 471 471 471 471 471 471
R2 0.287 0.351 0.338 0.272 0.344 0.329
Notes: The table presents estimates of two favors on the relative ATD using quantile regressions. Columns (1)
- (3) present estimates of debt leverage (measure for favor of credit access) in 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile.
Columns (4) - (6) present estimates of effective tax rate (measure for favor of tax deduction) in 25th, 50th, and
75th percentile. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax;
Debt leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets);
Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; All regressions control for
previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), and Ln GDP per capita. Robust
standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 8: Robustness check: sample selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Excluding 2002 Only 4 Provinces
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.595* 1.174*
(0.335) (0.662)
Debt leverage (Private) -0.191 -0.0621
(0.263) (0.478)
Effective tax rate (Private) -3.506** -4.163***
(1.421) (1.512)
Effective tax rate (State-related) -0.657 1.134
(1.156) (2.404)
Sales share (Utility Industry) -1.024**
(0.416)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 470 470 209 209 471
R2 0.437 0.449 0.390 0.397 0.422
Notes: The table presents robustness checks on estimates of favors on the relative ATD. Columns (1) - (2) present
estimates of favors when conditioning only on 4 provinces — Anhui, Hubei, Sichuan and Zhejiang. Columns (3)
- (4) present estimates of favors but using an alternative outcome measures that exclude 2002 when estimating.
Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Debt leverage
variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets); Effective tax
rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Sales share measures the size of firms for
each type of firms; All regressions control for previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized
by GDP), Ln GDP per capita and prefecture fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Summary statistics: counties with & without leaving leaders
Counties with Counties without
Variable leaving leaders leaving leaders Difference (Stand Error)
Debt leverage (All firms) 0.710 0.703 0.007 (0.027)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.740 0.721 0.029 (0.034)
Debt leverage (Private) 0.615 0.621 -0.070 (0.052)
Debt leverage (Utility industry) 0.549 0.532 0.017 (0.037)
Effective tax rate (All firms) 0.042 0.051 -0.009 (0.008)
Effective tax rate (Private) 0.044 0.059 -0.015* (0.009)
Effective tax rate (State-related) 0.035 0.047 -0.012 (0.007)
Sales share (State-related) 0.511 0.582 -0.071 (0.045)
Sales share (Private) 0.421 0.330 0.091** (0.041)
Sales share (Utility industry) 0.110 0.097 0.013 (0.023)
Ln GDP per capita 8.489 8.558 -0.069 (0.128)
Normalized corp. income tax 0.004 0.005 -0.001 (0.001)
Previous fiscal pressure 1.866 1.920 -0.054 (0.176)
Deviation of other tax -718.892 -591.698 -127.194 (298.658)
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics between counties with leaving leaders and counties without. Debt
leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets);
Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Sales share measures the
size of firms for each type; Normalized corporate income tax is the previous corporate income tax normalized by
GDP; Fiscal pressure captures the extent of tightness in fiscal budget; Absolute deviations is a measure on the
absolute deviation in the 2001 corporate income tax from trend; Deviation of other tax measures how much fiscal
resources were transferred to raise the 2001 corporate income tax.All firm-related variables are taken average from
1999 to 2000 and constructed from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production. Corporate Income tax are collected
from various local fiscal or tax yearbooks. All other taxes and GDP data are from Province, prefecture, and county
fiscal statistics. Details on the data source can be found in the Data section.
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Table 10: Leaving leaders and assistance from previously favored firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Indicator for leaving leaders -0.117 -0.130 0.941* -0.127 -0.394**
(0.115) (0.118) (0.540) (0.118) (0.186)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.580** 0.679**
(0.292) (0.313)
Debt leverage × Leaving Leaders -1.482**
(0.738)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.264* -2.441**
(1.169) (1.197)
Effective tax rate × Leaving Leaders 5.841**
(2.811)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 440 440 440 440 440
R2 0.438 0.446 0.450 0.451 0.454
Notes: The table presents heterogeneous effects of leaving leaders for each of the favors. Relative ATD is a measure
for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Debt leverage variables measures the amount
of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets); Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax
deduction for firms of different ownerships; Indicator for leaving leaders is an indicator that takes value of 1 if both
county mayor and party secretary are soon to leave office and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for previous fiscal
pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), Ln GDP per capita and prefecture fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Government responses and relabeling other taxes
VARIABLES Total Relative Level
Responses Responses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indicator for leaving leaders -0.0600 -142.5 -714.2
(0.154) (404.7) (767.4)
Deviation of other tax -0.178** -0.176** -0.144*
(0.0794) (0.0814) (0.0803)
Deviation of other tax × Leaving leaders -0.850
(0.706)
Prefecture FE X X X X
All Controls X X X X
Obs. 440 471 440 440
R2 0.426 0.591 0.587 0.591
Notes: The table presents the negative correlation between the deviation of other tax and the deviation of corporate
income tax in 2001. Total relative deviation is a measure for the extent of total deviations in the 2001 corporate
income tax; Absolute deviation is a measure on the absolute deviation in the 2001 corporate income tax from trend;
Deviation of other tax measures how much fiscal resources were transferred to raise the 2001 corporate income tax;
Indicator for leaving leaders is an indicator that takes value of 1 if both county mayor and party secretary are soon
to leave office and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax
(normalized by GDP), Ln GDP per capita and prefecture fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at
prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: Effects of favors when leaders are at the end of term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Indicator for end-of-term leaders 0.0125 0.0225 0.563 0.0270 -0.157
(0.143) (0.145) (0.528) (0.144) (0.184)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.572* 0.632*
(0.297) (0.324)
Debt leverage × End-of-term leaders -0.784
(0.738)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.254* -2.738**
(1.167) (1.191)
Effective tax rate × End-of-term leaders 3.525*
(2.084)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 440 440 440 440 440
R2 0.437 0.445 0.446 0.450 0.454
Notes: The table presents heterogeneous effects of end-of-term leaders for each of the favors. Relative ATD is a
measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Debt leverage variables measures the
amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets); Effective tax rate captures the extent
of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Indicator for end-of-term leaders is an indicator that takes value
of 1 if both county mayor and party secretary are at the end of term in office and 0 otherwise. All regressions control
for previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), Ln GDP per capita and prefecture
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Summary statistics: counties with & without new leaders
Counties with Counties without
Variable new leaders new leaders Difference (Stand Error)
Debt leverage (All firms) 0.699 0.704 -0.004 (0.027)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.710 0.723 -0.013 (0.031)
Debt leverage (Private) 0.680 0.615 0.064 (0.040)
Debt leverage (Utility industry) 0.521 0.534 -0.013 (0.041)
Effective tax rate (All firms) 0.055 0.050 0.004 (0.008)
Effective tax rate (Private) 0.060 0.057 0.003 (0.009)
Effective tax rate (State-related) 0.052 0.046 0.006 (0.007)
Sales share (State-related) 0.545 0.579 -0.034 (0.045)
Sales share (Private) 0.347 0.336 0.011 (0.041)
Sales share (Utility industry) 0.068 0.101 -0.033 (0.023)
Ln GDP per capita 8.630 8.547 0.083 (0.128)
Normalized corp. income tax 0.005 0.005 0.000 (0.001)
Previous fiscal pressure 1.747 1.930 -0.183 (0.175)
Deviation of other tax -597.291 -601.856 4.566 (298.719)
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics between counties with leaving leaders and counties without.
Debt leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total
assets); Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Sales share
measures the size of firms for each type; Normalized corporate income tax is the previous corporate income
tax normalized by GDP; Fiscal pressure captures the extent of tightness in fiscal budget; Absolute deviation
is a measure on the absolute deviation in the 2001 corporate income tax from trend; Deviation of other tax
measures how much fiscal resources were transferred to raise the 2001 corporate income tax.All firm-related
variables are taken average from 1999 to 2000 and constructed from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production.
Corporate Income tax are collected from various local fiscal or tax yearbooks. All other taxes and GDP data
are from Province, prefecture, and county fiscal statistics. Details on the data source can be found in the
Data section.
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Table 14: New leaders and assistance from previously favored firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Indicator for new leaders -0.065 -0.064 -0.347 -0.064 -0.296
(0.124) (0.121) (0.721) (0.127) (0.212)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.586* 0.580*
(0.296) (0.297)
Debt leverage × New leaders 0.387
(0.960)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.206* -2.403**
(1.178) (1.180)
Effective tax rate × New leaders 3.962
(3.078)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 441 441 441 441 441
R2 0.438 0.446 0.446 0.450 0.452
Notes: The table presents heterogeneous effects of new leaders for each of the favors. Relative ATD is a
measure for the extent of firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Debt leverage variables measures
the amount of loans that go to different type of firms (normalized by total assets); Effective tax rate captures
the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships; Indicator for new leaders is an indicator that
takes value of 1 if both county mayor and party secretary are new to office and 0 otherwise. All regressions
control for previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), Ln GDP per capita
and prefecture fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A1: Which leaving leader matters? mayor or party secretary?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Panel A: Heterogeneous effect of leaving mayor
Indicator for leaving mayor -0.108 -0.111 0.937* -0.0808 0.0852
(0.107) (0.105) (0.553) (0.101) (0.160)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.620** 0.800**
(0.299) (0.344)
Debt leverage × Leaving mayor -1.462*
(0.798)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.206* -1.172
(1.142) (1.037)
Effective tax rate × Leaving mayor -2.944*
(1.774)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 447 447 447 447 447
R2 0.446 0.455 0.462 0.458 0.463
Panel B: Heterogeneous effect of leaving party secretary
Indicator for leaving party secretary -0.0625 -0.0980 0.0997 -0.0782 -0.172
(0.111) (0.108) (0.348) (0.110) (0.150)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.645** 0.724*
(0.297) (0.381)
Debt leverage × Leaving party secretary -0.264
(0.504)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.301* -2.420**
(1.165) (1.216)
Effective tax rate × Leaving party secretary 2.080
(2.150)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 447 447 447 447 447
R2 0.444 0.454 0.454 0.457 0.458
Notes: The table presents heterogeneous effects of leaving leaders on each of the favors. Panel A presents heterogeneous effects
of leaving mayor. Panel B presents heterogeneous effects of leaving party secretary. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of
firms’ assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Debt leverage variables measures the amount of loans that go to different type
of firms (normalized by total assets); Effective tax rate captures the extent of tax deduction for firms of different ownerships;
Indicator for leaving mayor is an indicator that takes value of 1 if the county mayor is soon to leave and without promoting to
party secretary and 0 otherwise. Indicator for leaving party secretary is an indicator that takes value of 1 if the county party
secretary is soon to leave and without the mayor promoting to party secretary and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for
previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), Ln GDP per capita and prefecture fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A2: Which new leader matters? mayor or party secretary?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Relative ATD
Panel A: Heterogeneous effect of new mayor
Indicator for new mayor -0.0472 -0.0489 -0.411 -0.0453 -0.0428
(0.108) (0.105) (0.704) (0.112) (0.260)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.586** 0.562*
(0.296) (0.299)
Debt leverage × New mayor 0.508
(1.036)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.205* -2.200*
(1.179) (1.261)
Effective tax rate × New mayor -0.0423
(3.515)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 441 441 441 441 441
R2 0.438 0.446 0.446 0.450 0.450
Panel B: Heterogeneous effect of new party secretary
Indicator for new party secretary 0.128 0.135 -1.512 0.126 0.192
(0.147) (0.147) (1.233) (0.143) (0.238)
Debt leverage (State-related) 0.595** 0.391
(0.298) (0.293)
Debt leverage × New party secretary 2.235
(1.747)
Effective tax rate (Private) -2.202* -2.083
(1.195) (1.288)
Effective tax rate (State) × New party secretary -1.297
(2.854)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
All Controls X X X X X
Obs. 441 441 441 441 441
R2 0.440 0.448 0.461 0.452 0.453
Notes: The table presents heterogeneous effects of new leaders on each of the favors. Panel A presents heterogeneous effects of
new mayor. Panel B presents heterogeneous effects of new party secretary. Relative ATD is a measure for the extent of firms’
assistance in the 2001 corporate income tax; Indicator for new mayor is an indicator that takes value of 1 if the county mayor just
arrived in office and without the party secretary being promoted from mayor and 0 otherwise. Indicator for new party secretary
is an indicator that takes value of 1 if the county party secretary just arrived in office and without being promoted from mayor
and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for previous fiscal pressure, previous corporate income tax (normalized by GDP), Ln
GDP per capita and prefecture fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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E Data Sources for Corporate Income Tax
Province Prefecture County Data	Sources Province Prefecture County Data	Sources
Anhui Anqing Huaining	 Tax	Yeabook Anhui Wuhu Nanling	 Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Anqing Susong	 Tax	Yeabook Anhui Wuhu Wuhu	 Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Anqing Taihu Tax	Yeabook Anhui Xuancheng Guangde	 Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Anqing Tongcheng Tax	Yeabook Anhui Xuancheng Jingde	 Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Anqing Wangjiang Tax	Yeabook Anhui Xuancheng Jingxian Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Anqing Yuexi	 Tax	Yeabook Anhui Xuancheng Jixi	 Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Anqing Zongyang	 Tax	Yeabook Anhui Xuancheng Langxi Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Bengbu Guzhen Tax	Yeabook Anhui Xuancheng Ningguo Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Bengbu Huaiyuan	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Bishan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Bengbu Wuhe Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Dazu	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Bozhou Guoyang	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Dianjiang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chaohu Hanshan Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Fengdu	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chaohu Hexiang Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Fengjie	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chaohu Lujiang	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Hechuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chaohu Wuwei	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Jiangjin	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chuzhou Dingyuan Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Kaixian Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chuzhou Fengyang	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Liangping	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chuzhou Lai'an Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Nanchuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chuzhou Mingguang	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Pengshui	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chuzhou Quanjiao Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Qijiang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Chuzhou Tianchang Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Rongchang Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Fuyang	 Funan Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Shizhu Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Fuyang	 Jieshou Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Tongliang Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Fuyang	 Linquan Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Tongnan Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Fuyang	 Taihe	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Wulong	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Fuyang	 Yingshang	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Wushan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Hefei Changfeng	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Wuxi	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Hefei Feidong Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Yongchuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Hefei Feixi Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Youyang Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Huaibei Suixi Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Yunyang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Huainan	 Fengtai	 Tax	Yeabook Chongqing Chongqing Zhongxian Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Huangshan	 Qimen	 Tax	Yeabook Fujian	 Fuzhou Minhou	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Huangshan	 Shexian Tax	Yeabook Fujian	 Quanzhou Anxi	 Tax	Yeabook
Anhui Huangshan	 Xiuning Tax	Yeabook Gansu	 Jinchang Yongchang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Huangshan	 Yixian Tax	Yeabook Gansu	 Lanzhou	 Yuzhong	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Lu'an	area Huoqiu	 Tax	Yeabook Gansu	 Tianshui	 Gangu	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Lu'an	area Huoshan	 Tax	Yeabook Gansu	 Tianshui	 Qinan Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Lu'an	area Jinzhai	 Tax	Yeabook Gansu	 Tianshui	 Qingshui Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Lu'an	area Shouxian Tax	Yeabook Gansu	 Tianshui	 Wushan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Lu'an	area Shucheng Tax	Yeabook Gansu	 Tianshui	 Zhangchuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Ma'anshan	 Dangtu	 Tax	Yeabook Guangdong Guangzhou	 Conghua Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Suzhou	 Dangshan	 Tax	Yeabook Guangdong Guangzhou	 Zengcheng Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Suzhou	 Lingbi Tax	Yeabook Guangxi Guilin Gongcheng	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Suzhou	 Sixian Tax	Yeabook Guangxi Guilin Guanyang Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Suzhou	 Xiaoxian Tax	Yeabook Guangxi Guilin Lingchuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Tongling	 Dongzhi Tax	Yeabook Guangxi Guilin Lingui Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Tongling	 Qingyang	 Tax	Yeabook Guangxi Guilin Lipu	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Tongling	 Shitai	 Tax	Yeabook Guangxi Guilin Longsheng	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Anhui Tongling	 Tongling	 Tax	Yeabook Guangxi Guilin Pingle Fiscal	Yearbook
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Province Prefecture County Data	Sources Province Prefecture County Data	Sources
Guangxi Guilin Quanzhou	 Fiscal	Yearbook Heilongjiang Jiamusi	 Huanan Fiscal	Yearbook
Guangxi Guilin Xing'an	 Fiscal	Yearbook Heilongjiang Jiamusi	 Tangyuan Fiscal	Yearbook
Guangxi Guilin Yangshuo	 Fiscal	Yearbook Heilongjiang Jiamusi	 Tongjiang Fiscal	Yearbook
Guangxi Guilin Yongfu	 Fiscal	Yearbook Heilongjiang Mudanjiang	 Dongning Fiscal	Yearbook
Guangxi Guilin Ziyuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook Heilongjiang Mudanjiang	 Hailin Fiscal	Yearbook
Guangxi Nanning Paning Fiscal	Yearbook Heilongjiang Mudanjiang	 Linkou Fiscal	Yearbook
Guangxi Nanning Wuming Fiscal	Yearbook Heilongjiang Mudanjiang	 Muling Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Anshun	 Guanling	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Mudanjiang	 Ning'an Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Anshun	 Pingba	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Mudanjiang	 Suifenhe Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Anshun	 Puding	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Baiquan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Anshun	 Zhenning	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Fuyu Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Anshun	 Ziyun	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Gannan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Baiyun Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Kedong	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Huaxi Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Keshan Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Kaiyang	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Longjiang Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Nanming	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Tailai Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Qingzhen	 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Qiqihar Yian Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Udang Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Shuangyashan	 Baoqing Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Xiaohe Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Shuangyashan	 Jixian	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Xifeng		 Tax	Yeabook Heilongjiang Shuangyashan	 Raohe	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Xiuwen Tax	Yeabook Henan Kaifeng Kaifeng	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Guizhou Guiyang Yunyan	 Tax	Yeabook Henan Kaifeng Lankao	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Anping Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Kaifeng Sixian Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Fucheng	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Kaifeng Tongxu Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Gucheng Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Kaifeng Weishi	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Jinxiang Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Luohe Linying	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Jizhou Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Luohe Wuyang Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Raoyang Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Luohe Yancheng Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Shenzhou Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Luoyang	 Songxian Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Wuqiang	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Luoyang	 Xin'an	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Wuyi	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Luoyang	 Yanshi Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Hengshui	 Zaoqiang Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Luoyang	 Yichuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Bazhou Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Pingdingshan Baofeng	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Dachang	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Pingdingshan Jiaxian Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Dacheng Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Pingdingshan Lushan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Guan Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Pingdingshan Ruzhou Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Sanhe Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Pingdingshan Wugang Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Wenan Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Pingdingshan Yexian Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Xianghe	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Sanmenxia	 Lingbao Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Langfang Yongqing Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Sanmenxia	 Lushi	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Shijiazhuang	 Gaoyi	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Sanmenxia	 Mianchi	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Shijiazhuang	 Jingxing Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Sanmenxia	 Shanxian Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Shijiazhuang	 Yuanshi	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Sanmenxia	 Sheqi Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Xingtai	 Pingxiang Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Sanmenxia	 Yima	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Zhangjiakou	 Wanquan	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Zhengzhou	 Dengfeng Fiscal	Yearbook
Hebei Zhangjiakou	 Xuanhua	 Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Zhengzhou	 Gongyi	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Heilongjiang Jiamusi	 Fujin Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Zhengzhou	 Rongyang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Heilongjiang Jiamusi	 Fuyuan Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Zhengzhou	 Xinmi Fiscal	Yearbook
Heilongjiang Jiamusi	 Huachuan Fiscal	Yearbook Henan Zhengzhou	 Xinzheng Fiscal	Yearbook
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Province Prefecture County Data	Sources Province Prefecture County Data	Sources
Henan Zhengzhou	 Zhongmou	 Fiscal	Yearbook Hubei Xiantao Xiantao Tax	Yeabook
Henan Zhumadian Xiping Fiscal	Yearbook Hubei Xiaogan Anlu Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Enshi Badong	 Tax	Yeabook Hubei Xiaogan Dawu Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Enshi Hefeng Tax	Yeabook Hubei Xiaogan Hanchuan Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Enshi Jianshi	 Tax	Yeabook Hubei Xiaogan Xiaochang	 Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Enshi Laifeng Tax	Yeabook Hubei Xiaogan Yingcheng Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Enshi Lichuan Tax	Yeabook Hubei Xiaogan Yunmeng	 Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Enshi Xianfeng Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Changyang Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Enshi Xuan'en Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Dangyang Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Forest	zone Linqu Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Genggui Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Huanggang	 Hongan Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Wufeng	 Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Huanggang	 Huangmei Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Xingshan	 Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Huanggang	 Loushui Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Yidu Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Huanggang	 Luotian Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Yuanan Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Huanggang	 Macheng	 Tax	Yeabook Hubei Yichang	 Zhijiang	 Tax	Yeabook
Hubei Huanggang	 Tuanfeng	 Tax	Yeabook Hunan Huaihua Hongjiang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Huanggang	 Weichun	 Tax	Yeabook Hunan Zhuzhou	 Youxian Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Huanggang	 Wuxue Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Changzhou	 Jintan Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Huanggang	 Yingshan Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Changzhou	 Piaoyang Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Huangshi Daye	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Lianyungang Donghai	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Huangshi Yangxin	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Lianyungang Ganyu Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingmen	 Jingshan	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Lianyungang Guanna Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingmen	 Shayang	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Lianyungang Guanyun Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingmen	 Zhongxiang Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Nantong Hai'an Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingzhou	 Gong'an	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Nantong Haimen Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingzhou	 Honghu	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Nantong Qidong Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingzhou	 Jiangling	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Nantong Rudong Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingzhou	 Jianli	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Nantong Rugao Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingzhou	 Shishou Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Nantong Tongzhou Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Jingzhou	 Songzi Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Suzhou	 Changshu Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Qianjiang	 Qianjiang	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Suzhou	 Kunshan Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Suizhou Guangshui Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Suzhou	 Taicang Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Ten	Kansas	 Fangxian Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Suzhou	 Wujiang Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Ten	Kansas	 Jixi Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Suzhou	 Zhangjiagang Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Ten	Kansas	 Yuanxian Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Wuxi	 Jiangyin Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Ten	Kansas	 Zhushan Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Wuxi	 Yixing Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Ten	Kansas	 Zhuxi	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Binhai	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Tianmen Tianmen Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Dafeng Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xiangfan	 Baokang	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Dongtai Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xiangfan	 Laohekou Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Funing Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xiangfan	 Nanzhang Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Jianhu Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xiangfan	 Valley	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Sheyang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xiangfan	 Yicheng Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Xiangshui Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xiangfan	 Zaoyang Tax	Yeabook Jiangsu	 Yancheng Yandu	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xianning	 Chibi Tax	Yeabook Jiangxi	 Jiujiang	 Yongxiu	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xianning	 Chongyang	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Fengcheng Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xianning	 Jiayu Tax	Yeabook Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Fengxin	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xianning	 Tongcheng Tax	Yeabook Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Gaoan Fiscal	Yearbook
Hubei Xianning	 Tongshan	 Tax	Yeabook Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Jing'an	 Fiscal	Yearbook
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Province Prefecture County Data	Sources Province Prefecture County Data	Sources
Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Shanggao Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi Linfen Xiangfen	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Tonggu Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi Yuncheng Wanrong	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Wanzai	 Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi Yuncheng Yuanqu	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Yifeng	 Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Ansai	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Jiangxi	 Yichun	 Zhangshu	 Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Fuxian Fiscal	Yearbook
Jilin Siping	 Gongzhuling Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Ganquan Fiscal	Yearbook
Jilin Siping	 Lishu Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Huangling	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Jilin Siping	 Shuangliao	 Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Huanglong Fiscal	Yearbook
Jilin Siping	 Yitong	 Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Luochuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Jilin Yanbian Yanji Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Wuqi Fiscal	Yearbook
Ningxia Yinchuan	 Helan Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Yanchuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Ningxia Yinchuan	 Yongning Fiscal	Yearbook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Yanzhang Fiscal	Yearbook
Shandong Dezhou Leling Tax	Yeabook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Yichuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Shandong Dezhou Lingxiang Tax	Yeabook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Zhichang Fiscal	Yearbook
Shandong Dezhou Ningjin Tax	Yeabook Shanxi	 Yan'an	 Zhidan Fiscal	Yearbook
Shandong Dezhou Pinyuan Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Aba Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dezhou Qihe	 Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Heishui Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dezhou Qingyun Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Hongyuan Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dezhou Wucheng Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Jinchuan Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dezhou Xiajin	 Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Jiuzhaigou Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dezhou Yucheng Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Li	 Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dongying	 Guangrao Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Malcolm Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dongying	 Kenli Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Maoxian Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Dongying	 Lijin Tax	Yeabook Sichuan	 Aba Rangtang Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Jinan	 Jiyang	 Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Aba Ruoergai Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Jinan	 Pingyin Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Aba Songpan Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Jinan	 Shanghe Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Aba Wenchuan Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Jinan	 Zhangqiu Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Aba Xiaojin Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Liaocheng Chiping Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Bazhong Tongjiang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Shandong Liaocheng Dong'e	 Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Baiyu Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Liaocheng Gaotang Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Batang Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Liaocheng Guanxian Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Danba Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Liaocheng Liaocheng Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Daocheng Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Liaocheng Linqing Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Dege Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Liaocheng Shenxian Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Derong Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Liaocheng Yanggu	 Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Ganzi Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Qingdao	 Jiaonan Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Kangding Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Qingdao	 Jiaozhou Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Kowloon Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Qingdao	 Jimo Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Litang Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Qingdao	 Laixi Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Luding Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Qingdao	 Pingdu Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Luhuo Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Tai'an	 Faicheng Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Seda Tax	Yeabook
Shandong Weifang Shouguang Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Shiqu Tax	Yeabook
Shanxi Changzhi Changzhi	 Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Ganzi Xiangcheng Tax	Yeabook
Shanxi Changzhi Qinyuan Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Guang'an Wusheng	 Tax	Yeabook
Shanxi Jincheng Gaoping Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Mianyang	 Zitong	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Shanxi Jincheng Yangcheng	 Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Nanchong Nanbu	 Tax	Yeabook
Shanxi Jinzhong Heshun	 Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Nanchong Yilong Tax	Yeabook
Shanxi Jinzhong Qixian Fiscal	Yearbook Sichuan	 Nanchong Yingshan Tax	Yeabook
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Province Prefecture County Data	Sources Province Prefecture County Data	Sources
Sichuan	 Panzhihua	 Miyi Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Jinhua Wuyi	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Sichuan	 Panzhihua	 Yanbian Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Jinhua Yiwu Fiscal	Yearbook
Sichuan	 Suining Daying	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Jinhua Yongkang Fiscal	Yearbook
Sichuan	 Ziyang Lezhi Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Lishui Jingning	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Tianjin Tianjin Jinghai	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Lishui Jinyun	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Tianjin Tianjin Jixian Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Lishui Longquan Fiscal	Yearbook
Tianjin Tianjin Ninghe Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Lishui Qingtian	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Xinjiang Shihezi	 Shihezi	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Lishui Qingyuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Chuxiong	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Lishui Songyang Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Dayao Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Lishui Suichang Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Lufeng Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Lishui Yunhe Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Mouding	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Ningbo Cixi Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Nanhua Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Ningbo Fenghua Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Shuangbai Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Ningbo Ninghai	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Wuding	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Ningbo Xiangshan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Yaoan Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Ningbo Yuyao Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Yongren Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Shaoxing	 Shangyu Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Chuxiong Yuanmou	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Shaoxing	 Shaoxing Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Dali Yangbiyi	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Shaoxing	 Shengzhou Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Kunming Anning	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Shaoxing	 Xinchang Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Jiangcheng	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Shaoxing	 Zhuji Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Jingdongyi	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Taizhou Linhai Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Jinggudai	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Taizhou Sanmen	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Lahu Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Taizhou Tiantai Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Lancanglahu	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Taizhou Wenling Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Mojianghani	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Taizhou Xianju	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Ning'erhani Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Taizhou Yuhuan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Yunnan Simao Simao	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Wenzhou Cangnan	 Tax	Yeabook
Yunnan Simao Ximengva	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Wenzhou Dongtou Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Hangzhou Chunan	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Wenzhou Pingyang Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Hangzhou Jiande Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Wenzhou Rui'an Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Hangzhou Lin'an	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Wenzhou Taishun	 Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Hangzhou Tonglu	 Fiscal	Yearbook Zhejiang Wenzhou Wencheng	 Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Heng	 Changshan	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Wenzhou Yongjia	 Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Heng	 Jiangshan	 Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Wenzhou Yueqing Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Heng	 Kaihua Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Zhoushan Daishan	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Zhejiang Heng	 Longyou Tax	Yeabook Zhejiang Zhoushan Shengsi Fiscal	Yearbook
Zhejiang Huzhou	 Anji	 Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Huzhou	 Changxing	 Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Huzhou	 Deqing	 Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Jiaxing Haining Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Jiaxing Haiyan Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Jiaxing Jiashan	 Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Jiaxing Pinghu Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Jiaxing Tongxiang Tax	Yeabook
Zhejiang Jinhua Dongyang Fiscal	Yearbook
Zhejiang Jinhua Lanxi Fiscal	Yearbook
Zhejiang Jinhua Pan'an	 Fiscal	Yearbook
Zhejiang Jinhua Pujiang	 Fiscal	Yearbook
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Chapter 2:
Do giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal
armed conflicts?
Yu-Hsiang Lei and Guy Michaels
We use new data to examine the effects of giant oilfield discoveries around
the world since 1946. On average, these discoveries increase per capita oil
production and oil exports by up to 50%. But these giant oilfield discoveries
also have a dark side: they increase the incidence of internal armed conflict by
about 5–8 percentage points. This increased incidence of conflict due to giant
oilfield discoveries is especially high for countries that had already experienced
armed conflicts or coups in the decade prior to discovery.
1. Introduction
Do natural resource windfalls, such as those arising from the discovery of
giant oilfields, increase the risk of internal armed conflict? Anecdotal evidence
from Nigeria, Angola, and Iraq leads us to suspect that they may, and recent
research (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Besley and Persson, 2009, 2011; Dal Bo´
and Dal Bo´, 2011) even sheds light on the mechanisms that underlie some
of these conflicts over resources. But as Norway, Canada, and Brazil show,
not all oil rich countries experience conflict. Careful surveys of the literature
on conflicts and natural resources (e.g. Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Ross,
2004, 2006) show how difficult it has been to estimate the causal effect of oil
on armed conflict in all but a handful of countries.1 The goal of this paper
is to examine whether giant oilfield discoveries really do fuel internal armed
conflicts around the world, and if so — in which settings.
We begin with a simple model, following Besley and Persson (2009), which
guides our empirical analysis. In this model, giant oilfield discoveries increase
oil revenues, generating windfall income for the incumbent. When the in-
cumbent cannot credibly commit to share this windfall, the opposition may
mobilize to challenge him, and this may lead to an internal armed conflict.
Such conflicts over resources are especially likely in countries where political
violence tends to translate into political and economic gains.
To investigate this model’s predictions, we ideally require exogenous vari-
ation in resource windfalls. Finding such variation in multiple countries is
challenging, since cross-country (or cross-conflict) comparisons may be con-
taminated by omitted variables bias. Using panel data to absorb country
fixed effects is not straightforward either, because the quantity of natural
resources extracted is a choice and oil prices may be affected by violent con-
1Studies of the causal effect of natural resources on conflict tend to focus on specific countries. For
example, Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Dube and Vargas (2013) study the effect of resource windfalls on
conflict in Colombia, and Bellows and Miguel (2009) study this effect in Sierra Leone. Also closely related
is contemporaneous work by Cotet and Tsui (2013) on oil and conflict, which we discuss below.
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flict. To overcome this difficulty, we focus on the discovery of giant oilfields,
each of which contained ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of 500 million
barrels (bbl) equivalent or more before extraction began (data on these giant
oilfields are reported in Horn, 2004).2 Of the 910 giant oilfields that were
known as of 2003, we focus on the 782 giants that were discovered since 1946
in 65 different countries.
We show evidence that in a panel of countries, controlling for country
and year fixed effects, the timing of giant oilfield discoveries is plausibly
exogenous, at least in the short-medium run. To see why, consider how
important giant oilfields are as a global source of hydrocarbons. Horn (2007)
concludes that giant oilfields account for over 40% of the world’s URR of oil
and gas. Discoveries of these giant fields are therefore economically important
events, which are rare in all but a handful of countries: in less than 5% of the
country–year observations in our global dataset was one or more giant oilfield
discovered. It is true that countries can influence the prospecting efforts
within their territory, and thus affect the discovery rate. But prospecting for
oil is highly uncertain, and the odds of finding a giant oilfield are usually low,
so countries have little control over the timing of such finds. Below we discuss
a wide range of empirical tests, which support our interpretation that of the
events that follow giant oilfield discoveries as causal. But before we further
discuss our causal interpretation of the findings, we first describe them.
We find using a panel of 193 countries from1946 to 2008 that on average
oil production increases by about 35–50 percentage points within 4–10 years
of a giant discovery.3 Giant oilfield discoveries similarly increase oil exports
2Unless otherwise specified, we use “oil” as a shorthand that also includes condensate and natural gas. To
determine whether an oilfield has estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of 500 million bbl of oil equivalent
or more, the estimated reserves of oil and condensate are summed up. These are then added to the amount
of natural gas, which is converted to oil at a ratio of 6000 cu ft/bbl (Horn, 2004). Note that ultimate
recoverable reserves include the amount already extracted and the amount that has not yet been extracted.
3We use all the countries in the world, even those that do not discover giant oilfields. This allows us to
control for countries where non-giant discoveries are made (as discussed below), and for variation in countries
that do not discover oil, and which may affect the estimated year effects in the panel regressions.
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by about 20–50% within 6–10 years.
Having found evidence suggesting a large impact of giant oilfield discov-
eries on oil output, we next examine their impact on conflict. We find that
on average giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed
conflicts (measured as a year with 25 or more conflict casualties) by about
5–8 percentage points within 4–8 years of discovery, compared to a baseline
probability of about 10 percentage points.
We also find that the discovery of giant oilfields is especially likely to
fuel internal conflicts in countries with recent histories of political violence.
For example, giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed
conflict by about 11–18 percentage points (compared to a baseline probability
of about 37–39%) when a country experienced at least one such conflict in
the decade prior to discovery. Giant oilfield discoveries similarly increase the
odds of internal armed conflict by 11–14 percentage points (compared to a
baseline probability of about 19– 20%) in countries that experienced at least
one coup in the decade prior to discovery. In contrast, in countries that
experienced no internal conflicts or coups in the decade before a discovery,
there is no significant effect of giant oilfield discoveries on the incidence of
internal armed conflicts.
Turning to the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on economic outcomes, we
find suggestive evidence that per capita GDP and government spending may
have increased by about 4–6% within the decade following a giant discovery.
But unlike our results on conflict, these estimates are not robust to the differ-
ent specifications that we consider. Moreover,we find no evidence that giant
oilfield discoveries significantly affect private consumption or spending.
To support our interpretation that the findings described above are the
causal consequences of giant oilfield discoveries, we report results from a
number of robustness checks. First, we address the concern that giant oil-
field discoveries may have resulted from economic or political changes that
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preceded them. Reassuringly, we find no evidence of significant economic or
political changes in the five years leading up to giant oilfield discoveries. We
also test whether giant oilfield discoveries follow lulls in previous conflicts,
and find no evidence to support this hypothesis. Second, we tackle the con-
cern that giant oilfield discoveries are serially correlated over time, because
some oilfields are close together, so one finding one may lead to another.
While it is true that giant oilfield discoveries in a country’s recent past in-
crease the odds that it finds a giant oilfield in a given year, controlling for
these past discoveries does not change our estimates by much. Our results
are also robust to excluding country–year observations within a decade or
less of previous giant discoveries. Observations with giant oilfield discoveries
account for only about 1% of the remaining sample, making them especially
difficult to anticipate. Third, we address concerns that economic or politi-
cal conditions shortly before discovery may affect our estimates, by showing
that our results are robust to controlling for (instrumented) lagged depen-
dent variables, lagged institutional quality (polity 2), and lagged aggregate
private investment. Fourth, we tackle the concern that observations with
oil discoveries are different from others in ways that we cannot measure and
control for directly. To do so, we use the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book
(2008) to restrict our sample to observations where at least one oil discov-
ery – not necessarily of a giant oilfield –was made. Regressions using this
sample compare the effect of giant oilfield discoveries to the effect of smaller
oilfield discoveries. Remarkably, even in this restricted sample we find that
our results hold.
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal conflicts in coun-
tries prone to violence has policy implications. Those who strive to reduce
armed conflict should be concerned about oil rents that incumbents obtain in
conflict-prone areas, especially if those rents encourage challenges to the in-
cumbents’ power. And firms that prospect for oil in conflict-prone areas and
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those who regulate them ought to be concerned about negative externalities
for many locals,who have little to gain from giant oilfield discoveries but may
suffer from conflicts over the oil.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the related literature, Section 3 presents a model of conflict over oil revenues,
Section 4 discusses the data, Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6
concludes.
2. Related Literature
Concerns that some natural resources – including oil – may fuel internal
armed conflicts arise from observing at oil-rich countries, such as Angola,
Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, and Indonesia. A number of influential papers in-
cluding Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2004) and Reno (1999) have investigated
the relationship between natural resources and conflict, sparking considerable
interest among social scientists and policy makers. Surveys of the developing
literature on this topic, including Ross (2004, 2006), Humphreys (2005), and
Blattman and Miguel (2010), conclude that there is evidence linking oil to
some instances of internal armed conflict. At the same time, not all oil-rich
countries experience internal armed conflict, so conflicts over resources are
clearly not inevitable.4
Theoretical studies of the links between natural resource rents and conflict
have focused on the possibility that these conflicts are the result of competi-
tion over resources. Summarizing this literature, Blattman and Miguel (2010)
point out that models of armed conflict typically consider the cases where
property rights are not well-protected, contracts are imperfectly enforced,
and rulers are not always replaced by fair elections. Recent contributions
to the literature on conflicts over resources include Garfinkel and Skaperdas
4For example, Michaels (2011) and Caselli and Michaels (2013) find no evidence of armed conflict in the
U.S. South and in Brazil.
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(2007), Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´ (2011), Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), Caselli
and Cunningham (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2010), Miguel and Satyanath
(2011), Harari and La Ferrara (2013), and Caselli et al. (2013). Recent evi-
dence on the effect of U.S. food aid on civil conflict (Nunn and Qian, 2014)
is also highly relevant.
But despite all this research on the relation between natural resources and
armed conflict, establishing the causal effect of resource windfalls on conflict
around the world has been difficult. Some of the best-identified studies exam-
ine causality using regional variation within countries. For example, Bellows
and Miguel (2009) find that chiefdoms with more diamond wealth in Sierra
Leone experienced more armed clashes, and studies of Colombia find that
high coca prices increase conflict in coca producing regions (Angrist and Ku-
gler, 2008) and high oil prices increase conflict in areas where oil is extracted
from or shipped through in pipelines (Dube and Vargas, 2013).
Taken together, the evidence from within-country studies suggests that
natural resource windfalls can fuel armed conflicts, at least in some countries
and settings. But in order to generalize these findings to the rest of the
world and to better understand in what settings natural resource windfalls
are more likely to cause armed conflict, it seems useful to look beyond the
boundaries of specific nations. It turns out, however, that using variation
from multiple countries to identify the effect of natural resource on conflict is
not straightforward. To see why this is a challenge, consider first comparisons
of resource rich countries with resource scarce ones, or of conflicts that take
place in resource rich and resource scarce parts of the world. The main
concern about this approach is that resource-rich areas might differ from
others in ways that are difficult to measure and control for. For example, the
Middle East is not only rich in oil but it also differed from other parts of the
world in important ways before oil was discovered. These differences, which
are notoriously hard to quantify, along with oil abundance, may have caused
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subsequent conflicts, and telling apart the causes is difficult.
To overcome the problem of fixed differences between countries, we could
consider a second approach, which interacts country-specific measures of oil
abundance with variation over time in oil prices. But this approach suffers
from concerns about reverse causality, since conflicts may raise oil prices, as
they probably did during the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the Iranian Revolution
in 1979, the Kuwait War in 1990, and the Libyan Civil War in 2011, making
the direction of causality between conflict and resource revenues difficult to
ascertain.5
A third approach we could have pursued uses time-varying measures of oil
production or exports in each country. But this approach also has problems
in shedding light on causality, since countries choose the amount of oil they
extract, and potential buyers may also choose how much to buy from whom.
These choices may respond, directly or indirectly, to armed conflicts or their
underlying causes.6
Since identifying the causal effect of natural resources on conflict using
the approaches described above is difficult, our paper focuses on the discov-
ery of giant oilfields as a more plausibly exogenous source of variation. A
closely related study in this respect is contemporaneous work by Cotet and
Tsui (2013), which concludes that while the defense burden increases follow-
ing oil discoveries, conflict does not increase significantly. There are several
differences in the implementation of their paper and ours. First, our data,
unlike theirs, cover the entire world, focus only on giant oilfield discoveries,
and measure not only oil deposits, but also gas and condensate. Second, we
report large and significant effects of giant discoveries on oil output and oil
5The possibility that internal conflict in Libya increased oil prices was discussed by the media. See for
example: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12522291. When we regress an indicator for internal conflict
on an interaction of an indicator for countries with at least one giant oilfield and the log of inflation-adjusted
oil price, controlling for country and year fixed effects, we get a coefficient of 0.044 (s.e. 0.024), suggesting
a positive and marginally significant relation between the two.
6For example, the recent internal armed conflict in Syria appears to have reduced its oil production:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c9d67952-e823-11e0-9fc7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1aOqrle6u.
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exports (both measured per capita), while they do not. The giant discoveries
which we study, most likely reflect larger prizes over which rivals may fight.
Third, while Cotet and Tsui (2013) choose to emphasize instrumental vari-
ables estimates where the relationship between oil discoveries and conflict is
positive but imprecisely estimated, some of the other estimates that they re-
port (e.g. in Table 10) actually are positive and significant. Finally, we have
incorporated data used by Cotet and Tsui (2013) into our robustness checks.
We show that applying our methodology to their data yields estimates that
are quite similar to ours. In other words, even using their data, major oil
discoveries are followed by increases in internal armed conflict.
3. A model of conflict for resources
To guide our empirical analysis, we begin with a simple model of conflict
over resources, following Besley and Persson (2009).7 The model focuses on
two potentially conflicting groups denoted by J : an incumbent I and an
opposition O. Each group makes up half of the population and can mobilize
a fraction AJ of its citizens to serve in its army. The decision of each group
whether or not to mobilize an army is discrete, and is denoted by δJ ∈ 0, AJ .
The probability that power transitions from the incumbent to the opposition
is determined by a conflict function: Prob(change of power)= 12 +
1
µ{δO−δI}.
The parameter µ captures the degree to which the country can resist political
violence, and low values of µ mean that i political violence is a more practical
means of transferring power. We assume that A
I
µ ≤ 12 ≤ 1− A
O
µ , which holds
as long as µ is sufficiently large.
The winning group has access to government revenue denoted by R, which
comes from natural resources. These resources must be shared according to
an institutional rule, which stipulates that the incumbent gets (1 − θ)2R
7As we explain below, we depart from their model only in relatively minor details.
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and the opposition gets 2θR, where θ ∈ [0, 12 ]. In other words, we consider
sharing rules that range from institutions that lead to complete equality θ = 12
to institutions where the winner takes all (θ = 0).
In addition to any revenues they may receive from the government, each
citizen supplies one unit of labor to the market, earning a real wage w. A
group that wants to finance its army does so by taxing its population. Since
we are interested primarily in bilateral internal conflicts (as opposed to one-
sided conflicts), we depart from Besley and Persson (2009) by assuming that
the opportunity cost of fighting is equal for the opposition and the incum-
bent.8
The timing of events within each period is as follows. First the amount
of resources at the government’s disposal, R, is determined randomly. We
assume that if a giant oilfield is discovered then R = RH, and otherwise
R = 0.9 Second, the opposition decides whether to mobilize its army to fight
the incumbent. Third, the government decides whether to mobilize its own
army to fight the opposition. We assume that both the opposition and the in-
cumbent only mobilize if the net expected returns to mobilization are strictly
positive, and an internal conflict takes place if at least one party mobilizes
an army. Fourth, these choices and the probabilistic conflict technology then
determine who wins power. Finally, the winner allocates the resources R.
Given our assumptions, the expected per capita payoff to incumbent mem-
bers is:
w(1− δI) + {1
2
− 1
µ
(δO − δI)(1− 2θ)}2R (1)
8Besley and Persson (2009) study repression as one-sided violence by an incumbent, which has lower op-
portunity cost of fighting than the opposition since he can finance part of his army by taxing that opposition.
In our empirical analysis (Subsection 5.3) we therefore examine the possibility of repression in the aftermath
of giant oil discoveries.
9Besley and Persson (2009) do not focus on oil discoveries but on rents in general. Our assumption of
two states of the world – with and without giant oil discoveries – makes the model more closely related to
our empirical analysis.
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where the first term wages net of taxes, and the second is the expected size
of the transfer. Similarly, the expected payoff to opposition members is:
w(1− δO) + {1
2
− 1
µ
(δO − δI)(1− 2θ)}2R (2)
To solve for the equilibrium we identify the sub-game perfect Nash equi-
librium in the sequential game where the opposition moves first. It turns out
that this game has two equilibria:
• Peace (when neither side mobilizes): δO = δl = 0, which occurs when
2R(1− 2θ)/w ≤ µ.
• Internal conflict (when both sides mobilize): δI = AI and δO = AO,
which occurs when 2R(1− 2θ)/w > µ.
This model guides our empirical analysis of the effect of giant oilfields in
a number of ways. First, the model assumes that giant oilfield discoveries
increase oil revenues. While this assumption seems very plausible, it may
take time to start generating revenues from newly discovered oilfields, espe-
cially if it is difficult to extract the oil or if the discovering country lacks the
appropriate technology, capital, or infrastructure. While we cannot measure
oil revenues, we can measure oil production and oil exports, and our first
empirical challenge is to determine whether they increase significantly within
a few years of discovery, and if so - by how much.
Second, we investigate the effect of oil discovery on internal armed conflict.
The model predicts that in countries where 2RH(1−2θ)/w > µ, the discovery
of a giant oilfield ends peace and sets off an internal conflict. This can happen
when the incumbent receives most of the oil, and cannot commit to sharing
them with the opposition. If conditions are otherwise ripe for conflict, a giant
oilfield discovery can fuel conflict over the oil.
Third, giant oilfield discoveries are likely to set off conflict only in coun-
tries where political violence is seen as effective, namely where µ is sufficiently
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low. Empirically, we identify countries with low µ as those with a history
of internal conflicts or coups in the decade prior to the discovery of a giant
oilfield. It is in those countries that we expect giant oilfield discoveries to
trigger armed conflicts over the control of the oil. The model also allows for
the possibility that giant oilfield discoveries fuel conflicts in countries with
low wages (which imply a low opportunity cost of fighting), poor institu-
tions that increase inequality (θ close to zero represents “winner takes all”
societies, where it pays to fight for control), or ethnic fractionalization that
creates conflicting groups to begin with. In practice, however, underlying
characteristics such as income, institutions, and ethnic fractionalization may
be interrelated with each other and with the degree to which political vio-
lence pays off (µ). In the empirical analysis below (Section 5) we focus not
only on the interaction of giant oilfield discoveries with empirical measures
of µ, but we also examine other possible interactions related to the model.
Finally, the discovery of a giant oilfield increases government revenues, R,
and total per capita GDP, R+w. The increase of log per capita GDP in this
model is ∂ln(R+w)/∂ln(R) = R/(R+w), or in other words the proportional
increase in GDP as a result of an oilfield discovery is less than the proportional
increase in oil revenues as a result of this discovery. Moreover, as we discussed,
in some cases oil discoveries cause mobilization, and this may reduce civilian
per capita GDP. Any additional factors which are not modeled, such as the
cost of conflict or any distortionary effect of oil on the rest of the economy,
may further reduce the net benefits of giant oilfield discovery. Given these
caveats, Subsection 5.3 investigates the effect of giant oil discoveries on GDP
and its components.
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4. Data on oil, conflicts, and economic outcomes
To analyze the effects of giant oilfield discoveries we require panel data on
the timing of these discoveries in addition to outcome measures and control
variables. Since country definitions differ over time and usage, we use the
country definitions from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2009), a com-
monly used dataset, as the basis for our analysis.10 The Penn World Table
reports data on countries from 1950 to 2007, but we examine all the conflicts
that took place after the end of the Second World War (see below), so some
of the variables we match in from other sources span the years from 1946 to
2008, which is our period of analysis.
4.1. Data on oil discovery and production
Our main regressor of interest is an indicator for the discovery of (at least
one) giant oil field in a given country in a given year. We use data from
Horn (2003, 2004), which reports the date of discovery, the name of the
discovering country, and a number of other variables, for 910 giant oilfields
discovered both onshore and offshore from 1868 to 2003. This dataset builds
on previous datasets (e.g. Halbouty et al., 1970), and attempts to include
every giant oilfield discovered around the world. To qualify as a giant (and
thus be included in the dataset), an oilfield must have contained ultimate
recoverable reserves (URR) of at least 500million barrels of oil equivalent
(MMOBE). One limitation of these data is that the oilfields it describes differ
considerably in the identity of those who estimated the URR and in the way
the URR was estimated. Moreover, the estimated URR of various oilfields was
gradually updated, depending on the estimators and their methods.11 Since
10We add three Communist countries which existed until the early 1990s: the USSR (until 1991), Yu-
goslavia (until 1991), and Czechoslovakia (until 1992); the countries that emerged from these three are cov-
ered in our dataset from the year following the corresponding collapse. We also add North Korea,Myanmar,
and Netherlands Antilles. Our results are robust to excluding these countries.
11For example, some oilfields’ URR was updated from an earlier version of the dataset we use (compare
Horn, 2004, 2003).
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this process may induce measurement error issues across oilfields, we simply
construct an indicator for whether a country is mentioned in the dataset as
having discovered at least one giant oilfield in each given year. This does
not avoid all forms of measurement error, as some oilfields may have been
incorrectly included in the dataset or excluded from it, but we consider this
a reasonable compromise given the limitations of the data.12
Of the 910 giant oilfields covered in Horn (2004), 782were discovered from
1946 onwards, and these discoveries took place in 65 different countries. The
461 country–year observations with giant discoveries account for less than 5%
of all the observations in our data, and in all but a few countries giant oilfield
discoveries are rare events (Table A1 lists the number of observations with
discoveries in each discovering country). The rate of giant oilfield discoveries
peaked during the 1960s and 1970s, and country–year pairs with discoveries
were most common in Asia (41%), followed by Europe (18%), Africa (16%),
North America (12%), South America (9%), and Oceania (4%).13 Our dataset
contains 285 country–year observations with giant onshore discoveries and
213 country–year observations with giant offshore discoveries. These figures
include 37 country–year observations with both onshore and offshore giant
discoveries. Table 1 reports summary statistics for our measure of giant
oilfield discoveries and for other variables that we describe below.
We complement our data on giant oilfield discoveries with data on the
timing of other oilfield discoveries from the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book
(2008). This source reports more discoveries than our main dataset, since it
is not limited to giant oilfield discoveries, but its main drawback is that the
quantity of oil discovered is not reported for most oilfields. In addition, these
data seem to focus on oil-producing fields, so they may exclude some gas
12Nonetheless, in some robustness checks below we report separate estimates for giant oilfields of different
sizes.
13The continent classification follows that of the United Nations (U.N. Statistics Division, 2013). The
country–year distribution of discovery by decades is 3% for 1946–1949, 15% for 1950s, 22% for 1960s, 22%
for 1970s, 14% for 1980s, 17% for 1990s, and 7% for 2000–2003.
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fields.14 But these data are still useful, since they allow us to restrict parts
of our analysis to observations with oil discoveries, and compare the effect of
giant oilfield discoveries to discoveries of smaller fields.
In our robustness checks we incorporate into our dataset two variables
from the dataset constructed by Cotet and Tsui (2013).15 Both variables are
measured by country-year observations, for 63 countries from 1946-2003.16
The first variable is the number of “wildcat” (exploratory) oil wells drilled,
which is a proxy for oil exploration efforts. In addition to using this variable
directly, we also construct an indicator for a positive number of wildcat wells.
The second variable is the quantity of oil discovered, which we use to construct
indicators for years with “giant” discoveries (years with total URR of at least
500 million barrels) and for years with smaller discoveries. These variables
differ from those that we use in our main analysis in several ways. First, the
sources of data that Cotet and Tsui (2013) use are different from ours, and
they differ in the way they estimate ultimate recoverable reserves (URR).
Second, their measure includes only oil discoveries, while ours includes not
only oil but also natural gas and condensate. Finally, the measure that Cotet
and Tsui (2013) use aggregates the URR over all discoveries within a country
in a given year, while our measure effectively uses only the largest single
discovery. The correlation between our indicator for giant oilfield discoveries
and an indicator for years where the Cotet and Tsui (2013) report discoveries
with URR of at least 500 million barrels, is around 0.55.
Our final source for data on oil is Ross (2011), which reports the value of
production of oil and gas by country and year from 1932 onwards.17 These
14Some fields covered in Horn (2004) do not appear in the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book (2008), even
though this latter source covers smaller fields, so it reports more fields overall. This may be because the
coverage of the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book is uneven across countries, whereas Horn (2004) attempts
to cover all giant oilfields in all countries.
15Their dataset is available at: http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2010-0022 data.zip, and is dis-
cussed in Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Tsui (2011).
16The dataset that Cotet and Tsui (2013) construct includes Papua New Guinea, which is nonetheless
excluded from their econometric analysis of the remaining 62 countries.
17Details of data construction can be found in Ross (2010).
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data allow us to examine whether giant oilfield discoveries affect the value of
oil and gas which a country produces. We convert this variable into US$2005,
in line with our other variables below, using the CPI index from US Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
4.2. Data on economic outcomes
The Penn World Table (PWT 6.3, 2009) is our source for GDP-related
measures and population from 1950-2007. We use this dataset to construct
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per-capita GDP in constant US$2005,
and to decompose it into private consumption, private investment, and gov-
ernment expenditure.18 We also construct a measure of the real exchange
by taking the ratio of the nominal exchange rate (XRAT, which measures
dollars per local currency unit) to PPP. Using this definition, a decrease in
the real exchange rate corresponds to a real exchange rate appreciation. In
addition, we supplement the PWT data with International Monetary Fund
(IMF) data (Abbas et al. 2010) on public debt as a percentage of GDP.
To measure countries’ international trade, we use the NBER-UN trade
data (Feenstra et al. 2005), which reports trade outcomes from 1962-2000.
We construct per capita measures of oil exports and non-oil exports. This
last measure is constructed by summing up the exports in SITC Revision
2 categories 33 (Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials) and
34 (Gas, natural and manufactured). We convert all these measures into
US$2005 as described above.
18PPP-adjusted GDP per capita is constructed using rgdpl (real GDP per capita, Laspeyres) and the com-
ponents of GDP are constructed by multiplying each share, kc (private consumption), ki (private investment),
kg (government spending), to rgdpl. All these variables are from PWT 6.3.
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4.3. Data on political violence
We use the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) to measure the
incidence of internal armed conflicts from 1946-2008.19 One of our main
outcomes of interest is an indicator for whether a given country experiences
an internal conflict, which claims the lives of 25 people or more, in each
given year. About 10 percent of our country-year observations involve such
conflicts, and these conflicts take place in 97 different countries. Almost half
of the internal conflicts in our data took place during the 1980s and 1990s, and
the continent with the most conflicts was Asia (47% of conflict observations),
followed by Africa (33%), South America (8%), North America (7%), Europe
(6%), and Oceania (1%).20
For our robustness checks, we construct five other measures of internal
armed conflict. The first is an intensity-scaled measure of internal armed
conflicts, which takes on the value of one if the internal conflict’s death toll
in a given year was 25-999, two if it was 1000 or more, and zero otherwise.
The second is an indicator for having either an internal or an internationalized
internal conflict, since conflicts may switch from one type to the other. The
third is an indicator for having any type of armed conflict (internal or not).
The final two measures, following Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) and Cotet and
Tsui (2013), are: an indicator for onset of internal armed conflict (having an
internal conflict and no internal armed conflict in the preceding year); and
a measure of internal armed conflict transitions (an indicator for an internal
armed conflict in the current year minus the indicator for the previous year).
Another measure of political violence that we use is an indicator for having
at least one coup in a given year, based on data from the Polity IV project
(Marshall and Marshall 2011). A coup is defined as a forceful seizure of
19Conflicts are classified into four types in the UCDP/PRIO dataset: interstate, internal, internationalized
internal, and extra-systemic (conflicts between a state and a non-state group outside its territory). Our main
incidence measure is constructed using internal conflicts, but we consider others below.
20The country-year distribution of conflict incidence by decades is 2% for 1946-1949, 5% for 1950s, 10%
for 1960s, 15% for 1970s, 22% for 1980s, 27% for 1990s, 17% for 2000-2008.
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executive authority and office by a dissident or opposition faction within
the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in
the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime, or an attempt
to do so (we do not distinguish between successful or unsuccessful coups).
About 5.5 percent of our observations are classified as having at least one
coup, and coups thus defined took place in 116 different countries from 1946-
2008. Coups were fairly evenly distributed from the 1960s onwards (and
rarer before), and the continent with the most country-year observations
with coups is Africa (51%), followed by Asia (25%), South America (9%),
North America (9%), Europe (5%), and Oceania (1%).21
As an indicator for repression, we use a measure for purges from Banks
(2010). This indicator takes on a value of one if a country experiences at
least one purge in a given year, and zero otherwise. A purge is defined as sys-
tematic murder and elimination of political opponents by incumbent regimes.
About 8.6 percent of our observations are classified as having involved repres-
sion, and repression thus defined took place in 112 countries from 1946-2008.
Repressions peaked during the beginning of the sample period - the1940s and
1950s - and gradually declined over time.22
We also follow Besley and Persson (2011) in constructing an indicator for
countries with strong institutions. They use the fraction of time spent having
the highest score for executive constraints variable (XCONST) from Polity IV
project (Marshall et al. 2010) as the criterion for having strong institutions.23
In our analysis, we also use the Polity 2 score from the Polity IV project as
a measure for institutional quality. This is a common measure of a country’s
21The country-year distribution of coup incidence by decades is 4% for 1946-1949, 7% for 1950s, 19% for
1960s, 20% for 1970s, 20% for 1980s, 18% for 1990s, 12% for 2000-2008.
22The country-year distribution of repression incidence by decades is 32% for 1946-1949, 30% for 1950s,
17% for 1960s, 11% for 1970s, 3% for 1980s, 2% for 1990s, and 1% for 2000-2008.
23Details can be found in Besley and Persson (2011, pp. 1430-1431). There are 26 countries they define as
having strong institutions: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States.
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political institutions, taking on values from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10
(strongly democratic). Finally, we use the ethnic fractionalization measure
from Alesina et al. (2003).
5. Results
This section begins by discussing our baseline empirical specifications and
estimates of the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on oil production and ex-
ports and on internal armed conflicts (Subsection 5.1). We then discuss the
robustness of our estimates using a number of alternative specifications (Sub-
section 5.2). We conclude this section by discussing the estimates of giant
oilfield discoveries on other economic and political outcomes (Subsection 5.3).
5.1. Baseline Specifications and Results
In order to examine the effect of giant oilfield discoveries, we use our panel
data on countries over time to estimate the following specification:
Yit+j = β1jDiscit + Countryi + Y eart + εit (3)
where Yit+j is the outcome in country i in year t+ j, Discit is an indicator
for the discovery of a giant oilfield in country i in year t, Countryi and
Y eart are country and year fixed effects, and εit is a stochastic error. We
begin by estimating this specification for different lags j, where in most cases
j ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}. This allows us to non-parametrically trace the effect of
discovery on outcomes over a decade.24 In addition, some of our specifications
add controls, as explained in below and in the various tables.
As we later discuss, we find that after controlling for country and year fixed
effects, the timing of giant oilfield discoveries is largely uncorrelated with
countries’ economic and political performance in the five preceding years.
24Below we report estimates for other values of j, including odd and negative values.
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One notable exception to this, however, is that giant oilfield discoveries in a
country’s recent past raise the odds of additional discoveries in its near future.
Specifically, we find that the unconditional probability of a giant discovery
in year t increases from about 1 percent when there were no giant oilfield
discoveries from t − 10 to t − 1 to 87 percent if there was a giant discovery
in every year from t − 10 to t − 1. Controlling for country and (year fixed
effects) significantly reduces the predictive power of past discoveries, though it
remains statistically significant. In a regression where the dependent variable
is Discit and the regressor of interest is the number of years with giant oilfield
discoveries from t− 10 to t− 1, controlling for country and year fixed effects,
the estimated coefficient is 0.032 (s.e. 0.004).25
These results suggest that giant oilfield discoveries in a country’s recent
past have some predictive power for whether a subsequent discovery is made.26
We account for this serial correlation in the timing of giant oilfield discov-
eries by repeating our estimates of specification (1) with another specifica-
tion, which we call (1a), and which includes the number of years with giant
oilfield discoveries from t − 10 to t − 1 (labeled PDiscit) as a control. In
addition to reporting estimates from specifications (1) and (1a) in tables,
we also plot the regression estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for
jin{−5,−4, . . . , 9, 10} using figures. These figures allow us to economize
on space when we examine whether pre-discovery years differed from post-
discovery years in terms of the outcomes of interest, and to display outcomes
in years t+ j where j is zero or positive and odd.
Having explained our baseline estimation strategy, we now examine the
model’s first prediction (or rather its assumption) that giant oilfield discov-
eries increase income from oil. As Panel A of Table 2 shows, oil production
increases by about 25-30 percentage points within two years of a giant discov-
25One implication of this is that part of the effect of giant discoveries on subsequent outcomes may operate
through a (slightly) increased probability of making further discoveries.
26Interestingly, we find no significant correlation between the number of giant oilfields discovered in a year
and the inflation-adjusted price of oil in that year from 1946-2003.
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ery. This effect of discovery on oil production rises to about 40-50 percentage
points within four years, and remains stable (at least) until 10 years after
discovery.27 Past discoveries also matter, and their effect declines from about
26 percentage points two years after discovery to about 16 percentage points
ten years after discovery. These large and precise estimates confirm that gi-
ant oilfield discoveries have an important economic impact on the discovering
countries, as we can expect from the sheer size of these oilfields.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on oil ex-
ports. These discoveries increase oil exports by about 20-30 percentage points
after six years, and this rises to about 40-50 percentage points after ten years.
Past discoveries again matter, increasing oil exports by about 10-20 percent.
These estimates are similar to the effects we find on oil production, although
oil exports appear to take a bit longer to respond to giant discoveries.
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries increase per capita production
and exports of oil lead us to investigate the second prediction of the model,
that internal armed conflict increases after giant oilfields are discovered.
Panel A of Table 3 documents the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on the
subsequent incidence of internal armed conflict. In line with the second pre-
diction of the model, we find that giant oilfield discoveries increase the inci-
dence of internal armed conflict by about 5-8 percentage points within 4-8
years of discovery. This effect is sizeable, since the mean of the conflict vari-
able is just 10 percent, as we report in Table 1. Table 3 also shows that our
estimates of the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on internal armed conflict
do not change much when we control for the number of discoveries in t− 10
to t− 1.
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of internal
conflicts is also robust to alternative ways of measuring conflict. For example,
27The outcomes in the tables are in logs, and in the text we convert them into percentage changes. For
example, the 3rd-5th columns of Panel A of Table 2 show that log oil production increases by 0.39-0.41
within 6-10 years of giant discoveries, which corresponds to an increase of about 48-50 percentage points.
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Panel B of Table 3 shows that giant oilfield discoveries have a similar impact
on an intensity-scaled measure of armed conflict, which gives more weight
to conflict years with 1,000 casualties or more, as described in Section 4.
Giant discoveries increase this scaled measure of internal conflict by about
6-9 percentage points within 4-6 years of discovery. Panel C of Table 3 shows
an increase of about 5-8 percentage points after discovery in a measure of
conflict, which includes both internal and internationalized internal armed
conflicts.28
Given this evidence that giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of
internal armed conflict, we now ask: which countries are particularly likely
to experience internal conflicts after giant oilfield discoveries? According to
Prediction 3 of our model, armed conflict over oil is prevalent in countries
where political violence pays off. In order to identify these conflict-prone
countries, we use past violence as an indicator. As Panel A of Table 4 shows,
countries that experienced at least one coup from t− 10 to t− 1 were more
likely to plunge into internal conflict following giant oilfield discoveries. In
fact, in these countries giant oilfield discoveries raised the incidence of an
internal conflict by as much as 11-14 percentage points from t + 4 to t + 8.
This figure is high, but we should bear in mind that the mean incidence of
an internal conflict following a coup is about 19-20 percent. By contrast, in
countries that experienced no coups from t− 10 to t− 1, oil discoveries have
no significant effect on the incidence of internal conflict, again consistent with
the model’s predictions.
Another indicator that political violence pays off is that a country already
experienced internal conflict at some point from t − 10 to t − 1. In those
countries, giant oilfield discoveries raise the probability of conflict by as much
as 11-18 percentage points. The baseline level of violence in these cases is
28We also estimate similar regressions for the onset of internal armed conflict and for internal armed
conflict transitions, find no contemporaneous relation between these and giant oilfield discoveries, a finding
that is similar to Cotet and Tsui (2013). These measures increase significantly 4 years after discovery.
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also very high, with a mean of about 37-39 percent. Panel D of the table
shows that there is no significant effect of giant oilfield discoveries on internal
conflict in countries with no recent history of internal conflicts.
5.2. Robustness of Our Main Results
The results discussed so far indicate that giant oilfield discoveries increase
oil output and the incidence of internal armed conflict, and that the latter
increases particularly for countries with recent histories of violence. We now
examine the robustness of these results, and we begin by looking at what
happens in the years leading up to giant oilfield discoveries.
Sub-Figure A of Figure 1 shows estimates of specification (1) for our mea-
sure of oil production before and after discovery. The figure suggests that oil
production did not change much in the years leading up to giant oilfield dis-
coveries. Similarly, Sub-Figure B of Figure 1 shows that oil exports also did
not increase during the lead-up to the discovery of giant oilfields, and we can
again see that oil exports took longer to respond to giant oilfield discoveries
than oil production. Sub-figure C of Figure 1 shows that the probability of
internal armed conflicts also did not change much in the years leading up to
giant discoveries. Finally, Sub-Figure D of Figure 1 shows that in countries
that experienced at least one internal armed conflict from t − 10 to t − 1,
conflicts did not systematically flare up in the years prior to giant oilfield
discoveries.
The four sub-figures of Figure 2 show estimates similar to the correspond-
ing sub-figures of Figure 1, except that this time we control for the number
of years with giant oilfield discoveries from t − 10 to t − 1 (the estimates
for Figure 2 are generated using specification (1a) instead of specification 1).
The results once again show no evidence of significant trends before giant
discoveries. Moreover, the estimates are quantitatively very similar to those
in Figure 1. From this point on, to economize on space, we focus primarily
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on estimates that control for discoveries before t, as in specification (1a).
In Figure 3 we examine the changes before and after discovery in some of
the alternative measures of conflict discussed above. Sub-Figures A and B of
this figure correspond to Panels B and C of Table 3, using as outcomes internal
armed conflicts scaled by intensity and internal armed conflict including ones
that were internationalized. These outcomes, like our main measure of armed
conflict, show little change in the years leading up to discovery, and become
positive and significant within 4-8 years after discovery. Sub-Figure C of
the figure corresponds to panel A of Table 4, showing that in countries that
had at least one coup from t− 10 to t− 1, internal armed conflicts increase
more with giant oilfield discoveries, and there were no significant changes in
the years leading up to discovery. Sub-Figure D shows similar results for
countries that experienced any type of armed conflict from t− 10 to t− 1.
The finding that our key variables of interest do not change systematically
in the years leading up to giant oilfield discoveries supports our interpretation
that our estimated effects of giant oilfield discoveries are plausibly causal. In
the following paragraphs we address further potential concerns regarding this
interpretation.
One concern that may linger, for example, is that there may be serial
correlation not only in the timing of giant oilfield discoveries but also in
the outcomes we examine. To address this concern, panel B of Table 5 re-
estimates specification (1a), but this time also controlling for the dependent
variable in t − 1, which is instrumented by the dependent variable in t − 2.
The outcome here is our measure of oil production, and the estimates are
smaller than the baseline, but still positive and significant.
Another related concern is that political conditions in the discovering coun-
try may have changed shortly before discovery. But Panel C of the table adds
to specification (1a) a control for polity 2 (a common measure of institutional
quality) in t − 1 and this does not change the estimates much. Since we do
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not have a measure of investment in the oil sector, Panel D reports estimates
of specification (1a) with a control for log PPP-adjusted per capita private
investment in 2005 US dollar in t−1, and again the estimates remain statisti-
cally significant. Panel E adds together all the controls from Panels B-D, and
again the estimates remain significant for t + 2 through to t + 10, this time
with the exception of the estimate for t+ 8, which is marginally significant.
While the results discussed so far include all discoveries of giant oilfields
since 1946 and control for discoveries in countries’ recent past, a concern re-
mains that the odds of discovery are not the same in all countries and in all
years. More specifically, the regressions discussed so far include country-year
observations where the probability of discovery was relatively high given the
history of past discovery, along with many (most) observations where the
odds of discovery were low. Panel F of Table 5 focuses on giant oilfield dis-
coveries that were especially surprising, since no giant oilfield was discovered
in the country from t− 10 to t− 1. When we focus only on observations for
which no giant discoveries were made in the prior decade, the odds of a giant
discovery fall to just over 1 percent, so these discoveries were in all likelihood
highly unexpected. The results show that the effect of these unexpected dis-
coveries on oil production are about twice as large as in the baseline, and
precisely estimated. This is probably because in the countries that make
these discoveries, oil production prior to the giant discovery was usually very
low.
Another potential concern regarding our identification is that the coun-
tries that discover giant oilfields differ from others in ways that change over
time and are therefore not fully controlled for by country fixed effects. To
address this concern, Panel G re-estimates the baseline specification using
only countries that make at least one giant discovery in the period we ana-
lyze (from 1946 onwards). The estimates in this specification are similar to
those in the baseline, although slightly larger.
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Finally, we address the concern that country-year observations with oil
discoveries differ from others not only across countries, but also within coun-
tries, and in ways that we cannot observe and control for directly. To mitigate
this concern, we use data from the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book (2008),
which records country-year pairs where some oil discoveries, not necessarily
giant, were made. Estimating specification (1a) using only these country-year
observations, we essentially compare instances of giant oilfield discoveries to
instances of smaller discoveries. As Panel H of the table shows, even when
we restrict ourselves to these cases, the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on
oil production remains positive and significant, albeit smaller, for t + 6 to
t+ 10.
Table 6 repeats the robustness checks described above for our main result,
that giant oilfield discoveries increase the probability of internal armed con-
flict from t+ 4 to t+ 8. Controlling for the (instrumented) lagged dependent
variable, lagged polity 2 score and lagged investment, or all of these together,
tends to increase the coefficients very slightly, and they remain statistically
significant. Excluding observations that follow one or more discoveries in
t − 10 to t − 1 makes the estimate for t + 4 imprecise, but the coefficients
for t + 6 and t + 8 are still precise – the latter is even larger than in the
baseline specification. Restricting the sample to countries with giant oilfield
discoveries leaves the baseline coefficients almost unchanged. And using only
observations with some oil discoveries tends to increase both the point es-
timates and the standard errors, leaving the estimates for t + 4 and t + 6
positive and statistically significant.
Table 7 reports estimates for the same robustness checks as in Tables 5 and
6, but this time for the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on internal armed
conflicts in countries that experienced at least one year of conflict from t−10
to t− 1. As before the controls we include make little difference to our esti-
mates when they are included separately or simultaneously: the estimates for
119
t+4 to t+8 remain significant and change little in magnitude. Excluding ob-
servations with recent past discoveries makes the estimate for t+4 imprecise,
but the estimates for t+ 6 and t+ 8 are still precise. Restricting our analysis
to the set of countries with giant oilfield discoveries again makes almost no
difference relative to the baseline. Finally, using only observations with some
oil discoveries, while restricting our sample to about 400 observations, still
results in positive and significant estimates for t+ 4 and t+ 6.
The estimates reported thus far show that the effect of oil discovery on
conflict are larger in countries with a history of conflict. We now compare
the interaction of giant discoveries and recent conflicts with interactions of
giant discoveries with other features of the discovering country. To do so, we
begin by estimating the following equation:
Yit+j = β2jDiscit+γ2jPConfit+δ2jPDiscit+θ2jDiscit×PConfit+Countryi+Y eart+εit
(4)
where PConfit measures the number of years from t − 10 to t − 1 in
which country i experienced internal armed conflict. Panel A of Table 8
reports estimates of β2j and θ2j for j ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}. As the table shows,
θ2j is positive and significant for 4, 6, 8, and even 10 years after discovery,
confirming again that giant oil discoveries spell trouble in countries with
recent histories of violence.
We now add to this specification interactions of giant discoveries with
other country characteristics, following our discussion in Section 3. First, we
consider the possibility that in countries with strong institutions, giant oil-
field discoveries lead to less conflict. To test this, we add to specification (2)
an interaction of giant discoveries with strong institutions, which may proxy
for an institutionalized commitment to share revenues with the opposition
(θ close to 12). Second, much of the literature (see survey in Blattman and
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Miguel 2010) finds that conflicts are more prevalent in poor countries. In the
model this corresponds to low-wage countries, and given our data limitations
we proxy this using lagged per capita GDP. Specifically, we examine whether
giant oilfield discoveries are more likely to tip poor countries into internal
conflict by further adding to specification (2) controls for log per capita GDP
in t−1 (as discussed in the data section) and its interaction with our indicator
for giant discoveries, Discit. Finally, we consider the possibility that in coun-
tries with higher ethnic fractionalization, giant discoveries are more likely to
cause conflict, possibly because those countries are more prone to be divided
into opposing factions that willing to fight each other. We test this hypothesis
by further adding to specification (2) an interaction of our measure of ethnic
fractionalization (again see data section) with Discit. Panel B of Table 8
shows that none of the three interactions we added is statistically significant
in any of the regressions, while the interaction of giant discoveries and past
conflict is still positive and significant from 4 years after discovery onwards.
This suggests that the countries that should be most concerned about tipping
into violent conflict over resources are those with recent histories of conflict.
We also examine whether giant oilfield discoveries might themselves take
place during periods of lull following conflicts. We estimate a regression where
the dependent variable is an indicator for giant discovery and the regressor of
interest is an indicator for having no internal armed conflict in periods t−j to
t−1 and conflict in period t−j−1, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, controlling for country
and year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest in all these regressions is
small and imprecise (results available from the authors), providing evidence
that lulls in fighting do not predict the timing of giant oilfield discoveries.
But while lulls in conflict do not predict giant oilfield discoveries, do they
affect search effort to discover new oilfields more generally? To answer this
question, we use data from Cotet and Tsui (2013) on the number of “wildcat”
wells, which are wells exploratory wells drilled outside known oil-producing
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areas. Appendix Table A2 shows that the number of wildcat wells drilled
(and an indicator for any wildcat drilling) does not change significantly in
the years following a lull of any length from 1-5 years. These results are
robust to measuring the outcome during the final year of the lull or in the
year after the lull.
Our finding that wildcat drilling does not increase following lulls in conflict
differs from the finding that Cotet and Tsui (2013) report in columns 4-6
of Table 9 of their paper, since they report a negative association between
wildcat drilling and conflict. Their regressions, however, do not control for
country fixed effects, so they effectively use cross-sectional variation, whereas
we consistently use panel variation within countries and over time.
We further compare our results to those of Cotet and Tsui (2013) in Ap-
pendix Table A3. Panel A of the table reports estimates as in Table 3 of our
paper using only the observations for which we have non-missing wildcat data
from Cotet and Tsui (2013). While the sample is considerably smaller (since
Cotet and Tsui 2013 have data on fewer countries than we do) the coefficients
and their precision are quite similar to our baseline estimates. Panel B of
the same table re-estimates these regressions controlling for the number of
wildcat wells drilled, and the results are almost unchanged.
We next use the data from Cotet and Tsui (2013) to construct an indi-
cator for years with oil discoveries whose total estimated URR is at least
500 million barrels of oil. This measure is still different from our measure of
giant discoveries, not only because the sources are different, but also because
their measure excludes natural gas and condensate. In addition, their mea-
sure use aggregates the URR over all discoveries within a country in a given
year, while our measure effectively uses only the largest single discovery. As
Panel C of Appendix Table A3 shows, estimates using this new measure are
still positive and similar in magnitude to our baseline estimates, although
only the estimated effect on conflict 6 years after a major discovery is signif-
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icant. Finally, the last panel of the table shows that years where Cotet and
Tsui (2013) report smaller discoveries (which add up to less than 500 million
barrels of oil) are not followed by an increase in internal armed conflict.
We further explore the relationship between the size of giant oilfields dis-
covered and internal armed conflict using our main data. Specifically, we
divide the giant oilfield discoveries into four quartiles by the size of the esti-
mated Ultimate Recoverable Reserves (URR). In Panel A of Appendix Table
A4 we report estimates as in Table 3 of the paper, but this time allowing
for differential effects of discoveries of different quartiles. The effects of giant
oilfield discoveries at all sizes are generally positive. Although only some of
the estimates are statistically significant, we do find a positive and significant
effect for at least some lag between 4-8 years after giant oilfield discoveries
of all sizes, although the strongest effects are concentrated in the 2nd and
3rd quartiles. One might (cautiously) interpret this finding as suggesting an
inverted U-shape effect of giant oilfield discoveries, whereby the very largest
giant oilfield discoveries might not have as strong an effect as mere giant dis-
coveries. This result may be somewhat related to the pattern documented in
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), where high levels of primary commodity exports
are associated with more conflict, but in the case of the very highest levels,
“as in Saudi Arabia, the government is so well-financed that rebellion is mil-
itarily infeasible.” At the same time, in our analysis we find that even the
largest discoveries still increase the odds of conflict.29
Panel B of the same table repeats the exercise, but this time includes an
indicator for smaller (non-giant) oilfield discovery years, based on the Oil and
Gas Journal Data Book. These smaller (non-giant) discoveries have small and
insignificant effects on conflict, unlike the giant discoveries.
Another question that we examine is whether giant oilfields discovered
29Panel B of the same table repeats the exercise, but this time includes an indicator for smaller (non-giant)
oilfield discovery years, based on the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book. These smaller (non-giant) discoveries
have small and insignificant effects on conflict, unlike the giant discoveries.
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onshore have a different effect on conflict from those made offshore. Panel
A of Appendix Table A5 reports estimates of specifications as in Table 3
of our paper, but this time using separate indicators for giant onshore and
offshore discoveries instead of our usual indicator for all giant discoveries.
The estimates show that onshore discoveries significantly increase the odds
of internal armed conflict within a few years of discovery. The estimated effect
of offshore discoveries on subsequent conflict is also positive, but somewhat
smaller and imprecisely estimated, except in one case. At the same time,
a one-sided hypothesis test of whether the effect of onshore discoveries is
significantly larger than that of offshore discoveries cannot reject the null.
Taken together, our findings are broadly consistent with Lujala (2010) and
Ross (2006, 2012), who conclude that onshore oil increases conflict more than
offshore oil, but in the specifications that we estimate the difference between
onshore and offshore giant discoveries is imprecisely estimated.
5.3. Additional Results
The results discussed so far suggest that giant oilfield discoveries have two
opposing effects on the discovering countries’ economy: they increase oil in-
come, but also the incidence of a costly internal conflict. We now turn our
attention to the fourth and last outcome that we discuss in the model section
– whether these discoveries have a positive or a negative effect on per capita
GDP and its components. Using these as outcomes, Table 9 reports estimates
of specification (1a), and an augmented specification, which includes controls
as in Panel E of Tables 5-7, namely the dependent variable in t − 1 (instru-
mented by that same variable in t − 2) and polity 2 and log PPP-adjusted
per capita private investment, both also measured in t− 1.
Panel A of Table 9 suggests that giant oilfield discoveries increase per
capita GDP by about 4-6 percent. But as Panel B shows, this estimate is
imprecise when more controls are added. Having also experimented with sim-
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ilar specifications with various controls, we conclude that the positive effect
we find in Panel A is not very robust, so we are unable to say conclusively
whether giant oilfield discoveries have a small positive effect on per capita
GDP, or whether this effect is zero.
The next two panels of Table 9 show similar results for the effect of giant
oilfield discoveries on per capita government spending. Once again the effect
is either positive (around 4-6 percent in Panel C), or insignificantly different
from zero (Panel D) when more controls are added.
The remainder of Table 9 shows that giant oilfield discoveries have no
significant effect on per capita private consumption and (with the exception
of one negative estimate for t + 6 in panel H), also no effect on per capita
private investment.30
We conclude this section of the paper with an investigation of other possi-
ble economic and political consequences of giant oilfield discoveries in Table
10. In Panels A and B of this table we test one of the mechanisms often
discussed in the “Dutch Disease” literature (e.g. Corden and Neary 1982),
whereby natural resource booms may cause a real exchange rate appreciation.
This may happen, for example, if an oil-producing country spends some of its
proceeds from oil on local non-tradable goods. As a result of such spending,
the nominal exchange rate may appreciate (if the exchange rate is flexible) or
local prices may rise. Either (or both) of these can cause real exchange rate
appreciation, which can hurt the non-oil exporting industries. Panels A and
B of Table 10, however, show that giant oilfield discoveries decrease the real
exchange rate only for some years after discovery, and even then the effect is
quite small and imprecisely estimated. Panels C and D similarly show that
non-oil exports are not significantly reduced by giant oilfield discoveries. A
more thorough investigation of various related “Dutch Disease” mechanisms
30We do not report figures for the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on per capita GDP and its components,
but these are available on request from the authors, and they also suggest that the changes before and around
discoveries are small and imprecisely estimated.
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is, however, outside the scope of this paper and we leave it for future work.
We next examine an alternative hypothesis on a potential cost of oil pro-
duction, namely that it may lead, in some cases, to over-spending and in-
debtedness by the government (for related discussions see Tornell and Lane
1999 and Manzano and Rigobo´n 2008). As Panels E and F of Table 10 show,
we find no support for this hypothesis using our global dataset. Again, we
leave further investigations of this issue for particular countries or regions
for future work. Turning to other political economy hypotheses on the effect
of natural resources, Panels G and H of Table 10 examine whether competi-
tion over oil takes the form of coups to replace the incumbent. As the table
shows, we find no evidence that giant oilfield discoveries increase the odds of
coups in the subsequent decade. Finally, the last two panels of Table 10 test
the prediction of Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), that resource windfalls
increase repression. Our estimates show no significant increase in repression
in the aftermath of giant oil discoveries.
In sum, the results discussed in this subsection suggest that while the
economic gains from giant oilfield discoveries to the local population may be
limited, we do not identify other costs to from discovery, except for our main
result of an increased risk of internal armed conflict.
6. Conclusion
We began this paper by asking whether natural resource windfalls fuel
internal armed conflicts, and if so – in which settings. To answer this question,
we use new data on giant oilfield discoveries to identify the effect of oil on
economic and political outcomes around the world. We find that within a few
years of giant oilfield discoveries, per capita oil production and oil exports
in discovering countries increase by up to 50 percent. But we also find that
discovering giant oilfields increases the incidence of internal armed conflict
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by about 5-8 percentage points. This increase is driven predominantly by
countries with recent histories of political violence – those that experienced
coups or armed conflicts during the decade prior to discovery. We show that
these findings are robust to a wide range of specification checks.
Our findings shed light on the questions we began with. Giant oil and
gas field discoveries in Norway, Canada, and Australia, are unlikely to fuel
internal armed conflicts, since these countries’ recent histories include little
political violence. But in countries where political disputes are often resolved
by violence (or remain unresolved despite violence), giant oilfield discoveries
can fuel the flames of internal conflicts.
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal conflicts in countries
that are prone to violence has policy implications. Those who strive to reduce
armed conflict should be concerned about oil rents that incumbents obtain
in conflict-prone areas, especially if those rents encourage challenges to the
incumbents’ power. At the same time, the firms that prospect for oil in
conflict-prone areas and those who regulate them ought to be concerned about
negative externalities for many locals, who have little to gain from giant
oilfield discoveries but may suffer from conflicts over the oil.
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Figure 1: Effect of giant oilfield discovery on oil production, oil export, and internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure A shows the effect of giant oil discovery on PPP-
adjusted per capita oil production in US$2005. Sub-figure B shows the effect of giant oil discovery on per capita oil export in US$2005. Sub-figure C shows the effect of giant 
oil discovery on internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure D is as sub-figure C but only with those having at least one or more years experienced internal armed conflict from t-10 
to t-1. The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-5 to t+10. The black lines show the estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% 
confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by country. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Details on variable construction 
can be found in the data section of the paper. 
Figure 2: Effect of giant oilfield discovery on oil production, oil export, and internal armed conflicts with controls for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 
to t-1. Sub-figure A shows the effect of giant oil discovery on PPP-adjusted per capita oil production in US$2005. Sub-figure B shows the effect of giant oil discovery on per 
capita oil export in US$2005. Sub-figure C shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure D is as sub-figure C but only with those having at 
least one or more years experienced internal armed conflict from t-10 to t-1. The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-5 to t+10. The black lines 
show the estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by country. All regressions include 
country and year fixed effects and control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Details on variable construction can be found in the data section of the 
paper.
Figure 3: Effect of giant oilfield discovery on various measures of internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure A shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal armed conflict 
scaled by intensity. Sub-figure B shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal and internationalized internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure C shows the effect of giant oil 
discovery on internal armed conflicts but only for countries experienced at least one coup from t-10 to t-1. Sub-figure D shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal 
armed conflicts but only for countries experienced any armed conflicts from t-10 to t-1. The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-5 to t+10. The 
black lines show the estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by country. All 
regressions include country and year fixed effects and control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Details on variable construction can be found in the 
data section of the paper. 
Outcome in year: Obs Mean Std. Dev.
First 
year of 
data
Last 
year of 
data
Discovery (indicator for giant oilfield discovery) 10,141 0.05 0.21 1946 2003
Indicator for discovery size in quartile 4, URR ϵ (2733, 160673] 10,141 0.01 0.11 1946 2003
Indicator for discovery size in quartile 3, URR ϵ (1180, 2733] 10,141 0.01 0.11 1946 2003
Indicator for discovery size in quartile 2, URR ϵ (658, 1180] 10,141 0.01 0.11 1946 2003
Indicator for discovery size in quartile 1, URR ϵ [500, 658] 10,141 0.01 0.11 1946 2003
Onshore discovery (indicator for giant onshore oil discovery) 10,141 0.03 0.17 1946 2003
Offshore discovery (indicator for giant offshore oil discovery) 10,141 0.02 0.14 1946 2003
Indicator for any oilfield discovery, not necessarily of a giant 11,091 0.12 0.32 1946 2008
Number of wildcats drilled  2,951 128 790 1946 2003
Indicator for positive wildcats drilled  2,951 0.86 0.35 1946 2003
Giant‐equivalent discovery (As discovery indicator, but using 
data from Cotet and Tsui 2013) 2,951 0.15 0.36 1946 2003
Non‐giant discovery  (As indicator for any oil discovery, but using 
data from Cotet and Tsui 2013) 2,951 0.52 0.50 1946 2003
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita oil and gas production (US$2005) 3,759 5.33 2.92 1950 2007
Log per capita oil exports (US$2005) 4,599 2.64 3.48 1962 2000
Log per capita non‐oil export (US$2005) 5,562 5.69 1.92 1962 2000
Internal armed conflict indicator 11,091 0.10 0.30 1946 2008
Internal armed conflict indicator scaled by intensity 11,091 0.13 0.41 1946 2008
Internal or internationalized internal armed conflict indicator 11,091 0.11 0.32 1946 2008
Armed conflict indicator 11,091 0.14 0.34 1946 2008
Coup indicator 11,091 0.05 0.23 1946 2008
Repression indicator 8,497 0.09 0.28 1946 2008
Polity 2 score (between ‐10 and 10) 7,831 0.17 7.49 1946 2008
Ethnic fractionalization (time‐invariant, between 0 and 1) 10,650 0.44 0.27 1946 2008
Log real exchange rate 8,362 0.71 0.55 1950 2007
Log public debt as percentage of GDP 5,698 3.75 0.89 1946 2008
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita GDP (US$2005) 8,342 8.46 1.13 1950 2007
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita government spending (US$2005) 8,342 6.63 1.18 1950 2007
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private consumption  (US$2005) 8,342 7.97 0.99 1950 2007
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment  (US$2005) 8,338 6.69 1.59 1950 2007
PPP‐adjusted per capita military expenses (US$2005) 6,119 0.34 1.10 1950 2001
Ratio of PPP‐adjusted military expenses to GDP 6,115 0.04 0.08 1950 2001
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for a panel of 193 countries from 1946‐2008. Giant oilfields are 
those having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). URR figures in this table are in million of barrels of oil 
equivalent. There are 461 observations with at least one giant oilfield discovery from 1946‐2003. 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8  t+10 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita oil and gas production in US$2005
Discovery 0.28 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.33
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.15
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 3,535 3,705 3,629 3,551 3,470 3,535 3,705 3,629 3,551 3,470
Panel B. Dependent variable: Log oil and gas exports per capita in US$2005
Discovery ‐0.04 0.14 0.25 0.37 0.40 ‐0.09 0.08 0.19 0.31 0.36
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 4,563 4,530 4,492 4,453 4,436 4,563 4,530 4,492 4,453 4,436
Table 2: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Oil Production and Oil Export
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel includes 193 
countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated 
ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered by country.
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8  t+10 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Panel A. Dependent variable: Internal armed conflict
Discovery 0.015 0.061 0.079 0.060 0.031 0.003 0.050 0.072 0.057 0.031
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.020 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Panel B. Dependent variable: Internal armed conflict scaled by intensity
Discovery 0.009 0.084 0.085 0.060 0.009 ‐0.002 0.076 0.081 0.060 0.012
(0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.018 0.013 0.007 0.000 ‐0.005
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Panel C. Dependent variable: Internal and internationalized internal armed conflict
Discovery 0.014 0.060 0.076 0.050 0.021 0.003 0.051 0.070 0.049 0.023
(0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.019 0.015 0.008 0.002 ‐0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Table 3: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel includes 193 
countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated 
ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by country.
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8  t+10 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Panel A. Countries that experienced at least one coup from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery 0.044 0.139 0.140 0.114 0.047 0.041 0.136 0.138 0.113 0.048
(0.050) (0.044) (0.037) (0.033) (0.049) (0.048) (0.042) (0.034) (0.032) (0.049)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.070 0.055 0.034 0.009 ‐0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 2,605 2,605 2,557 2,457 2,347 2,605 2,605 2,557 2,457 2,347
Panel B. Countries that experienced no coups from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery 0.010 0.039 0.057 0.037 0.022 ‐0.001 0.026 0.046 0.025 0.012
(0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.016) (0.014) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 7,337 7,331 7,183 6,897 6,621 7,337 7,331 7,183 6,897 6,621
Panel C. Countries that experienced at least one internal armed conflict from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery ‐0.021 0.124 0.179 0.114 0.057 ‐0.032 0.113 0.172 0.108 0.053
(0.058) (0.049) (0.042) (0.046) (0.063) (0.050) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.059)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.040 0.042 0.026 0.016 0.011
(0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019)
Observations 1,958 1,958 1,907 1,797 1,679 1,958 1,958 1,907 1,797 1,679
Panel D. Countries that experienced no internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery 0.019 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.005
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.006 0.003 ‐0.002 ‐0.006 ‐0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 7,984 7,978 7,833 7,557 7,289 7,984 7,978 7,833 7,557 7,289
Table 4: Heterogeneous Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel includes 193 countries 
and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate 
recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by country.
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Panel A. Baseline ‐ as in Panel A of Table 2
Discovery 0.215 0.297 0.310 0.329 0.332
(0.069) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.076)
Observations 3,535 3,705 3,629 3,551 3,470
Discovery 0.136 0.172 0.160 0.135 0.164
(0.050) (0.057) (0.067) (0.074) (0.076)
Observations 3,134 3,121 2,919 2,718 2,525
Panel C. As baseline, but controlling for polity2 score in t‐1
Discovery 0.215 0.279 0.259 0.254 0.266
(0.072) (0.062) (0.072) (0.075) (0.082)
Observations 3,290 3,400 3,296 3,185 3,068
Discovery 0.144 0.221 0.222 0.231 0.242
(0.070) (0.066) (0.077) (0.078) (0.084)
Observations 3,356 3,426 3,291 3,151 3,005
Panel E. As baseline, but with all controls from panels B‐D
Discovery 0.139 0.173 0.162 0.133 0.168
(0.050) (0.058) (0.068) (0.075) (0.075)
Observations 2,977 2,964 2,772 2,579 2,394
Discovery 0.384 0.574 0.555 0.627 0.672
(0.197) (0.189) (0.173) (0.184) (0.195)
Observations 2,202 2,337 2,302 2,269 2,226
Panel G. As baseline, but using only countries that discovered at least one giant oilfield
Discovery 0.239 0.320 0.338 0.355 0.352
(0.071) (0.064) (0.067) (0.070) (0.079)
Observations 2,570 2,686 2,637 2,587 2,535
Discovery 0.023 0.086 0.144 0.172 0.170
(0.080) (0.068) (0.070) (0.058) (0.063)
Observations 1,107 1,138 1,142 1,140 1,119
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Table 5: Robustness of Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Oil Production
Panel B. As baseline, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2
Panel D. As baseline, but controlling for log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel F. As baseline, but excluding observations with one or more discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1
Panel H. As baseline, but using only countries*year observations with one or more discoveries in the 2008 
Oil and Gas Journal Data Book.
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Panel A. Baseline ‐ as in Panel A of Table 3
Discovery 0.003 0.050 0.072 0.057 0.031
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Discovery 0.005 0.053 0.072 0.055 0.029
(0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 9,749 9,743 9,547 9,161 8,775
Panel C. As baseline, but controlling for polity2 score in t‐1
Discovery 0.009 0.060 0.086 0.065 0.036
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
Observations 6,894 6,888 6,726 6,407 6,087
Discovery 0.015 0.060 0.084 0.064 0.025
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036)
Observations 7,404 7,404 7,218 6,845 6,471
Panel E. As baseline, but with all controls from panels B‐D
Discovery 0.013 0.058 0.092 0.067 0.027
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.037)
Observations 5,942 5,942 5,789 5,481 5,171
Discovery 0.031 0.036 0.068 0.098 0.057
(0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.039) (0.040)
Observations 8,590 8,586 8,424 8,111 7,791
Panel G. As baseline, but using only countries that discovered at least one giant oilfield
Discovery 0.007 0.052 0.072 0.058 0.026
(0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Observations 3,572 3,570 3,504 3,374 3,244
Discovery 0.011 0.066 0.100 0.067 0.040
(0.033) (0.030) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035)
Observations 1,311 1,307 1,298 1,276 1,247
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Table 6: Robustness of Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts
Panel B. As baseline, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2
Panel D. As baseline, but controlling for log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel F. As baseline, but excluding observations with one or more discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1
Panel H. As baseline, but using only countries*year observations with one or more discoveries in the 2008 
Oil and Gas Journal Data Book. 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Panel A. Baseline ‐ as in Panel C of Table 4
Discovery ‐0.032 0.113 0.172 0.108 0.053
(0.050) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.059)
Observations 1,958 1,958 1,907 1,797 1,679
Discovery ‐0.029 0.115 0.176 0.110 0.050
(0.044) (0.043) (0.037) (0.036) (0.057)
Observations 1,948 1,948 1,898 1,788 1,670
Panel C. As baseline, but controlling for polity2 score in t‐1
Discovery ‐0.025 0.109 0.181 0.111 0.054
(0.050) (0.044) (0.036) (0.039) (0.062)
Observations 1,879 1,879 1,830 1,723 1,607
Discovery ‐0.012 0.125 0.196 0.128 0.066
(0.060) (0.048) (0.037) (0.040) (0.068)
Observations 1,753 1,753 1,704 1,597 1,481
Panel E. As baseline, but with all controls from panels B‐D
Discovery ‐0.019 0.109 0.198 0.130 0.066
(0.052) (0.049) (0.039) (0.038) (0.067)
Observations 1,708 1,708 1,662 1,558 1,444
Discovery ‐0.031 0.154 0.131 0.118 ‐0.009
(0.057) (0.082) (0.058) (0.057) (0.096)
Observations 1,437 1,437 1,400 1,323 1,236
Panel G. As baseline, but using only countries that discovered at least one giant oilfield
Discovery ‐0.026 0.113 0.172 0.108 0.049
(0.051) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.059)
Observations 986 986 964 916 864
Discovery ‐0.028 0.052 0.215 0.129 0.087
(0.066) (0.049) (0.056) (0.046) (0.066)
Observations 406 406 403 398 384
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Table 7: Robustness of Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts in 
Countries with at Least One Internal Armed Conflict in Decade Before Discovery
Panel B. As baseline, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2
Panel D. As baseline, but controlling for log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel F. As baseline, but excluding observations with one or more discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1
Panel H. As baseline, but using only countries*year observations with one or more discoveries in the 2008 
Oil and Gas Journal Data Book.
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Discovery 0.012 0.030 0.037 0.030 0.007
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1  0.044 0.028 0.015 0.005 ‐0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Discovery x (Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1) ‐0.007 0.013 0.023 0.017 0.016
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Discovery 0.085 0.191 0.079 0.071 ‐0.051
(0.252) (0.197) (0.188) (0.193) (0.169)
Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1  0.038 0.019 0.003 ‐0.010 ‐0.023
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log ppp‐adjusted per capita GDP in t‐1 ‐0.014 ‐0.010 ‐0.012 ‐0.013 ‐0.012
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027)
Discovery x (Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1) ‐0.002 0.015 0.029 0.025 0.029
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Discovery x (Log ppp‐adjusted per capita GDP in t‐1) ‐0.003 ‐0.015 ‐0.009 ‐0.007 0.007
(0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Discovery x (Countries with strong institution) 0.028 0.029 0.077 0.088 0.102
(0.072) (0.062) (0.080) (0.086) (0.083)
Discovery x (Ethnic fractionalization) ‐0.102 ‐0.080 0.031 ‐0.018 ‐0.119
(0.121) (0.110) (0.097) (0.100) (0.118)
Observations 7,209 7,209 7,028 6,666 6,304
Table 8: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries and Interactions on Internal Armed Conflicts 
Panel A. As Panel A of Table 3, but including discovery interaction with number of years with internal 
conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1
Panel B. As Panel A, but including various interactions of discovery
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Discovery 0.040 0.048 0.036 0.059 0.059
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024)
Observations 7,937 8,266 8,108 7,940 7,760
Discovery 0.016 0.014 0.002 0.004 ‐0.001
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021)
Observations 5,839 5,838 5,532 5,222 4,912
Discovery 0.017 0.041 0.048 0.053 0.062
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029)
Observations 7,937 8,266 8,108 7,940 7,760
Discovery 0.017 0.026 0.035 0.035 0.023
(0.012) (0.018) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations 5,839 5,838 5,532 5,222 4,912
Discovery ‐0.004 ‐0.002 ‐0.009 ‐0.001 0.013
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 7,937 8,266 8,108 7,940 7,760
Discovery 0.015 0.017 0.003 0.010 0.015
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 5,839 5,838 5,532 5,222 4,912
Discovery 0.038 0.026 0.004 0.049 0.051
(0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038)
Observations 7,933 8,262 8,104 7,936 7,756
Discovery 0.008 ‐0.019 ‐0.053 ‐0.004 ‐0.005
(0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.043) (0.042)
Observations 5,834 5,833 5,527 5,217 4,907
Panel F. As Panel E, but including controls as Panel B
Panel G. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005
Panel H. As Panel G, but including controls as Panel B
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
Panel E. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private consumption in US$2005
Table 9: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Per Capita GDP and its Components
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita GDP in US$2005
Panel B. As Panel A, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2, polity2 score in t‐1, and log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel C.  Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita government spending in US$2005
Panel D. As Panel C, but including controls as Panel B
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Discovery 0.045 0.021 0.020 ‐0.014 ‐0.027
(0.033) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
Observations 7,957 8,286 8,126 7,956 7,774
Discovery 0.036 0.017 0.014 ‐0.035 ‐0.048
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037)
Observations 5,840 5,839 5,533 5,223 4,913
Discovery ‐0.053 0.020 0.017 0.001 0.030
(0.069) (0.070) (0.057) (0.065) (0.061)
Observations 5,519 5,475 5,431 5,387 5,367
Discovery ‐0.036 ‐0.008 ‐0.011 0.024 0.051
(0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.049) (0.068)
Observations 4,134 3,846 3,540 3,292 3,045
Discovery 0.046 0.041 0.045 ‐0.022 ‐0.067
(0.033) (0.039) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043)
Observations 5,144 5,424 5,517 5,438 5,337
Discovery 0.021 0.034 0.011 0.009 ‐0.024
(0.020) (0.035) (0.043) (0.045) (0.035)
Observations 3,733 3,725 3,577 3,305 3,038
Panel G. Dependent variable: Coup
Discovery ‐0.009 0.005 0.008 0.018 ‐0.005
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Panel H. As Panel G, but including controls as Panel B
Discovery ‐0.007 0.002 0.014 0.009 ‐0.018
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017)
Observations 5,942 5,942 5,789 5,481 5,171
Panel I. Dependent variable: Repression
Discovery 0.007 ‐0.022 ‐0.019 ‐0.020 ‐0.003
(0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)
Observations 7,778 7,974 7,987 7,805 7,611
Panel J. As Panel I, but including controls as Panel B
Discovery ‐0.004 ‐0.032 ‐0.014 ‐0.009 ‐0.007
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 5,694 5,693 5,542 5,238 4,932
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Panel E. Dependent variable: Log Public debt (as percentage of GDP)
Panel F. As Panel E, but including controls as Panel B
Table 10: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Other Outcomes
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log real exchange rate
Panel B. As panel A, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2, polity2 score in t‐1, and log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel C. Dependent variable: Log per capita non‐oil export in US$2005
Panel D. As Panel C, but including controls as Panel B
Outcome in year:
Years (from 1946‐
2003) with at least 
one giant oilfield 
discovery country
Years (from 1946‐
2003) with at least 
one giant oilfield 
discovery country
Years (from 1946‐
2003) with at least 
one giant oilfield 
discovery
Former USSR 41 Angola 7 Albania 1
Saudi Arabia 29 Malaysia 6 Austria 1
Iran 27 Colombia 5 Azerbaijan 1
United States 25 Pakistan 5 Bangladesh 1
China 21 Qatar 5 Côte d'Ivoire 1
Iraq 20 Argentina 4 Denmark 1
Nigeria 19 Congo, Republic of 4 Ecuador 1
Australia 18 Netherlands 3 Equatorial Guinea 1
Libya 16 Peru 3 Gabon 1
Norway 15 Thailand 3 Germany 1
Canada 14 Trinidad and Tobago 3 Hungary 1
Indonesia 14 Tunisia 3 Morocco 1
Mexico 14 Bolivia 2 Namibia 1
United Arab Emirates 14 Brunei 2 New Zealand 1
Brazil 13 France 2 Papua New Guinea 1
United Kingdom 12 Italy 2 Philippines 1
Venezuela 12 Kazakhstan 2 Romania 1
Egypt 11 Myanmar 2 Russian Federation 1
Oman 10 Sudan 2 Spain 1
Kuwait 9 Viet Nam 2 Syria 1
Algeria 8 Yemen 2 Turkmenistan 1
India 8 Afghanistan 1
Appendix Table A1: Number of Years (from 1946‐2003) with One or More Giant Oilfield Discoveries, by Country
Notes: This table reports the number of country‐year cells with one or more discovery of a giant oilfield from 1946‐2003, by country.
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conflict in t‐2, no conflict in t‐1 ‐7.126 0.014
(8.192) (0.031)
Conflict in t‐3, no conflict in t‐2 & t‐1 ‐8.544 0.011
(7.873) (0.035)
Conflict in t‐4, no conflict in t‐3, t‐2 & t‐1 ‐1.785 0.003
(7.726) (0.035)
Conflict in t‐5, no conflict in t‐4, t‐3, t‐2 & t‐1 ‐0.895 ‐0.043
(9.069) (0.046)
Conflict in t‐6, no conflict in t‐5, t‐4, t‐3, t‐2 & t‐1 ‐0.137 ‐0.038
(8.493) (0.040)
Observations 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951
Panel B. As Panel A, but using indicator for conflict followed by the number of years without conflict including t
Conflict in t‐1, no conflict in t ‐2.562 0.014
(8.455) (0.029)
Conflict in t‐2, no conflict in t‐1 & t ‐8.027 ‐0.009
(7.828) (0.040)
Conflict in t‐3, no conflict in t‐2, t‐1 & t ‐6.666 0.011
(8.048) (0.037)
Conflict in t‐4, no conflict in t‐3, t‐2, t‐1 & t ‐1.573 ‐0.017
(7.822) (0.031)
Conflict in t‐5, no conflict in t‐4, t‐3, t‐2, t‐1 & t ‐0.415 ‐0.050
(9.290) (0.048)
Observations 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951 2,951
Indicator for positive wildcats drilled
Notes: This table reports the association of oil explorations and the lull period of conflict in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel 
includes 63 countries and uses data from 1946 ‐ 2003 respectively. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Wildcats drilled, a direct 
measure of oil exploration effort, are constructed using Cotet and Tsui (2013) online published dataset. Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered by country.
Appendix Table A2: Oil Explorations During Lull Periods Following Internal Armed Conflict
Panel A. Indicator for conflict followed by the number of years without conflict before t
Number of wildcats drilled
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10  t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Panel A.  As in Panel A of Table 3, but using only observations for which wildcat data from Cotet and Tsui (2013) are available
Discovery 0.012 0.068 0.089 0.060 0.037 0.002 0.059 0.083 0.057 0.036
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.021 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.003
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629
Panel B. As Panel A, but controlling for the number of wildcats drilled
Discovery 0.012 0.068 0.089 0.060 0.037 0.002 0.059 0.083 0.057 0.036
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
Wildcats drilled (in thousands) 0.014 0.012 0.005 0.000 ‐0.005 0.002 0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.005 ‐0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.021 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.003
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629
Panel C. As Panel B, but using an indicator for years with giant‐equivalent discoveries using Cotet and Tsui (2013) data
Giant‐equivalent discovery (Cotet and Tsui 2013) 0.022 0.043 0.057 0.049 0.034 0.018 0.036 0.051 0.045 0.032
(0.035) (0.029) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025)
Wildcats drilled (in thousands) 0.012 0.008 0.000 ‐0.003 ‐0.006 0.011 0.006 ‐0.002 ‐0.004 ‐0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Years with giant‐equivalent discovery from t‐10 to t‐1 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629
Panel D. As Panel C, but controlling for non‐giant oil discoveries from Cotet and Tsui (2013)
Giant‐equivalent discovery (Cotet and Tsui 2013) 0.019 0.054 0.065 0.056 0.024 0.015 0.046 0.058 0.052 0.022
(0.039) (0.032) (0.030) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.027) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032)
Non‐giant discovery (Cotet and Tsui 2013) ‐0.004 0.016 0.012 0.010 ‐0.014 ‐0.004 0.015 0.011 0.009 ‐0.015
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
Wildcats drilled (in thousands) 0.012 0.006 ‐0.001 ‐0.004 ‐0.005 0.011 0.004 ‐0.003 ‐0.004 ‐0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Years with giant‐equivalent discovery from t‐10 to t‐1 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629 2,948 2,944 2,880 2,755 2,629
Appendix Table A3: Effect of Giant Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts: Comparing with Cotet and Tsui (2013) 
Notes: This table reports the reconciliation between our findings and Cotet and Tsui (2013) in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel 
includes 63 countries and uses data from 1946 ‐ 2003 respectively. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those 
having an estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Giant‐
equivalent discovery and non‐giant discovery are constructed using Cotet and Tsui (2013) data. Details can be found in section 4. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered by country.
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10  t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Discovery size in quartile 4 ‐0.017 ‐0.016 0.057 0.050 0.026 ‐0.036 ‐0.032 0.046 0.045 0.026
(0.030) (0.034) (0.026) (0.028) (0.047) (0.030) (0.036) (0.020) (0.022) (0.046)
Discovery size in quartile 3 0.041 0.114 0.116 0.065 0.009 0.021 0.097 0.105 0.061 0.009
(0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Discovery size in quartile 2 0.002 0.058 0.097 0.079 0.071 ‐0.004 0.053 0.094 0.078 0.071
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036)
Discovery size in quartile 1 0.028 0.069 0.043 0.044 0.011 0.020 0.062 0.038 0.042 0.011
(0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.030)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.021 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Panel B. As Panel A,  but controlling for non‐giant oil discovery dummy from Oil and Gas Journal Databook
Discovery size in quartile 4 ‐0.011 ‐0.016 0.056 0.051 0.024 ‐0.033 ‐0.035 0.043 0.045 0.024
(0.031) (0.035) (0.027) (0.029) (0.047) (0.029) (0.037) (0.020) (0.023) (0.047)
Discovery size in quartile 3 0.048 0.113 0.114 0.066 0.008 0.026 0.094 0.102 0.060 0.007
(0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Discovery size in quartile 2 0.008 0.058 0.095 0.080 0.070 0.000 0.050 0.090 0.077 0.069
(0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034)
Discovery size in quartile 1 0.034 0.068 0.041 0.044 0.010 0.024 0.060 0.035 0.041 0.010
(0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030)
Non‐giant discovery 0.018 ‐0.002 ‐0.005 0.001 ‐0.004 0.010 ‐0.008 ‐0.009 ‐0.001 ‐0.004
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.020 0.018 0.012 0.005 0.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Appendix Table A4: Effect of Oil Discovery Size on Internal Armed Conflicts
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering oilfield in size in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel includes 193 countries 
and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate 
recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Discovery size in each 
quartile is constucted based on the estimated Ultimate Recoverable Reserves (URR, in million barrels) of all giant discoveries in a given year 
and each quartile has the following range of URR: URR in quartile 1 ϵ [500, 658], URR in quartile 2 ϵ (658, 1180], URR in quartile 3 ϵ (1180, 
2733], and URR in quartile 4 ϵ (2733, 160673]. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. 
Panel A. As in Panel A of Table 3, but including indicators for each quartile of discoveries size in a given country‐year observations
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8  t+10 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Onshore discovery 0.009 0.070 0.083 0.069 0.030 ‐0.003 0.061 0.077 0.066 0.030
(0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Offshore discovery 0.031 0.034 0.065 0.028 0.004 0.017 0.022 0.057 0.024 0.004
(0.030) (0.028) (0.038) (0.042) (0.048) (0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037) (0.047)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.020 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135  10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
H0: Onshore discovery = Offshore discovery (p‐value) 
H1: Onshore discovery > Offshore discovery 0.242 0.166 0.336 0.206 0.323 0.262 0.144 0.316 0.196 0.322
Panel B. As Panel A, but controlling for the number of years with onshore and offshore discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 separately
Onshore discovery ‐0.003 0.060 0.077 0.067 0.031
(0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Offshore discovery 0.022 0.027 0.063 0.027 0.004
(0.022) (0.018) (0.028) (0.032) (0.043)
Years with onshore discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.021 0.018 0.012 0.004 ‐0.002
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Years with offshore discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.013)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
H0: Onshore discovery = Offshore discovery (p‐value) 
H1: Onshore discovery > Offshore discovery 0.143 0.126 0.332 0.159 0.300
Appendix Table A5: Effect of Onshore and Offshore Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant onshore or offshore oilfield in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel 
includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an 
estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered by country.
Panel A. As in Panel A of Table 3, but using separate indicators for at least one onshore or offshore discoveries in a given country‐year observation
Chapter 3:
Proxy Warriors: A Theory of Military
Assistance
Yu-Hsiang Lei
One main feature contributing to the latest conflicts in the Middle East, and, in particular,
to the issue of the wide spread of military resources well beyond governmental control, is that
governments sponsor weapons to non-state militias to fight the state’s enemies, but after the
fighting ends these weapons cannot be called back. I develop a theory to study government
strategy in supplying weapons to militias. When many weapons are supplied a war can be
won more quickly but leaving too many weapons beyond control. Militias learn that they can
benefit from retaining these extra weapons when hostilities end. This incentivizes the militias
to fight strategically in order to maximize their subsequent stock of weapons. Given this
governmental dilemma, in a dynamic setting I rationalize a supply strategy with a stopgap
proposed by the US security forces. I find that the government would prefer to adopt a
stopgap strategy when the weapons left with the militia are particularly harmful and when the
government is impatient. I also find that the effect of a stopgap strategy is more useful to
the government when the militia is sufficiently patient and when the weapons depreciate at a
medium rate.
1. Introduction
Mercenary captains are either excellent men of arms or not: if they are, you can-
not trust them because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppress-
ing you, who are their patron, or by oppressing others contrary to your intention;
but if the captain is not virtuous, he ruins you in the ordinary way.
– Machiavelli, The Prince, XII
Establishing a monopoly of violence is one of the essential features of a modern state,
in the Weberian view. However, in many modern civil wars, the government military is
no longer the only war agent. In fact, due to limited state capacity many countries often
rely on non-state militias to fight national enemies (e.g. Bates (2015) and Kaldor (2013)).
According to Carey, et al. (2013), between 1981 and 2007 there were 332 identified pro-
government militias working in about 50 countries in all regions of the world.1 Governments
recruit these allies to fight the governments’ enemies by supplying military resources and
wage compensation.2 However, at the end of the war much of the weaponrys were left held
in the hands of the militias, which poses additional security concerns.3 This concern also has
received much attention in the debate whether or not to provide weapons to local militias in
the recent conflict in Syria.4 In order to address this issue, many programs were introduced
by the UN and the World Bank to buy up weapons after the war (Harris, 2002) or to provide
conditional aid when the community surrenders its weapons (Mugumya, 2005).
This concern not only brings in measures to deal with the issue ex post but also reflects
the way in which a government should supply weapons to a militia ex ante. In Kimberly
Marten’s recent book on warlords (Marten (2012)), she mentions how this concern affects the
way in US arming the militia. In 2005-2006 during the US mission in Iraq, the Sons of Iraq
(SOI), a Arab Sunni tribal militias, were working with US troops and Shia-led government
of Iraq in fighting against Al Qaeda in Iraq. She cited from a war journalist Jim Michaels
(Michaels, 2010) who observed on how the supply of weapons was implement in practice:
1The definition of a pro-government militia is: 1) one which is identified as pro-government or sponsored
by the government (national or subnational); 2) one which is identified as not being part of the regular
security forces; 3) one which is armed; 4) one which has some level of organization. More details can be
found in Carey, et al. (2013).
2For example, Janjaweed militia supported by Sudanese government.
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/01/sudan.jeevanvasagar) or Iran backed Taliban.
(http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backs-taliban-with-cash-and-arms-1434065528) and also many others,
such as Latin America (Mazei 2009), Indonesia (Cribb 2001), Africa, and elsewhere (Reno 2002; Mitchell
2004).
3For example, paramilitary in Columbia (Grajales, 2011).
4“It would have been nearly impossible for the United States to ensure its arms were ending up in the
right hands.” (http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-obama-have-armed-syrian-rebels-sooner
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“. . . US commanders did not consciously support warlordism....When the US gave them
[SOI] weapons it was always presented as a temportary stopgap.”5
Based on with this policy suggestion, it is clear that when the US security forces work
with militias in Iraq, the weapons left beyond US control are a major concern, one main
contributor to this being that the weapons are supplied without careful consideration. What
the US commander proposed was to supply weapons with a brief stopgap before another
supply. However, it is unclear what effects result from using a supply strategy featuring
stopgaps. The strategic consideration behind it is unclear, since another obvious choice is
to replenish the stock of weapons so that the militia maintained enough capacity to fight.
Therefore, the question is what the benefits associated with the temporary stopgap strategy
are, so that governments may reasonably prefer it to any other course of action.
The focus of this paper is to understand the characteristics of supply strategies with
stopgap features and to clarify the conditions in which governments prefer to use them. In
order to do so, I develop a model in which the government and the militia interact in an
infinite horizon. In each period, the government supplies weapons to the militia in order
to fight the enemy. Apart from the weapons in hand, the militia also inputs costly efforts
to fight. The effort is a private decision that cannot be observed by the government. The
weapon holdings by the militia depreciate over time. The war could be won with a higher
probability if the militia holds more weapons or inputs more effort. The government can
benefit from winning the war while the militia can gain from the weapons left in their hands
after the war. But the militia’s gain through holding weapons is at the expense of the
government’s utility. Therefore, the government in supplying many weapons faces a trade-
off: on the one hand, the war can be won more quickly but on the other hand too many
weapons are held by the militia. In addition, the militia also strategically chooses how much
costly effort to input.
Given the strategic concerns from both the government and the militia, I try to rationalize
the use of a supply strategy with stopgap features. Before the analysis starts, I first define
this supply strategy: the government first decides how much weaponry to supply and then
stops supplying for a while before resuming. During the stopgap periods, the weapons held
by the militia depreciate. Given this definition, my first finding is that if the government
supplies with limited commitment, stopgap periods are never part of an equilibrium. This
is because, without commitment, the government would always supply additional weapons
to the militia if too few weapons are available. That means that the government will not
5This quote is from chapter 6 p.142 of Marten (2012).
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choose not to supply weapons as part of an equilibrium. This result leads me to examine
the situation in which the government can supply with commitment.
When the government can supply with commitment, I first show that an equilibrium
exists for the government to use a temporary stopgap strategy. In order to rationalize the
choice of stopgap strategy, I use it to compare with another commonly observed strategy -
replenish weapons in every period so that the militia has a constant amount of weaponry
available. If the government’s welfare under the strategy with stopgaps is greater than that
under the benchmark strategy, then the stopgap strategy is preferred.
In order to compare these different equilibrium, I characterize their differences in the
militia’s input of effort and the government’s expected loss from leaving weapon beyond
its control. I show that the militia’s effort is constant over time when weapon holding is
constant, while the effort associated with a stopgap strategy has a dynamic pattern. The
militia’s efforts are highest in periods with a supply of weapons and then start to trend
down once entering the stopgap periods when the weapon holdings start to diminish due to
depreciation. The dynamic pattern is due to the changes in the held weapons and in the
the militia’s continuation value. While the effort is greater in supply periods than is the
effort under constant holding, the effort is less in the stopgap periods. Furthermore, the
government can save losses if the war is won in a stopgap period because the militia will be
holding fewer weapons.
In sum, there are three differences between the two equilibrium. First, under the stopgap
strategy the effort is always higher in supply periods than is the effort under constant weapon
holding. Second, the expected losses from weapons beyond government control are lower
because the war is likely to be won in a stopgap period when fewer weapons are being
held by the militia. Finally, both weaponry and effort are lower in stopgap periods, which
suggests that the war is less likely to be won in these periods. Given these differences, using
a one-period-stopgap strategy as an example, I look for sufficient conditions in which the
supply strategy with stopgap produces greater welfare for the government than would accrue
from a strategy of constant supply.
The main result of this paper can be summarized in two propositions: first, that when
leaving weapons in the hands of a militia after a war is particularly costly for the government,
the supply strategy with a stopgap is to be preferred. This is because it lowers the expected
weapon holdings at the end of the war. Second, when the government wants to win a war
now without delay, the strategy of supplying as a stopgap is again to be preferred. This is
because the effort is greater in the periods with supply, thus raising the odds of ending the
war.
In addition, for the second result to hold, I find that the militia should take future values
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sufficiently into account. This is because it is only when the militia is patient enough to take
its future weapon supply into account that it responds strategically to the stopgap strategy.
Furthermore, when the weapons depreciate at a medium rate, the government prefers the
supply strategy with stopgap. This is because the dynamic incentive effect is limited when
the weapons do not depreciate much. Equally, when the weapons depreciate too fast, the
dynamic incentive effect cannot compensate for the loss of holding too few weapons in periods
with a stopgap strategy.
Literature Review
This paper is related to several different areas of study. First, it relates closely to the
literature on the military and the potential to stage a coup (e.g. Acemoglu, Vindigni and
Ticchi (2010a, 2010b), Besley and Robinson (2010), Leon (2014), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2006)).
These papers discuss the dilemma facing governments between the strength of the military
and the concern at the prospect of coups; Papers of this theme study how the government
may control their own armed forces through size and budgets. In this paper, governments
which employ militias share these concerns - supplying many weapons to win the war but also
increasing the security threat from the militias. Given such dilemmas, this paper extends
the discussion on the strength of the armed group from a static relationship to a dynamic
interaction.
Second, this paper also contributes to the literature on the monopoly of violence. Re-
searchers take the strength of non-governmental groups as exogenously given and focus on
negotiation or power-sharing as ways of settling incipient conflict (e.g. Powell, 2013). In
this paper, the strength of the militia is endogenously determined through the government’s
military sponsorship.
Third, as Blattman and Miguel (2010) and others (e.g. Dani Rodrik (1999), Cerra and
Saxena (2008), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and Weinstein (2005)) point out, many
political and economic legacies are conferred by wars. Besides the impact of these, this
paper along with others (e.g. Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012) emphasizes security concerns as
another legacy of war. In particular, it studies the how governments can strategically supply
their allies in order to reduce the risk of leaving too many weapons outside their control after
a war.
Fourth, the commitment problem has been the leading explanation for the cause of
civil wars (Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and their long duration (Walter 1997, 2002, 2009).
This paper also contributes to this literature by introducing another contracting problem
between the government and its allies. The present paper takes the incomplete contracting
problem between the government and a militia as exogenously given. Without commitment,
the militia which was an ally during the war can turn itself into another security threat
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afterwards.
Finally, this paper also relates to the discussion of ways to control war agents. Padro-
i-Miquel and Yared (2012) claim that the government can choose to directly intervene to
punish its agents. This paper introduces another instrument: the control of the weapon
supply. This can be used to build up the strength of the militias to fight the enemy but it
also raises security concerns after the war.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibria when the
government has limited commitment, and Section 4 studies two government strategies with
commitment. In the first one the government supplies weapons to keep a militia’s holding
constant. In the second, the government do not supply weapons in stopgap periods. Section
5 characterizes the differences in these two equilibria. Section 6 compares the government’s
welfare in the former with that in the latter supply strategy. Section 7 considers the com-
parative effects of stopgap strategies. Section 8 concludes. Proofs of the results are in the
Appendix.
2. Model
I consider a dynamic environment in which a government supplies military weapons to a
militia for fighting an enemy. In every period, the government chooses how many weapons to
supply, or to supply none. The militia uses the weapons-in-hand, defined as weapons given
in the past subject to depreciation, and the weapon supply in this period, together with its
unobservable effort in fighting. In this scenario, if the war continues, the government cannot
determine whether it does so due to the militia’s shirking or to bad luck. If the government
wins the war, the militia is not committed to returning the weapons. Instead, it can choose
to hold these weapons to make later gains at the expense of the government’s utility. This
is the source of incentive misalignment between the government and the militia. I study the
conditions in order to rationalize the use of the stopgap strategy. For expositional simplicity,
I assume there are no other transfers from the government to the militia and focus simply
on the government’s weapon supply strategies.6
2.1. Setup
There are infinite time periods, t = {1, ..., ∞}. In every period the government (g) and
the militia (m) repeat the following interaction. The government chooses wt ≥ 0 to give
6Even if the government uses transfer to exchange for the weapons after winning the war is committed,
the militia can always use weapon-in-hand to renegotiate with the government. This assumption also helps
the paper to focus on comparing weapon-supply strategies of the government.
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to the militia. In order to focus on ways in which to allocate weapons, I assume that it
costs nothing for the government to supply weapons. The weapons held by the militia are
subjected to depreciation over time, leaving δ ∈ [0, 1] proportion of weapons in the next
period. The higher δ is, the more slowly the weapons depreciate. The weapons-in-hand
at time t is equal to w¯t =
∑t
s=1 δ
t−sws. Given the value of the weapons held, the militia
privately chooses the amount of effort et ≥ 0 in fighting the enemy at a cost of c(et) = c2e2,
c > 0. Nature determines whether the war is won with a probability of p(w¯t+et). Otherwise,
the war continues with a probability of 1−p(w¯t+ et). When the war is won, the government
receives a payoff ∆g and a loss depending on the value of the weapons held by the militia
G(w¯t) = Gw¯t, G > 0, while the militia receives a payoff of M(wt) = Mwt, M > 0.
7 I let
the maximal weapons supplied be wˆ > 0 and the maximal effort inputs be eˆ > 0. The p(·)
is assumed to be linear. Given a small p > 0, p(w+ e) = pw+ pe ∈ [0, 1).8 The government
and the militia discount future values with a discount factor of βg ∈ [0, 1] and βm ∈ [0, 1],
respectively. All the parameters are common knowledge for both the government and the
militia. The only information asymmetry is that the government does not observe how much
effort invested by the militia. The timing of the game is shown in the Figure 1.
2.2. Equilibrium Definition
Next, I present the equilibrium concept to characterize different supply strategies. The
government maximizes its utility function, Vg, by choosing the amount of weapons to supply
in every period, wt, subjected to the militia’s participation constraint, incentive compatibility
constraint, and finally the feasibility constraints.
Vg = max{wt}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
βt−1g Π
t−1
γ=1(1− p(w¯γ + eγ))p(w¯t + et){∆g −G(w¯t)} (1)
subjected to
V 1m = max{et}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
βt−1m Π
t−1
γ=1(1− p(w¯γ + eγ)){p(w¯t + et)M(w¯t)− c(et)} ≥ 0 (2)
βt−1m Π
t−1
γ=1(1− p(w¯γ + eγ))
{− c(et) + p′(w¯t + et){M(w¯t)− V t+1m } ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [1, ...,∞] (3)
wt ≥ 0 and et ≥ 0, t ∈ [1, ...,∞] (4)
7I assume that the militia can only gain from weapons after winning the war. This assumption is not as
strong as it sounds. When the government chooses which militia to work with, it is usually those who are
also affected by the enemy and therefore there is an intrinsic value attached to winning for the militia. The
setup can easily accommodate this intrinsic value without any qualitative differences in the main results.
8I assume 0 effort is a normalized benchmark and that means the minimal amount of efforts. Therefore,
when the effort inputs are 0, the probability of winning the war can still be positive.
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Constraint (1) is the government’s utility function, Vg, which is the sum of the government’s
expected payoff from winning the war at a given time. I assume that ∆g is large enough to
keep the government’s net payoff always positive. The cost G(w) is assumed to be incurred
only when the war is won and the militia uses the weapons to threaten. Constraint (2)
is the militia’s participation constraint, which is the sum of the militia’s expected payoff
from winning the war at a given time and the cost of its effort. Constraint (3) is the
militia’s incentive compatibility constraint, which is derived from the first-order condition
of the militia’s effort-choosing problem. The choice of effort must balance three factors -
the expected value of winning the war, p′(w¯t + et)M(w¯t), the expected marginal costs of
additional effort, −c′(et), and a lower continuation value in expectation, −p′(w¯t + et)V t+1m .
Constraint (4) ensures that there is no borrowing of weapons and that effort is non-negative.
Figure 1: Timing of The Game
The	Government	supplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤8 ≥ 0
The	Militia	 decides𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑜	𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒8 ≥ 0	𝑎𝑡	𝑎	𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑐(𝑒8)
The	war	is	won	with	p𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑝(𝑤8 + 𝑒8)	
Payoff	after	winning	the	war
The	government:	(ΔN − 𝐺 𝑤8 )
The	militia:	𝑀 𝑤8
The	war	continues	with	p𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	1 − 𝑝(𝑤8 + 𝑒8)	
2.3. Supply With Temporary Stopgaps
After setting up the model, in this subsection, I now define the temporary stopgap strat-
egy based on the model. A temporary stopgap strategy with k stopgap periods is defined as
follows: to begin with, the government chooses to supply w1 > 0 and then leaves k periods
without any supply, w2 = w3 = ... = wk+1 = 0. After a k-period of no supply, the govern-
ment supplies weapons again to the militia, w(k+1)+1 > 0, before entering a stopgap period.
During all stopgap periods, the weapons held by the militia depreciate, w¯s = δ
s−1w1, for
s ∈ [2, ..., k+ 1]. This pattern then repeats itself as long as the war continues. This strategy
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is illustrated in Figure 2, below. In order to rationalize the use of a temporary stopgap
strategy, in the next section, I start by examining whether a supply strategy with stopgaps
would be adopted by a government without commitment.
Figure 2: Temporary Stopgap Strategy
Temporary	Stopgap	Strategy	(TS)
(k	stopgap	period)
The	Government	supplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤8 = 𝑤 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤: = 0 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤<=8 = 0 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤<=: = 1 − 𝛿<=8 𝑤
𝑤A8 = 𝑤 𝑤A: = 𝛿𝑤 𝑤A<=8 = 𝛿<𝑤 𝑤A<=: = 𝑤
K-Stopgap	Periods
3. Government Without Commitment
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium which takes into account a government
supplying weapons with limited commitment. When the government cannot supply with
commitment, it may face a time inconsistency problem. This means that if the government
chooses a supply strategy ahead of time, it may renege upon it. Therefore, its decision
becomes state contingent. In the following proposition, I show that, in this scenario, the
government would not choose not to supply any weapons.
Proposition 1. If the government supplies weapons without commitment, the temporary
stopgap strategy is never part of an equilibrium, wt > 0 for all t > 0.
The proof of Proposition 1 is shown in Appendix section A. Proposition 1 states that if
the government has no commitment, then it is never a rational choice for the government to
leave gaps in its supply of weapons. The intuition behind this is that without commitment
the government can in every period decide whether to supply weapons, given the existing
weapon holdings. The government would have to use a threshold strategy. If the weapon
stock is lower than the optimal level, the government would have an incentive to top it
up to the desired level at no extra cost. However, if the weapon stocks are higher than
the optimal level, the government would choose not to supply any weapons. But, since
the supply relationship starts from no weapon holdings, the government begins by simply
supplying weapons to the desired level. If the war continues, the weapons depreciate. The
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government faces the same problem and then supplies again to the desired level. Since
weapons will never be supplied beyond the optimal level, the government will not stop
supplying weapons. Therefore, supplying no weapon should never be a possibility in the
equilibrium when the government cannot commit.
In the next section, I move on to discuss the scenario when the government can supply
weapons with commitment.
4. Government With Commitment
In the previous section, I showed that the government without commitment would not
adopt a supply strategy with temporary stopgap supplies. In this section, I turn to examining
the equilibrium in which the government supplies weapons with commitment; that is, it
chooses the weapon supply strategy at the beginning of the game and does not renege upon
it. Therefore, I apply the Nash equilibrium concept in the following analysis.
In order to rationalize the use of a weapons supply strategy with stopgaps, I focus on
comparing the stopgap strategy with another strategy commonly used by the government –
the supply-upto-level (SUL) strategy – in which the government supplies weapons in every
period in order to keep the militia’s weapon holdings constant. I illustrate these two strategies
in Figure 3.
As the first example shown in Figure 3, the SUL strategy is meant to keep the weapon
holdings constant, w¯t = w. After the first government supply, in every period the government
simply supplies the weapons to make up for the depreciation wt = (1− δ)w. The temporary
stopgap strategy, in contrast, leaves periods in which no weapons are supplied and lets the
weapon holdings depreciate. In Figure 3, the second example is the one-stopgap-period
strategy. In period 2, the government stops supplying and the weapon holdings depreciate
at a rate of 1− δ, w¯2 = δw. In period 3, the government supplies weapons, w3 = (1− δ2)w,
to make up for the depreciation and reach the level set in period 1 once more. Below I first
establish the Nash equilibrium associated with the SUL strategy and then proceed to the
equilibrium associated with the temporary stopgap strategy.
Proposition 2. (Supply-Upto-Level) When the government can commit to supplying
weapons which will to keep the weapon holdings constant, the equilibrium exists in which:
1. The government supplies w1 = w
SUL followed by wt = (1− δ)wSUL, for all t ≥ 2.
2. In every period the militia exerts the same effort et = e
SUL, for all t ≥ 1.
The proof of Proposition 2 is shown in Appendix section B. In the equilibrium associated
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with the SUL strategy, the government in every period tops up the weapons to keep the
weapon holdings constant, w¯t = w
SUL, for all t ≥ 1.9
Figure 3: Supply-Upto-Level (SUL) vs. Temporary Stopgap (TS, one-period)
The	Government	supplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤8 = 𝑤 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤: = (1 − 𝛿)𝑤 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤@ = (1 − 𝛿)𝑤 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤A = (1 − 𝛿)𝑤 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤B = (1 − 𝛿)𝑤
𝑤C8 = 𝑤 𝑤C: = 𝑤 𝑤C@ = 𝑤 𝑤CA = 𝑤 𝑤CB = 𝑤
The	Government	supplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤8 = 𝑤 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤: = 0 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤@ = 1 − 𝛿: 𝑤 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤A = 0 The	Governmentsupplies		𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑤B = 1 − 𝛿: 𝑤
𝑤C8 = 𝑤 𝑤C: = 𝛿𝑤 𝑤C@ = 𝑤 𝑤CA = 𝛿𝑤 𝑤CB = 𝑤
Supply-Upto-Level	Strategy	(SUL)
Temporary	Stopgap	Strategy	(TS)
(1	stopgap	period)
Since the weapon holdings are constant, the militia’s optimization problem is recursive and
stationary. Therefore, I can easily compute the militia’s choice of effort. I find that in the
equilibrium the militia uses the same effort et = e
SUL in every period. The intuition behind
this is straightforward: since the weapon holdings are fixed, the militia’s problem is identical
in each period and the choice of effort does not change conditions for later periods either.
As a result, the militia chooses the same level of effort inputs in each period so long as the
war continues.
In the next proposition, I establish the equilibrium associated with the temporary stopgap
strategy.
Proposition 3. (Temporary Stopgap) When the government can commit to stop supply-
ing weapons for k periods, the equilibrium exists in which
1. The government supplies w1 = w
TS and w2 = ... = wk+1 = 0.
2. This weapon supply strategy is repeated with the following pattern:
(ws(k+1)+1, ws(k+1)+2, ... ws(k+1)+k+1) = ( (1− δ(k+1))wTS, 0, ... 0), s ∈ [1, 2, ... ∞].
9I assume for simplicity that the government knows the rate of weapon depreciation and is able to use
the knowledge to control the level of weapons held by the militia.
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3. The militia’s efforts conform to following pattern:
(es(k+1)+1, ..., es(k+1)+k+1) = (e
k
1, ..., e
k
k+1), s ∈ [0, 1, 2, ... ∞]
The proof of Proposition 3 is shown in Appendix section C. This equilibrium associated with
a k-period-stopgap strategy is characterized with k periods of no supply after each supply
period. During those stopgap periods, the weapon holdings are subjected to a depreciation
at a rate of 1− δ. After k periods of no supply, the government supplies w = (1− δ(k+1))wTS
again to replenish the holdings to a given level w¯t = w
TS. This gives the following weapon
holding pattern which repeats itself every k + 1 periods:
(w¯s(k+1)+1, w¯s(k+1)+2, ... w¯s(k+1)+k+1) = ( w
TS, δwTS, ... δkwTS), s ∈ [0, 1, 2, ... ∞]
Since the weapon holding pattern repeats itself in every k+1 period, the militia’s effort
choosing problem remains the same. Therefore, the militia’s equilibrium efforts also follow a
fixed pattern over k+1 periods and then repeat themselves. After establishing the equilibrium
associated with each of the two supply strategies, in the next section, I characterize these
two equilibria and discuss their differences.
5. Characterizing The Equilibria
In this section, in order to characterize the two equilibria, I focus on two aspects of
them that prepare us to compare them in the next section. The first one to be discussed in
subsection 5.1 is the militia’s effort choices. Then I move on in subsection 5.2 to examining
the government’s losses from the militia’s weapon holdings after winning the war.
5.1. The Militia’s Effort Choices
In this subsection, I first discuss the militia’s effort choice under the SUL strategy as
the benchmark and then proceed to study the effort choices under the temporary stopgap
strategy; finally I examine their differences and how their differences are affected by various
government and militia characteristics.
5.1.1. Supply-Upto-Level Strategy
I start by examining how the various characteristics of effort choice change under the
SUL strategy. The results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. The following statements hold true for the militia’s effort choice under the
SUL strategy, eSUL:
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1. ∂e
SUL
∂βm
< 0: eSUL is decreasing in the militia’s patience, βm.
2. ∂e
SUL
∂w¯
> 0: eSUL is increasing in weapon holdings, w¯.
3. ∂e
SUL
∂w¯
> 0: eSUL is increasing in gain from holding weapons after the war, M .
4. ∂e
SUL
∂δ
= 0: eSUL does not change with the depreciation factor, δ.
The proof of Lemma 5.1 is shown in Appendix section D. The first part of Lemma 5.1 states
that the militia chooses to make fewer efforts when it is more patient, with a greater βm.
The intuition behind this is straightforward: when the militia discount future value less,
the continuation value increases. Therefore, it reduces the militia’s incentive to exert costly
effort in order to win the war sooner. The second part of Lemma 5.1 states that when there
are more weapon holdings, the militia is willing to put more effort into fighting the war.
The intuition behind this is that the militia can gain from weapons after the war is over and
thus holding more weapons will encourage the militia to put more effort into fighting. This
also suggests that the weapon holdings not only increase the chance to win the war but also
function similarly as a gain by rewarding the militia after the war is won. Following the
same logic, if the militia could benefit more from the weapon holdings, such as earning a
higher unit benefit from doing so (M), it would exert more effort in fighting. The final part
of Lemma 5.1 states that the weapons’ depreciation does not affect the militia’s choice of
effort. This is because, under the SUL strategy, the government is committed to supplying
weapons to a fixed level. Therefore, the militia’s weapon holdings are constant at any given
period. Since the militia’s effort choices are determined by the amount of weapon holdings
over time and not by the amount supplied, the militia’s choice of effort will not be affected
by the weapons’ depreciation. In the next lemma, I show that the militia is better off when
it holds more weapons.
Lemma 5.2. ∂Vm
∂w¯
≥ 0: the militia’s expected utility increases with its weapon holdings, w¯.
The proof of Lemma 5.2 is shown in Appendix section E. As discussed earlier, the weapon
holdings serve as a reward for the militia to gain after winning the war. Therefore, Lemma
5.2 states that if more weapons are held by the militia, it can expect higher utility from
them.
5.1.2. Temporary Stopgap Strategy
In this subsection, I turn to characterizing the militia’s efforts under the temporary
stopgap strategy. For expositional simplicity, I focus first on the one-stopgap-period strategy,
k=1, and at the end of the section will generalize the result to a k-stopgap-period strategy
at the end of the section. The following corollary describes the effort choices under the
one-stopgap-period strategy.
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Corollary 1. Under the one-stopgap-period strategy (k = 1), there are two equilibrium
efforts: (e2s+1, e2s+2) = (e
1
1, e
1
2), for all s ∈ [0, 1, 2, ... ∞].
On the basis of Proposition 3, the equilibrium efforts under the one-stopgap-period strategy
repeat a fixed pattern every two periods. When the government supplies weapons, the militia
exerts effort, e11. When the government supplies no weapons, the militia exerts efforts, e
1
2.
Since the stopgap is one period and whenever the government supplies weapon the amount is
fixed, the pattern of the militia’s efforts repeats itself every two periods. Next, I characterize
these two effort choices, summarizing the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. The following statements hold true for the militia’s choice of efforts under the
one-stopgap-period strategy:
1.
∂e11
∂βm
< 0 and
∂e12
∂βm
< 0: e11 and e
1
2 are decreasing in the militia’s patience, βm.
2.
∂e11
∂w¯
> 0 and
∂e12
∂w¯
> 0: e11 and e
1
2 are increasing in weapon holding, w¯.
3.
∂e11
∂M
> 0 and
∂e12
∂M
> 0: e11 and e
1
2 are increasing in gain from weapons after the war, M .
4.
∂e11
∂δ
< 0 for δ > δˆ and
∂e11
∂δ
≥ 0 for δ ≤ δˆ: e11 is decreasing in δ when δ is sufficiently
large and increasing in δ otherwise.
5.
∂e12
∂δ
< 0 for δ > δ¯ and e12 = 0 for δ ≤ δ¯: e12 is decreasing in δ and is equal to 0 when δ
is small.
6. e11 ≥ e12.
The proof of Lemma 5.3 is shown in the Appendix section F. Lemma 5.3 establishes how the
militia’s effort choices under the one-stopgap-period strategy are affected by various factors.
The first three statements concern the same properties as those in Lemma 5.1 and therefore
the same intuitions apply. The militia chooses to make a greater effort if he discounts the
future more, holds more weapons, and can gain more from holding weapons. The next
two statements refer to the properties that fundamentally distinguish the two strategies.
Unlike the effort choice under the SUL strategy, the effort choices under the stopgap strategy
are affected by weapon depreciation, δ. In particular, the two efforts respond in different
directions. First, there is a non-monotonic effect of the weapons’ depreciation, δ, on the
militia’s effort choice in the supply periods, e11. If the weapon depreciation is rapid (δ ≤ δˆ),
the militia chooses to put in more effort for a slower weapon depreciation. Conversely, if
the weapons depreciate slowly (δ > δˆ), the militia chooses to make less effort with slower
weapon depreciation. In other words, e11 has a concave relationship with δ. Second, the
militia chooses not to exert any effort in periods without weapon supply, e12 = 0, if the
weapons depreciate fast (δ ≤ δ¯). But the militia chooses greater effort for a slower weapon
depreciation when the weapons depreciate slowly (δ > δ¯). In other words, e12 increases with
δ when δ is large enough.
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In order to trace the intuition behind the last two statements, I start from the effort
made in periods without supply, e12, and then move to discussing the effort made in periods
with supply, e11. Previously in Lemma 5.2 I mentioned that the weaponry held by the militia
can be treated as a reward for winning the war. Therefore, more weaponry would encourage
the militia to make more effort to fight the enemy. When the weapons depreciate fast, in
periods without supply the weapon holdings become fewer, to the point where it is no longer
worth investing any effort in fighting. This is because it would imply that too few weapons
would be gained from winning the war and also that a further supply would arrive by the
time the war had been delayed for one period. Both factors drive the militia’s incentive not
to make an effort to fight in periods without supply. Therefore, if δ is small, the militia
chooses not to invest any effort in periods without supply, e12 = 0. However, if the weapon
depreciate slowly enough, e12 becomes positive. And the slower the weaponry depreciates,
the more weapons are held by the militia in a period of no supply; thus the militia will put
in more effort. Therefore when δ is sufficiently large, the militia chooses to input greater
effort in periods without supply, e12 for a higher δ.
Now I resume the discussion on the effect that weapons depreciation has on the effort
choice in periods with supply, e11. The militia in supply periods chooses to make less effort
if the weapons depreciate more slowly because in periods without supply the weaponry does
not depreciate so much. The militia’s continuation value is higher for a even greater δ.
However, if the weapons depreciate sufficiently fast, the militia chooses to make more effort
when the weapon depreciation is slower. This result seems counter-intuitive. The intuition
behind this is as follows: in periods without supply, when the weapons depreciate fast, fewer
weapons remain and thus the reward for winning the war is also small. This is true to
the point where the militia no longer finds it worthwhile to input any effort, e12 = 0. If in
periods without supply the weapons depreciation becomes slightly slower, it will increase the
probability of winning the war. This means that there is a higher chance of winning the war
when the reward is small. Therefore, the militia will have an incentive to make more effort
in supply periods and this will lower the chance that the war will continue and be won in
periods without a weapons supply.
The last property in Lemma 5.3 states that the militia will choose to make a greater
effort in supply periods than in periods without supply, i.e. e11 > e
1
2. There are two main
reasons for asserting this. First, the militia in supply periods holds more weapons than it
does in periods without supply. Earlier in the discussion, I showed that the weapons serve
as a reward that the militia can gain if the war is won. Therefore, holding more weapons
will incentivize the militia to make more effort. This is the first reason why the militia is
expected to input more effort in supply periods. Second, for the militia each supply period is
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immediately followed by a period without supply, while a periods without supply is followed
by a period with supply. In Lemma 5.2, I show that the militia’s utility is higher when it
holds more weapons. This suggests that the militia in supply periods has a lower continuation
value than in periods without supply. Therefore, the militia has another incentive to make
a greater effort in supply periods.
After establishing the comparative statics for the militia’s effort choices under the two
strategies, in the next subsection I compare how the differences between them change with
various characteristics.
5.1.3. Effort Choices in Comparison
Given Lemma 5.1 and 5.3, I can now compare the effort choices that the militia makes
between these two strategies. The results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Given a fixed level of weapon holdings whenever there is a supply, w,
1. During the weapon supply period: e11(w) > e
SUL(w).
2. During the period when no weapon is supplied: e12(w) < e
SUL(w).
The proof of Lemma 5.4 is shown in Appendix section G. The first part of Lemma 5.4
states that for a given weapon holding, w, the militia will choose greater effort in periods
with weapon supply under the temporary stopgap strategy, e11(w), than it will under the SUL
strategy, eSUL(w). The intuition behind this is that if the weapon holdings are fixed whenever
replenishments are supplied, w, the militia under the SUL strategy always holds w, while
under the one-stopgap-period strategy it holds w when the government supplies weapons and
δw in stopgap periods. This suggests that the militia under the SUL strategy holds no fewer
weapons than when it is under the one-stopgap-period strategy. As previously discussed,
the weapon holdings can be treated as a reward for winning the war. As a result, the
militia’s continuation value is higher with the SUL strategy than it is with the one-stopgap-
period strategy. This incentivizes the militia in supply periods under the one-stopgap-period
strategy to invest more effort in fighting and reduces the likelihood that the war will continue.
Therefore, e11 is greater than e
SUL.
The second statement in Lemma 5.4 suggests that in stopgap periods, the militia will
choose to invest less effort under the temporary stopgap strategy, e12(w), than under the
SUL strategy, eSUL(w). As previously discussed, the continuation value under the temporary
stopgap strategy is lower than it is under the SUL strategy. This incentivizes the militia to
exert more effort under the SUL strategy. However, despite a lower continuation value, fewer
weapon holdings can be gained from winning the war in periods without supply. Furthermore,
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knowing that the supply will arrive in the next period, the militia, if patient enough, might
be better off if it delayed the war for another period and did so by making less effort. This
would incentivize the militia to make less of an effort. In the proof, I show that the effect
of the latter dominates the former. Therefore, the militia would choose e12(w) smaller than
eSUL(w).
In sum, Lemma 5.4 suggests that, taking the effort choice under the SUL strategy as a
benchmark, the government when using the stopgap strategy is making a trade-off between
benefiting from a greater effort in the weapon supply periods at the expense of having fewer
weapons and a lower effort in periods without supply. Since the purpose of this paper is
to compare these two strategies, the natural next step is to investigate how these effort
differences change with other various factors, in particular, the militia’s patience, βm, and
the weapons’ depreciation, δ. The first result is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Given a fixed level of weapon holdings whenever there is a supply, w,
• ∂|e11(w)−eSUL(w)|
∂βm
> 0: |e11(w)− eSUL(w)| is increasing in βm.
• ∂|e12(w)−eSUL(w)|
∂βm
< 0: |e12(w)− eSUL(w)| is decreasing in βm.
The proof of Lemma 5.5 is shown in Appendix section H. Lemma 5.5 shows how the differ-
ences in efforts between the two strategies change with the militia’s patience, βm. The first
part of Lemma 5.5 states that, if the militia is more patient, it invests even greater effort in
supply periods under the stopgap strategy than under the SUL strategy. The reason behind
this is as follows: if the militia discounts future value fully, it will care only about its current
weapon holdings. Regardless of the supply strategies, if the weapon holdings are identical
the effort choices are no different. But once the militia cares enough about future values, the
difference in the continuation value starts to matter. As Lemma 5.1 and 5.3 suggest, both
effort choices are decreasing in βm because the militia value the future more. Since the slope
is steeper for eSUL than for e11 when facing a greater value in βm, the difference is greater
when the militia is more patient.
The second part of Lemma 5.5 states that, in periods without supply under the one-
stopgap-period strategy, the militia invests an amount of effort closer to the amount under
the SUL strategy, when the militia is more patient. The intuition behind this is similar to the
first statement that although both efforts are less when the militia is more patient, the rising
slope of the continuation value is steeper for the SUL strategy and therefore the associated
effort falls faster than the effort in periods without supply under the stopgap strategy. Since
e12 < e
SUL, the difference is smaller when the militia is more patient. In sum, these results
suggest that, if the militia is more patient, it will input more effort in supply periods than
it would under SUL strategy, and it will input more or less the same effort in no-supply
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periods. In the following lemma, I show how these differences in effort choices between the
two strategies change with the rate of weapons depreciation.
Lemma 5.6. Given a fixed level of weapon holdings whenever there is a supply, w,
• ∂|e11(w)−eSUL(w)|
∂δ
< 0 for δ > δˆ and
∂|e11(w)−eSUL(w)|
∂δ
≥ 0 otherwise:
|e11(w) − eSUL(w)| is decreasing in δ when δ is sufficiently large and increasing in δ
otherwise.
• ∂|e12(w)−eSUL(w)|
∂δ
≤ 0: |e12(w)− eSUL(w)| is non-increasing in δ.
The proof of Lemma 5.6 is shown in Appendix section I. As suggested by Lemma 5.1,
the effort choice under the SUL strategy, eSUL, is not affected by weapons depreciation.
Therefore, the effect of weapons depreciation on the differences in efforts is dominated by
the effect on the effort choices under the one-stopgap-period strategy. As a result, Lemma
5.6 is a restatement of the fourth and the fifth parts in Lemma 5.3. The intuition behind this
is therefore no different from that behind Lemma 5.3. In sum, these results suggest that for
a greater δ both efforts under the stopgap strategy converge the effort choice under the SUL
strategy. But if δ is small enough, both efforts in the stopgap strategy will become greater
with a greater δ. In the next Corollary, I extend some of the results in previous lemmas to
the strategy with k stopgap periods.
Corollary 2. Given a fixed level of weapon holdings whenever there is a supply, w,
1. During the weapon supply period: ek1(w) > e
SUL(w).
2. In the last no weapon supply period: ekk+1(w) < e
SUL(w).
3. The efforts have the following pattern: ek1(w) ≥ ek2(w) ≥ ... ≥ ekk+1(w).
4. The difference of efforts in (3) is decreasing in δ.
The first part of Corollary 2 states that the militia always invests greater effort in supply
periods under the temporary stopgap strategy than under the SUL strategy. The second part
of Corollary 2 states that the militia always invests less effort in the last stopgap period under
the temporary stopgap strategy than under the SUL strategy. These results are similar to
Lemma 5.4. The third part of Corollary 2 states that the militia’s effort choices decrease over
the stopgap periods. The intuition behind this is similar to that behind the last statement in
Lemma 5.3 that the militia’s continuation values grow over the stopgap periods as they get
closer to the supply period while the weapon holdings are depreciating over the stopgaps.
The two factors incentivize the militia to exert less effort. The final part of Corollary 2 states
that the differences in the militia’s effort choices are smaller when the weapons depreciate
more slowly, a higher δ. The intuition is also straightforward: as the weapons depreciate
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more slowly, the relative differences in weapon holdings in the stopgap periods is smaller.
Therefore, the militia is given a limited incentive to differentiate between its inputs of effort.
After studying the effort choices under the two supply strategies, I turn to look at the way
in which the stopgap strategy may affect the government’s losses from weapons beyond its
control after the war.
5.2. The Losses when Weapons are Left beyond Government Control
Finally, in this subsection, I compare the government’s losses due to weapons being
permanently held by the militia after the war ends. The differences in the government’s
losses between the two strategies are documented in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.7. Given a fixed level of weapon holdings whenever the supply, w:
1. Supply-upto-level strategy: G(w¯t) = G(w), for t ≥ 1.
2. One-stopgap-period strategy: {G(w¯s), G(w¯s+1)} = {G(w), G(δw)} for odd number s.
The first part of Lemma 5.7 states that under the SUL strategy the government suffers a fixed
amount of losses due to the constancy of the militia’s weapon holdings. The losses under the
one-stopgap-period strategy, stated in the second part of Lemma 5.7, follow the pattern of
weapon holdings that repeats itself every two periods. In supply periods, the losses are the
same as those in the SUL strategy, G(w). But in periods without supply, the government’s
losses are smaller because of fewer holdings, G(δw) < G(w). This suggests that whenever
the war is won in periods without weapon supply the government can save G(w) − G(δw)
in losses. The likelihood of winning the war in periods without supply lowers the expected
losses for the government. This is another factor that incentivizes the government to use
the one-stopgap-period strategy. After characterizing and discussing the two equilibrium, in
the next section I calculate and compare the government’s welfare associated with the two
equilibrium in order to rationalize the adoption of the stopgap strategy.
6. Rationalizing The Stopgap Strategy
In this section, I compare the government’s welfare associated with each of the two strate-
gies in order to rationalize the adoption of the temporary stopgap strategy. For expositional
simplicity, I continue to focus on the equilibrium with one-stopgap-period strategy when
considering the temporary stopgap strategy. To undertake this exercise, I explore conditions
in which the government would prefer the one-stopgap-period strategy. In particular, I focus
on two government characteristics - the losses due to the militia’s retention of weapons after
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the war, G, and the patience of the government, βg. The government’s incentive to reduce
the losses due to weapons remaining beyond its control leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If G > G¯, then V TS1g > V
SUL
g .
The proof of Proposition 4 is shown in Appendix section J. Proposition 4 states that if it is
very costly for the government to leave weapons in the hands of the militia after the war is
over, G > G¯, then the temporary stopgap strategy gives a greater government welfare than
the SUL strategy, V TS1g > V
SUL
g . The intuition behind this can be derived straight from
Lemma 5.7 that the government can reduce the expected losses so long as it is probable that
the war will be won in a period without a weapon supply (fewer weapon holdings). This
implication is important for it suggests that a government that may suffer substantial threats
from non-state agents holding weapons after the war will prefer the temporary stopgap
strategy. This intuitive result supports the rationale behind the US commander’s proposition
at the beginning of this paper. However, this is not the only way that the government can
gain from the temporary stopgap strategy. As discussed in the previous section, a government
using the stopgap strategy may also benefit from the higher effort made by the militia in
a supply period. This factor leads to the next proposition discussing the way in which the
government discounts future value can affect its preference for one of the two strategies.
Proposition 5. If G < G¯ and βg < β¯
L
g , then V
TS1
g > V
SUL
g .
The proof of Proposition 5 is shown in Appendix section K. Proposition 5 states that the
government when it is less patient prefers the temporary stopgap strategy, βg < β¯
L
g . The
intuition behind this is as follows: the government begins by supplying weapons and then
moving onto stopgap periods. Lemma 5.4 suggests the efforts are in this case higher in
periods with supply than corresponding ones would be under the SUL strategy. Therefore,
the effort made is higher at the beginning when using the stopgap strategy than it is when
using the SUL strategy. Since greater efforts at the beginning increase the chance of winning
the war without delay, this makes the stopgap strategy preferable. This proposition suggests
that a government which hopes to win the war without delay should adopt the temporary
stopgap strategy. Propositions 4 and 5 are the main rationales behind the government’s
adopting the stopgap strategy. However, the effect of the stopgap strategy of raising the
amount of effort in supply periods would depend on the militia’s patience, βm, and the rate
at which the weapons depreciate, δ. Therefore, in the next section, I move to a discussion
of the way in which these elements would shape the effects of the stopgap strategy.
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7. Comparative Statics
In the previous section, I showed that when the government is hoping to win a war as
soon as possible, the stopgap strategy is preferred. This is because it makes the militia put
in more effort in the supply periods. However, the effect of the stopgap strategy to bring
forward the effort will depend on the militia’s characteristics and the quality of the weapons.
In this section, I examine how the militia’s patience and the weapons’ depreciation rate affect
the result of the stopgap strategy.
7.1. The Militia’s Characteristics
In this subsection, I examine how the militia discounts of future value will affect the
amount of effort that it invests, which then determines the government’s preference for one
or other of the two strategies. In particular, I look for conditions in which the e11 is greater
than eSUL, and e12 is closer to e
SUL. This means that the government can gain from the
greater efforts in supply periods without losing too much efforts in periods without supply.
The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If G < G¯ and βm > β¯
L
m, then V
TS1
g > V
SUL
g .
The proof of Proposition 6 is shown in Appendix section L. Proposition 6 states that the
government would prefer the temporary stopgap strategy when the militia is sufficiently
patient, βm > β¯
L
m. This result can be easily shown using Lemma 5.5. The intuition behind
this is twofold: first, as stated in Lemma 5.5, the effort in supply periods, e11, and the effort
under the SUL strategy, eSUL, diverges (with the e11 being greater) when the militia is more
patient. Second, also stated in Lemma 5.5, the effort in periods without supply, e12, is closer
to the effort inputs in the SUL strategy, eSUL with a greater βm. Therefore, when the
militia is patient enough, comparing with the SUL strategy, the militia under the stopgap
strategy inputs greater effort in periods with supply and invests similar effort in periods
without supply. This condition relaxes the requirement on the government’s impatience to
prefer the stopgap strategy. Therefore, greater patience from the militia makes the stopgap
strategy more likely to be the government’s preference. This result does not imply that
the government should work with a militia which is more patient. In fact, the opposite is
what actually works: - the government should choose to work with a militia which is less
patient and consequently will make more effort. What this result suggests is that when the
government has to work with a militia which is very patience, the government should adopt
the stopgap strategy, which will produce more welfare for itself.
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7.2. The Weapon’s Depreciation
Finally, in this subsection I discuss how weapons’ depreciation will determine the gov-
ernment’s preference between the two strategies.
Proposition 7. If G < G¯ and δ¯U > δ > δ¯L, then V TS1g > V
SUL
g .
The proof of Proposition 7 is shown in Appendix section M. Proposition 7 states that when
the weapons depreciation is at an intermediate level, by the government prefers the stopgap
strategy to the SUL strategy. The intuition behind this is as follows: when the weapons
depreciate slowly, δ > δ¯U , the extra effort in periods with supply will not be large enough to
compensate for the losses from both lower weapon holdings and less effort invested during
periods without supply. Conversely, when the weapons depreciate rapidly, δ < δ¯L, the
weapon holdings and also the effort invested in periods without supply will be too low to
compensate for it by extra effort in the periods with supply. These conditions also relax the
requirement on the government’s impatience, βg, to prefer the stopgap strategy. Therefore,
a government that supplies weapons with a medium rate of depreciation will be more likely
to prefer the stopgap strategy.
8. Conclusions
In order to lessen the likelihood of conflict, one important precaution is to ensure that
military resources do not fall into the hands of non-state groups. However, due to limited
state capacity, countries often rely on many non-state militias to fight their enemies. Gov-
ernments recruit these allies for this purpose by offering to supply military resources and
wage compensation. Their sponsorship seems to explain why so many weapons are left be-
yond governments’ control. In order to deal with this dilemma, a weapon-supply strategy
with stopgaps is suggested – the militia holds fewer weapons in stopgap periods due to de-
preciation. In this paper, I sought to understand why this strategy might be preferred by
governments which supply arms to non-state militias. I find that this strategy is sustained
only if the government can commit itself to a given supply strategy. Compared with an-
other commonly observed supply strategy, in which the stock of weapons is kept constant
by government replenishment, the stopgap strategy is the one that governments prefer when
leaving the weapons in the hands of a militia is particularly harmful and also when the
government hopes to win the war very soon afterwards.
There are a few avenues for future development on this subject. First, in this paper,
I have been using the one-stopgap-period strategy as an example. It would be very useful
also to know how different conditions might shape the number of stopgap periods chosen.
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Second, today’s conflicts all seem to rely heavily on the effort invested by the militia, e.g. in
guerrilla warfare. Therefore, it would be useful to know whether and how the result would
differ if the militia’s effort mattered more in relation to the weapons. Third, I assume the
government is fully informed about the rate of the weapons’ depreciation and I also set the
rate to be constant. However, in many situations, this information is also secretly known to
the militia and the rate of deprecation may be affected by the effort invested by the militia.
This may generate different dynamics and results. Finally, the central purpose of this paper
is to rationalize the use of stopgap strategy, but it would also be essential to learn what the
optimal strategy would be for a government to employ.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, I show that the government without commitment cannot have supply
stopgaps as part of equilibrium. Because the government supplies without commitment, in
every period the government would make supply decision based on current weapon holdings.
This makes the current weapon holdings a state variable. In every period the government
faces the same problem. Therefore, its problem can be rearranged into a recursive structure:
V G(w) = max
w′≥w
p(w′ + e)(∆g −G(w′)) + βg(1− p(w′ + e))V G(δw′) (5)
The government uses a threshold strategy: if the current holdings is below the optimal level,
then the government would top it up to the desired level without any cost. However, if the
current holdings is above the optimal level, the government will choose not to supply any
weapons. Since there were no weapons held by the militia initially, in the equilibrium, the
weapon supply will be w1 = w∗ and then fixed at wt = δw∗ for t > 1. The weapon holdings
by the militia are w∗ for all t ≥ 1. The militia also learns that weapons will always be top
up to a certain level. Therefore it generates a constant level of efforts, e.
V M(w∗) = max
e≥0
p(w∗ + e)M(w∗)− c(e) + βg(1− p(w∗ + e))V M(w∗) (6)
The next step is to take the first-order-condition:
p′(w′+e)(1+
∂e
∂w′
){∆g−G(w′)−βgV M(δw′)}−p(w′+e)G+βg(1−p(w′+e))δ∂V
M(δw′)
∂δw′
(7)
If δw′ is below the w∗, then it does not affect the value of V M . Since ∂V
M (δw′)
∂δw′ = 0 when
δw < w∗, the optimal level of w is determined by
p(1 +
∂e
∂w∗
){∆g −G(w∗)− βgV M} − p(w∗ + e)G = 0 (8)
This equation along with the following first-order condition characterize the equilibrium
p′(w∗ + e)M(w∗)− c′(e)− βgp′(w∗ + e)V M(w∗) = 0 (9)
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In every period, the government supplies (1− δ)w∗ and the militia inputs effort et = e∗. The
equilibrium does not include periods with no weapon supplies.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium associated with the supply-upto-level strat-
egy. Under SUL strategy, the government supplies weapons w1 = w and then followed by
wt = (1− δ)w, for all t ≥ 2. This ensures w¯t = w, for all t ≥ 1. The government chooses w
to maximize welfare, Vg.
I start by solving the militia’s response function when the government commits to have
the militia holding w¯t = w, for all t ≥ 1. Then I solve for the w that maximize the
government’s welfare. Since the militia faces the same problem in every period with the same
amount of weapon-in-hand. The militia’s equilibrium effort choice is fixed as a function of
w, e = eSUL(w). Therefore, the militia’s problem is stationary and reduced to a recursive
structure as follows:
V SULm = max
e
p(w + e)M(w)− c(e) + βg(1− p(w + e))V SULm (10)
To find the militia’s participation constraint, the equation 10 is rearranged and gives
V SULm =
p(w + eSUL(w))M(w)− c(eSUL(w))
1− βg(1− p(w + eSUL(w))) ≥ 0 (11)
This can always be achieved since the militia can simply input no efforts and no other costs
will occur. To find the militia’s incentive compatibility constraint, I simply look for the
first-order condition:
− c′(e) + p′(w + e){M(w)− Vm} = 0 (12)
Substituting V SULm from equation 11 into equation 12, the militia’s incentive compatibility
constraint is as follows:
p′(w + e)[(1− βm)M(w) + βmc(e)]
1− βm(1− p(w + e)) = c
′(e) (13)
Therefore the equilibrium associated with the supply-upto-level strategy is characterized as
follows:
V SULg = max{w}
p(w + e){∆g −G(w)}+ βg(1− p(w + e))V SULg (14)
s.t.
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V SULm =
p(w + eSUL(w))M(w)− c(eSUL(w))
1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL(w))) ≥ 0 (15)
− c(e) + p′(w + e){M(w)− Vm} = 0, ∀t ∈ [1, ...,∞] (16)
w ≥ 0 and e ≥ 0 (17)
This equilibrium can be summarized and characterized by two equations: 1) the militia’s
incentive compatibility constraint 13. 2) the government’s first-order condition which pins
down the optimal choice of weapon supply level, wSUL, shown below:
p′(w + eSUL(w))(1 +
∂eSUL(w)
∂w
){∆G −G(w)− βgV SULg } − p(w + eSUL(w))G′(w) = 0 (18)
where Vg =
p(w + eSUL(w)){∆g −G(w)}
1− βg(1− p(w + eSUL(w)))
To ensure the existence of interior solution, two conditions are assumed:
Assumption B.1. More weapons encourage fighting:
∂eSUL(w)
∂w
> 0
Assumption B.2. Diminishing effect of additional weapon on effort:
∂2eSUL(w)
∂w2
< 0
While Assumption B.1 ensures the government’s first-order condition is held, Assumption
B.2 ensures the second-order condition is satisfied as well as the uniqueness of the solution.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
Under the temporary stopgap strategy, the government supplies weapons as follows:
w1 = w
TS and w2 = ... = wk+1 = 0, then followed by
(ws(k+1)+1, ws(k+1)+2, ... ws(k+1)+k+1) = ( (1− δ(k+1))wTS, 0, ... 0), s ∈ [1, 2, ... ∞].
Therefore the militia’s weapon-in-hand has the following pattern:
(w¯s(k+1)+1, w¯s(k+1)+2, ... w¯s(k+1)+k+1) = ( w
TS, δwTS, ... δkwTS), s ∈ [0, 1, 2, ... ∞]
Because the weapon-in-hand has a fixed pattern that itself repeats every k+1 period, the mili-
tia’s problem also repeats every k+1 period: (es(k+1)+1, ..., es(k+1)+k+1) = (e
k
1, ..., e
k
k+1), s ∈
[0, 1, 2, ... ∞]. This reduces the militia’s problem to a recursive structure with k+ 1 effort
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choices.10
V km = max{ekt }k+1t=1
k∑
l=0
βlmΠ
l
γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))[p(δlw + ekl+1)M(δlw)− c(ekt+1)]
+ βk+1m Π
k+1
γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))V km
(19)
To find the militia’s participation constraint, the equation 19 is rearranged and gives
V km =
∑k
l=0 β
l
mΠ
l
γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))[p(δlw + ekl+1)M(δlw)− c(ekt+1)]
1− βk+1m Πk+1γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))
≥ 0 (20)
To find the militia’s incentive compatibility constraint, I take the first-order condition
for ekt , for all t ∈ [1, ..., k + 1]:
− c′(ekt ) + p′(δt−1w + ekt ){M(δt−1w)−
k∑
l=t
βlmΠ
l
γ=t+1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))[p(δlw + ekl+1)M(δlw)− c(ekl+1)]
− βk+2−tm Πk+1γ=t+1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))V km} = 0
(21)
Therefore the equilibrium associated with the temporary stopgap strategy is characterized
as follows:
V kg = max{w}
k∑
l=0
βlgΠ
l
γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))[p(δlw + ekl+1)[∆g −G(δlw)]]
+ βk+1g Π
k+1
γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))V kg
(22)
s.t.
V km =
∑k
l=0 β
l
mΠ
l
γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))[p(δlw + ekl+1)M(δlw)− c(ekt+1)]
1− βk+1m Πk+1γ=1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))
≥ 0 (23)
− c′(ekt ) + p′(δt−1w + ekt ){M(δt−1w)−
k∑
l=t
βlmΠ
l
γ=t+1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))[p(δlw + ekl+1)M(δlw)− c(ekl+1)]
− βk+2−tm Πk+1γ=t+1(1− p(δγ−1w + ekγ))V km} = 0
(24)
w ≥ 0 and ekt ≥ 0, for t ∈ [1, ..., k + 1] (25)
10From section 5 onwards, I use one-stopgap-period strategy as an example to show a more complete
characterization.
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Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 5.1
Under the supply-upto-level strategy, the militia’s effort choice for a given weapon-in-
hand, w, is determined by the following equation:
− c
′(eSUL)
p′(w + eSUL)
+
(1− βm)M(w) + βmc(eSUL)
1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL)) = 0 (26)
The proof of first part of Lemma, the effort is decreasing in the militia’s patience, βm, is
shown below:
∂eSUL
∂βm
=
Ω1
{c′′(eSUL)− p′′(w + eSUL) c
′(eSUL)
p′(w + eSUL)
}(1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL)))
< 0 (27)
Ω1 = −p′(w + eSUL)(p(w + eSUL)M(w)− c(eSUL))/1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL)) =
− 1
βm
(p′(w + eSUL)M(w)− c′(eSUL)) < 0 (28)
The proof of second part of Lemma, the effort is increasing in weapon holding, w¯, is shown
below,
∂eSUL
∂w
=
Ω2
{c′′(eSUL)− p′′(w + eSUL) c
′(eSUL)
p′(w + eSUL)
}(1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL)))
(29)
Ω2 = p
′(w+eSUL){(1−βm)M−βmc′(eSUL)}+p′′(w+eSUL){(1−βm)M(w)+βmc(eSUL)} (30)
Since p(w + eSUL) is linear, the term p′′(w + eSUL) = 0. The Ω2 can be rearranged into
p{(1− βm)M − βmceSUL} which is positive because eSUL < (1− βm)M
βm
.
The proof of third part of Lemma, the effort is increasing in gain from holding weapons after
the war, M , is shown below.
∂eSUL
∂M
=
Ω3
{c′′(eSUL)− p′′(w + eSUL) c
′(eSUL)
p′(w + eSUL)
}(1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL)))
> 0 (31)
Ω3 = (1− βm)wp′(w + eSUL) (32)
Finally, the proof of last part of Lemma, the effort does not change with depreciation rate,
δ, is trivial since the δ does not enter the militia’s optimization problem under the supply-
upto-level equilibrium.
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Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 5.2
In this proof, I show that
∂V SULm
∂w
> 0.
∂V SULm
∂w
=
Ω
(1− βm(1− p(w + e)))2 (33)
Ω = p′(w+e)(1+
∂e
∂w
){(1−βm)M(w)+βmc(eSUL)}+{p(w+e)M−c′(e) ∂e
∂w
}(1−βm(1−p(w+e)))
(34)
Substituting in equation 26 and gives
= p′(w+e)(1+
∂e
∂w
){ c
′(e)
p′(w + e)
(1−βm(1−p(w+e)))}+{p(w+e)M−c′(e) ∂e
∂w
}(1−βm(1−p(w+e)))
(35)
= {c′(e) + p(w + e)M}(1− βm(1− p(w + e))) > 0 (36)
This result suggests that the more weapons are supplied to the militia, the higher the utility
that stays with the militia. Intuitively since the weapon serves as a resource for both fighting
the war and to gain, more weapons given relaxed the constraints the militia has and thus
should generate more values to the milita. I also apply the same intuition for later proofs.
Appendix F. Proof of Lemma 5.3
In this section, I characterize the effort choices under the one-stopgap-strategy. Let k = 1
and in the equilibrium there are two different level of efforts: e11 and e
1
2. These efforts are
jointly determined by the following equations for a given w:
− c
′(e11)
p′(w + e11)
+
M(w)− β2m(1− p(δw + e12)){−c(e11) +M(w)} − βm{−c(e12) + p(δw + e12)M(δw)}
1− β2m(1− p(δw + e12))(1− p(w + e11))
= 0
(37)
− c
′(e12)
p′(δw + e12)
+
M(δw)− β2m(1− p(w + e11)){−c(e12) +M(δw)} − βm{−c(e11) + p(w + e11)M(w)}
1− β2m(1− p(δw + e12))(1− p(w + e11))
= 0
(38)
Equation (37) is the first-order condition of e11 for the militia’s utility function. Equation
(38) is the first-order condition of e12 for the militia’s utility function. In particular, when
δ is sufficiently small, the second term of (38) can be negative and increasing in δ. In this
case, I can conclude that e12 = 0 when δ < δ¯ = δ(βm|w). Now I start by showing the proof
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of the first part of Lemma, both effort choices are decreasing in the militia’s patience, βm.
∂e11
∂βm
=
Ω1
{c′′(e11)− p′′(w + e11)
c′(e11)
p′(w + e11)
}(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
< 0 (39)
Ω1 = −p′(w+ e11){2βm(1− p(δw+ e12))[p(w+ e11)M(w)− c(e11)] + [1 + β2m(1− p(w+ e11))(1−
p(δw + e12))](p(δw + e
1
2)M(δw)− c(e12))}/(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
= − 1
βm
(p′(w + e11)M(w)− c′(e11))− p′(w + e11)βm(1− p(δw + e12))V TSm < 0
∂e12
∂βm
=
Ω2
{c′′(e12)− p′′(δw + e12)
c′(e12)
p′(δw + e12)
}(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
< 0
(40)
Ω2 = −p′(δw+ e12){2βm(1−p(w+ e11))[p(δw+ e12)M(δw)− c(e12)] + [1 +β2m(1−p(w+ e11))(1−
p(δw + e12))](p(w + e
1
1)M(w)− c(e11))}/(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
= − 1
βm
(p′(δw + e12)M(δw)− c′(e12))− p′(δw + e12)(V TSm − (p(w + e11)M(w)− c(e11)) < 0
The proof of second part of Lemma, both effort choices are increasing in gain from holding
weapons after the war, M , is shown below.
∂e11
∂M
=
w(1− βm)(1 + βm(1− p(δw + e12))) + (1− δ)βmp(δw + e12)
{c′′(e11)− p′′(w + e11)
c′(e11)
p′(w + e11)
}(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
> 0 (41)
∂e12
∂M
=
δw(1− βm)(1 + βm(1− p(w + e11))) + δβmp(w + e11)
{c′′(e11)− p′′(w + e11)
c′(e11)
p′(w + e11)
}(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
> 0 (42)
The proof of third part of Lemma, the effort e11 decreases in the depreciation factor, δ, is
shown below. If e12 > 0, then
∂e11
∂δ
=
−wβmp′(w + e11){p(δw + e12)M ′(δw) + c′(e12)}
{c′′(e11)− p′′(w + e11)
c′(e11)
p′(w + e11)
}(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
< 0 (43)
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Otherwise, if e12 = 0, then
∂e11
∂δ
=
Ω5
{c′′(e11)− p′′(w + e11)
c′(e11)
p′(w + e11)
}(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
(44)
Ω5 = −wc′(e11)β2mp′(δw + e12)(1 − p(w + e11)) + p′(w + e11){wβ2mp′(δw + e12)(M(w) − c(e11)) −
wβm(p
′(δw + e12)M(δw) + p(δw + e
1
2))M
′(δw)}
= −wce11β2mp(1− p(w + e11)) + p{wβ2mp(M(w)− c(e11))− wβm(pM(δw) + p(δw))M}
The Ω5 is decreasing in δ and when δ is sufficiently small, Ω5 > 0 . The proof of last part
of Lemma, the effort e21 increases in the depreciation factor, δ, when δ ≥ δ(βm|w) is shown
below.
∂e12
∂δ
=
Ω6
{c′′(e12)− p′′(δw + e12)
c′(e12)
p′(δw + e12)
}(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12)))
≥ 0
(45)
Ω6 = wp
′′(δw + e12)
c′(e12)
p′(δw + e12)
(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12))) + wp′(δw + e12){(1−
β2m(1 − p(w + e11)))M ′(δw) − β2m(1 − p(w + e11))c′(e12)} = wp{(1 − β2m(1 − p(w + e11)))M −
β2m(1− p(w + e11))ce12} > 0
Appendix G. Proof of Lemma 5.4
In this section, I first show that e11 > e
SUL and then followed by e12 < e
SUL. To prove
that e11 > e
SUL, I compare the first-order condition for both effort choices, the equation 37
and 26. I do this by first assuming that e11 = e
SUL and study the sign of equation 37. If the
sign is positive, then
− (1− βm)M(w) + βmc(e
SUL)
1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL))
+
M(w)− β2m(1− p(δw + e12))[−c(eSUL) +M(w)]− βm[−c(e12) + p(δw + e12)M(δw)]
1− β2m(1− p(δw + e12))(1− p(w + eSUL))
(46)
which is determined by
p(w + eSUL)M(w)− c(eSUL)
1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL)) −
p(δw + e12)M(δw)− c(e12)
1− βm(1− p(δw + e12))
> (47)
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p(δw + eSUL(δw))M(δw)− c(eSUL(δw))
1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL(δw))) −
p(δw + e12)M(δw)− c(e12)
1− βm(1− p(δw + e12))
> 0 (48)
Lemma 5.2 suggests that (47) is greater than (48) because more weapon-in-hands gives
a greater utility to the militia. This result implies that e11 > e
SUL. Next I turn to compare
e12 and e
SUL which is determined below:
p′(δw + eSUL){mδw − βmV SULm (δw)} − c′(eSUL) = 0 (49)
p′(δw + e12){mδw − βmV TS1m } − c′(e12) = 0 (50)
The continuation value of period without weapon supply, V 1m, is greater than the continuation
value of supply-upto-level strategy, V SULm . This is because the weapon-in-hand for the first
case is greater or at least the same as those in the later. This suggest e12 ≤ eSUL(δw) ≤
eSUL(w).
Appendix H. Proof of Lemma 5.5
In this section, I show how the difference in effort choices change with the militia’s
patience, βm, and the weapon depreciation factor, δ. Below I show that the effort differences
are all increasing in βm.
∂e11
∂βm
− ∂e
SUL
∂βm
=
Ω1
c{(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12))}{1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL))}
> 0
(51)
Ω1 = β
2
m(1− p(δw + e12)){(1− p(w + eSUL))(pMδw − ce12)− (1− p(w + e11))(pMw − ce11)}
+βm{(1− p(w + eSUL))(pMw − ce11)− (1− p(δw + e12))(pMδw − ce12)}
+(pMw − ceSUL)− (pMw − ce11) is convex in βm.
∂e12
∂βm
− ∂e
SUL
∂βm
=
Ω2
c{(1− β2m(1− p(w + e11))(1− p(δw + e12))}{1− βm(1− p(w + eSUL))}
> 0
(52)
Ω2 = β
2
m(1− p(w + e11)){(1− p(w + eSUL))(pMw − ce11)− (1− p(δw + e12))(pMw − ceSUL)}
+βm{(1− p(w + eSUL))(pMδw − ce12)− (1− p(w + e11))(pMw − ce11)}
+(pMw − ceSUL)− (pMδw − ce12) is convex in βm.
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Appendix I. Proof of Lemma 5.6
In this section, I show how the effort differences change with δ. Lemma 5.1 suggests
∂eSUL
∂δ
= 0. Therefore, we have the following:
∂e11
∂δ
− ∂e
SUL
∂δ
=
∂e11
∂δ
(53)
∂e12
∂δ
− ∂e
SUL
∂δ
=
∂e12
∂δ
(54)
The results should follow those in Lemma 5.3.
Appendix J. Proof of Proposition 4
In this section, I compare the government’s welfare between supply-upto-level and 1-
period stopgap strategy by first establishing a sufficient condition as follows.
V TSg (w
TS)− V SULg (wSUL) > V TSg (wSUL)− V SULg (wSUL) =
p(w + e11)(∆
g −G(w)) + βg(1− p(δw + e11))p(δw + e12)(∆g −G(δw))
1− β2g(1− p(δw + e12))(1− p(w + e11))
−p(w + e
SUL(w))(∆g −G(w))
1− βg(1− p(w + eSUL(w)))
(55)
=
Ω
{1− β2g (1− p(δw + e12))(1− p(w + e11))}{1− βg(1− p(w + eSUL(w)))}
(56)
Ω = {p(w + e11)− p(w + eSUL)}(∆g −G(w))
+ βg{(1− p(w + e11))p(δw + e12)(∆g −G(δw))− (1− p(w + eSUL))p(w + e11)(∆g −G(w)}
+ β2g(1− p(w + e11)){(1− p(δw + e12))p(w + eSUL)(∆g −G(w))− (1− p(w + eSUL))p(δw + e12)(∆g −G(δw))}
(57)
Since the denominator is positive, this sign is determined by Ω and it is quadratic in βg.
Furthermore, Ω is positive when βg = 1 and βg = 0. I check the coefficient of β
2
g which
determines the convexity or concavity of Ω. I find that if G is large, Ω is concave and is
always positive. If G is sufficiently small, Ω is convex in βg. The next step is to check if Ω
ever goes below 0. To do so I first let Ω2 =
{(1− p(w + e11))p(δw + e12)(∆g −G(δw))− (1− p(w + eSUL))p(w + e11)(∆g −G(w)}2
−4{p(w+ e11)− p(w+ eSUL)}(∆g−G(w))}(1− p(w+ e11)){(1− p(δw+ e12))p(w+ eSUL)(∆g−
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G(w))− (1− p(w + eSUL))p(δw + e12)(∆g −G(δw))}
Ω2 is consisted of the square of the coefficient for βg minus 4 times the coefficient of β
2
g and
the constant term. If Ω2 < 0, then the function is always larger than 0 and V
TS
g > V
SUL
g .
If Ω2 > 0, then V
TS
g > V
SUL
g when βg is small or when βg is large. To show the sign of Ω2,
first let Θ1 = p(w + e
1
1)− p(w + eSUL) and Θ2 = p(δw + e12)− p(w + eSUL). I find that the
Ω2 can be rearranged as follows:
(∆g −G(w)){{(Θ2(1− p(w + e11) + Θ1)) + (1− p(w + e11))p(δw + e12)G(1− δ)w∆g −Gw }2
−4Θ1p(w + eSUL)(1− p(w + e11))p(δw + e12)
G(1− δ)w
∆g −Gw
}
The first term, (∆g − G(w)) is decreasing in G. For the second term, the first one is also
decreasing in G since the Θ2(1 − p(w + e11) + Θ1) is negative and (1 − p(w + e11))p(δw +
e12)
G(1− δ)w
∆g −Gw is increasing G. A larger G will lower the difference. The second one is
−4Θ1p(w+eSUL)(1−p(w+e11))p(δw+e12)
G(1− δ)w
∆g −Gw which is also decreasing in G. Therefore
Ω2 is decreasing in G and it can go below zero. As a result is sets an upper bound, G¯, for G.
Whenever G is greater than G¯, Ω2 is negative. This suggests large enough G would make
temporary stopgap strategy always superior to supply-upto-level strategy.
Appendix K. Proof of Proposition 5
In this section, I show that the V TS1g > V
SUL
g when βg is sufficiently small. Following
previous section, I show that the comparison is determined by the sign of Ω, Equation (57).
As previously discussed when G is small, Equation (57) is convex in βm. Furthermore if
G < G¯, β¯g
L
> 0 and β¯g
U
< 1 exist and V TS1g > V
SUL
g when βg < β¯g
L
or βg > β¯g
U
. However,
given that governments are generally not patient, in this paper I focus on discussing the
impatient governments.
Appendix L. Proof of Proposition 6
In this section, I show that the V TS1g > V
SUL
g when βm is sufficiently large. In or-
der to compare the government’s welfare, I take the difference of the government’s utility:
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V TSg (w
TS)− V SULg (wSUL) > V TSg (wSUL)− V SULg (wSUL) > V¯ TSg (wSUL)− V SULg (wSUL) =
p(w + e11)(∆
g −G(w)) + βg(1− p(δw + e11))p(δw + e12)(∆g −G(w))
1− β2g(1− p(δw + e12))(1− p(w + e11))
−p(w + e
SUL(w))(∆g −G(w))
1− βg(1− p(w + eSUL(w)))
(58)
=
Ω
{1− β2g (1− p(δw + e12))(1− p(w + e11))}{1− βg(1− p(w + eSUL(w)))}
(59)
Ω = (∆g −G(w)){p(w + e11)− p(w + eSUL)}
+ βg{(1− p(w + e11))p(δw + e12)− (1− p(w + eSUL))p(w + e11)}
+ β2g(1− p(w + e11)){(1− p(δw + e12))p(w + eSUL)− (1− p(w + eSUL))p(δw + e12)}
(60)
In equation (58), the first inequality holds since V TSg (w
TS) > V TSg (w
SUL). The second
inequality holds because V¯ TSg (w
SUL) is V TSg (w
SUL) but replacing the G(δw) with G(w).
Therefore if Ω is positive, then V TSg (w
TS) > V SULg (w
SUL).
Equation (60) can be arranged into a quadratic and convex function of βg and therefore
one-period-stopgap equilibrium is associated with a higher government welfare comparing
with those associated with supply-upto-level equilibrium if the following condition holds:
βg < β¯g =
p(w + e11)− p(w + eSUL(w))
{p(w + eSUL(w))− p(δw + e12)}(1− p(w + e11))
(61)
This result suggests that one-period-stopgap equilibrium is preferred if:
1. the government is less patient, a small βg, which aligns with Proposition 5.
2. the militia exerts more effort during the weapon supply period than the effort choice
under the supply-upto-level strategy and the effort choice during the stopgap periods
is also sufficiently large.
The later one can be achieved through conditions on βm and δ. Here I focus on the condition
on βm while the condition on δ is shown in the next section. To do so, I examine how β¯g
change with a larger βm. If β¯g is increasing in βm, then when the βm is sufficiently large so
that βg < β
L
g . This suggests V
TS1
g > V
SUL
g . To do so, I take the derivative over βm.
∂β¯g
∂βm
=
Ω1
(1− p(w + eSUL))(p(w + eSUL)− p(w + e12)))
(62)
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∂e11
∂βm
− (1− p(w + e11))
∂eSUL
∂βm
}
− p(1− p(w + e11)){p(w + e11)− p(w + eSUL)}(
∂eSUL
∂βm
− ∂e
1
2
∂βm
) > 0
(63)
The first term of Ω1 is positive since {(1−p(w+eSUL)) ∂e
1
1
∂βm
−(1−p(w+e11))
∂eSUL
∂βm
} is greater
than (
∂e11
∂βm
−∂e
SUL
∂βm
) which is positive shown in Lemma 5.5. The second term of Ω1 is positive
since (
∂eSUL
∂βm
− ∂e
1
2
∂βm
) is negative shown in Lemma 5.5. Therefore, when βm > βm(βg, δ|w),
V TS1g > V
SUL
g .
Appendix M. Proof of Proposition 7
In this section, I show that V TS1g > V
SUL
g when δ
L(βm, βg|w) < δ < δU(βm, βg|w). As
shown in the Appendix section L, the sufficient condition, βg < β¯g, implies that V
TS1
g >
V SULg , where
β¯g =
p(w + e11)− p(w + eSUL(w))
{p(w + eSUL(w))− p(δw + e12)}(1− p(w + e11))
(64)
In order to prove the proposition that δL(βm, βg|w) < δ < δU(βm, βg|w), I show that the β¯g
has a concave relationship with δ.
∂β¯g
∂δ
=
Ω1
(p(w + eSUL)− p(δw + e12))2(1− p(w + e11))2
(65)
Ω1 = p
′(w + e11)
∂e11
∂δ
(1− p(w + eSUL))(p(w + eSUL)− p(δw + e12))
+p′(δw + e12)(w +
∂e12
∂δ
)(1− p(w + e11))(p(w + e11)− p(w + eSUL))
Given Lemma 5.3, when δ is small, both
∂e11
∂δ
and
∂e12
∂δ
are positive. Therefore Ω1 is posi-
tive and so is
∂β¯g
∂δ
. This suggests that there is > 1δL > 0 such that V TS1g > V
SUL
g when
δL(βm, βg|w) < δ. On another hand, given Lemma 5.3 when δ is large, ∂e
1
1
∂δ
is negative and
∂e12
∂δ
is positive. But both
∂e11
∂δ
and
∂e12
∂δ
are both decreasing in δ (second-order condition)
and therefore
∂β¯g
∂δ
is decreasing in δ. Therefore, there exists 0 < δU < 1 such that the
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V TS1g > V
SUL
g when δ < δ
U(βm, βg|w).
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